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ABSTRACT

Since 1989, the co-riparian States of Georgia, Florida and Alabama have been locked in
an overt and institutionalized conflict to secure access to the waters of the ApalachicolaChattahoochee-Flint (ACF) River Basin. In 1997, in an effort to end this interstate conflict which
had earned the reputation as the longest water conflict in U.S. history, public officials at the
federal and state scales agreed to suspend all pending litigation against one another and
concurrently deployed a dispute resolution mechanism, known as ‘compact negotiations,’ in the
hope of equitably allocating the waters of the ACF Basin. Despite proclamations by public
officials, exclaiming their commitment to the process of compact negotiations and their desire to
see an end to the lingering conflict, 2014 marks the 25th anniversary of the bitter conflict over the
ACF waters and a sustainable resolution has not yet been achieved.
Against this background, this study provides an in-depth empirical explanation for why
multiple efforts to resolve the ACF conflict have been unsuccessful and largely
counterproductive. Using data collected from in-depth interviews with elite stakeholders and
archival data parsed from executive agencies, bureaucratic reports and media sources, this study
demonstrates that Georgia’s strategic efforts to (a) rescale water management authority in the
basin along neoliberal lines and (b) spatiotemporally displace demand- and supply-side
management policies, have allowed Georgia and metropolitan Atlanta to achieve water security
through a process of accumulation by dispossession. Finally, this study shows that Georgia and
Atlanta’s water security has compromised the authority of federal agencies to manage interstate
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waters, exposed the inability of the three riparian states to reach equitable compromise, and
demonstrated the Court’s express complicity in (re)producing uneven development in the
American South.
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CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION TO OVERT AND INSTITUTIONALIZED
WATER CONFLICTS

“With water conflicts, it’s not always about scarcity; it’s often about power”
(Ziyaad Lunat, Emergency Water Sanitation and Hygiene Task Force)

In September of 2012, the United Nations held a panel discussion on water security in
which topical experts offered their theories on the relationship between water, peace, and
political and economic security. With leading policy analysts, academics and government leaders
in attendance, the discussion quickly turned to the issue of shared transboundary water resources.
During the discussion, Patricia Wouters, a leading scholar on international water law, noted the
difficulties of facilitating non-adversarial political relationships between states competing for
water security in the face of freshwater scarcity, population and economic growth. For Wouters,
in order to prevent water insecurity from seguing into a threat to peace, governments must see
past their own territorial and economic interests and adopt a “duty to cooperate” (Global Water
Partnership 2012). For Wouters and Chen (2013), the “duty to cooperate” is not merely a moral
disposition but is a water policy doctrine based on diplomacy, which sees dialogue, interregional
cooperation and peaceful negotiations as cornerstones of peaceful international relations.
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That the United Nations organized a highly publicized roundtable discussion on water
security, which saw Nelson Mandela and Bill and Hillary Clinton in attendance among other
heads of state, is evidence that there is a growing research and policy interest in transboundary
conflicts over secure and reliable water sources (Utton 1988; Earl and Czerniak 1996; Wolf
1998; Glennon 2002; Jordan and Wolf 2006; Shiva 2002). Much of the literature on water
conflicts is dedicated to predicting and anticipating their occurrence, analyzing dispute resolution
mechanisms and determining how governance innovations can better manage competition over
water resources. Considerable attention is also being paid to the effects of drought-induced
scarcity – politicians, water managers and business elites are increasingly treating conflicts as
‘natural’ outcomes to the growing scarcity of shared water resources. And yet, positivist and
quantitative frameworks offer only partial insights and explanations to the issue of water
scarcity. Moreover, positivist explanations are ill-equipped to account for the many political,
economic and geographical nuances and complexities of the ACF conflict. This study seeks to
problematize the view that scarcity is produced ‘naturally’ by investigating the multiple ways
water conflicts are constructed and perpetuated on the ground, both materially and empirically,
by studying the longstanding water conflict over the ACF Basin.
For 25 years, the riparian States of Georgia, Florida and Alabama have been locked in a
seemingly intractable conflict over the freshwater of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint
(ACF) River Basin. The trigger for the conflict was a massive drought in 1986, which spread
across the entire southeastern U.S. and severely constrained the region’s available water supply.
As a result, the three states have spent a quarter century attempting to litigate and/or negotiate
their way to an allocation formula, which would determine how to equitably share the water in
the ACF Basin system. Despite state and local officials publicly proclaiming their commitment
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to achieve a resolution, it is questionable whether meaningful progress has been made. What is
considerably more certain is that for the foreseeable future, metropolitan Atlanta has solidified its
position as a regional water hegemon vis-à-vis Florida and Georgia.
Using a geographical historical materialist framework, this study seeks to provide an
empirically grounded understanding, which describes the geopolitical, geoeconomic and
geoecological significance of the ACF Basin to each of the stakeholders involved in the conflict.
Moreover, this study offers an historiographical account of the conflict as described by those
involved and explores why multiple efforts to resolve the conflict were unsuccessful and largely
counterproductive. Finally, this study will contextualize the states’ failure to negotiate a
resolution within a framework of competitive federalism and the scalar reconfiguration of water
governance along neoliberal lines.

Background of the Problem

As mentioned above, the interstate conflict over the waters of the ACF Basin began as a
result of a drought, which spread across the entire southeast region of the U.S. (Erhardt 1992;
Stephenson 2000; O'Day, Reece and Nackers 2009). The 1986 drought event was so severe that
meteorologists accorded it the distinction of a 100-year drought, meaning that the recurrence
interval of such an extreme drought was estimated to be between 100 and 200 years (Cook,
Kablack and Jacoby 1988). In 1989, in order to stave off the drought’s harmful effects on
metropolitan Atlanta’s water supply, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) decided that a
portion of storage capacity in Lake Lanier, metropolitan Atlanta’s largest water supply, had to be
repurposed from hydroelectric production to meet the region’s projected water demands (Jordan
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2006). In 1990, the State of Alabama filed a lawsuit against USACE, alleging that increasing
metropolitan Atlanta’s water withdrawals out of the lake would severely curtail Alabama’s future
economic development (Williams 1991). Shortly thereafter, Florida joined Alabama’s lawsuit
against USACE, alleging that the reduced water supply would also threaten its oyster industry
and the ecology of Apalachicola Bay (Beaverstock 1998).
Despite the persistence of the conflict, as well as its long-term implications for the three
riparian states, there is surprisingly little in-depth qualitative research, which critically explores
its underlying causes and dynamics. There is, however, a growing body of quantitative literature
which frames the problem as a legal and/or managerial dispute, including studies focusing on
water budgets and demand (USACE 1997; Peterson and Wallick 2006); the role of eastern water
law in instigating the ACF water conflict (Dellapenna 2006); and conflict resolution options
predicated upon game theory models (Wolf et al. 1999). However, despite numerous
quantitatively driven studies, significant gaps in the literature remain. Legalistic and economic
frameworks cannot convincingly explain the successive delays, missed deadlines and time
extensions with regard to the compact negotiations (Teegardin 1990; Eberly and Shelton 2008),
nor can they account for the failure of the courts to establish an equitable allocation formula
among the states. These explanations fall short and only serve to highlight the need for a new
framework to explain the perdurability of the water conflict.
Accordingly, this study addresses these limitations by providing a precise
historiographical account of the complexity of the water conflict over the last 25 years, in order
to systematically connect the various failures and delays of the water conflict to a number of
interconnected causes, including: (a) the institutionalization of water competition; (b) the
neoliberalization of water management; and, (c) the increasingly capitalist logic of
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regionalization that overwhelmingly serves the commercial and residential interests of
metropolitan Atlanta.

Central Research Question and Hypothesis

The central research question guiding this study is: Why has the longest water dispute in
U.S. history, the ACF River Basin conflict among the riparian States of Georgia, Florida and
Alabama, not yet been resolved? This study offers the hypothesis that as a result of its
preeminence in the South, metropolitan Atlanta was able to (a) outcompete Georgia’s southern
agricultural interests for intrastate water supplies; (b) recruit Georgia State officials to actively
compete for interstate water supplies on behalf of the city’s powerful urban and suburban
interests; and, (c) successfully leverage its geopolitical and geoeconomic clout in the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit so as to dispossess both Florida and Alabama of their
respective riparian rights to the waters of the ACF Basin. By virtue of metropolitan Atlanta’s
regional hegemony, the State of Georgia was forced to actively compete to secure the region’s
municipal water supply. As a result of the state-led effort to usurp water management authority
from USACE and remove the agency from compact negotiations, Georgia’s negotiators used a
series of “spatiotemporal fixes,” meaning that they strategically resolved their capitalist crisis of
water scarcity through temporal deferral and spatial expansion (Harvey 2003), in order to both
increase and guarantee the state’s consumption of water and grow its municipal, industrial,
recreational and, to a lesser extent, agricultural consumptive uses.
In order to fully explore this hypothesis, the central research question has been broken
down into four supporting research questions. Research question 1: What is the trend in respect
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of freshwater consumption by the various stakeholders to the ACF Basin conflict? What are the
sources and competing uses of water among the conflicting states? Research question 2: What is
the policy and regulatory framework that currently exists for the allocation and distribution of
the water resources among the three ACF riparian states? Research question 3: How did the
three states strategically orchestrate the failure of compact negotiations in order to push the
problem into the future and at the same time to develop facts on the ground? Research question
4: How have stakeholders in Atlanta used a discourse of water scarcity to construct a unique
interpretation of the water conflict, which differs greatly from the interpretations by stakeholders
of Florida, Alabama and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers?

Purpose of the Study

This study uses a variety of qualitative research methods. Structured and semi-structured
interviews with water regulators, state and federal policymakers, and major industrial
representatives are used to determine the trends in freshwater consumption among the various
stakeholders to the ACF water conflict, including the sources and competing uses of water
among the conflicting states. This data is then used to theoretically ground the stakeholders’
attitudes toward the conflict and toward one another, the unique and contingent obstacles facing
each stakeholder at various points during the conflict’s history, and each stakeholder’s goals and
strategies to resolve the water conflict.
Textual and discursive analytical techniques are then used to critically evaluate the
competing claims to power over the waters of the ACF Basin. Archival materials including
newspaper and journal articles, public pronouncements, public documents, and media campaign
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documents were collected, sorted and dramaturgically coded. Coded archival materials were then
used in combination with interview data to generate and triangulate a detailed historiography of
the conflict. The focus in this context is on the language employed to argue and propagate
selected strategic positions in regard to the water conflict.

Theoretical Framework

A common view among water law experts is that because the American South does not
have a long tradition of dealing with drought and water scarcity, it lacks coherent and integrated
water management policies and strategies (Erhardt 1992; Klein 2005; O'Day, Reece and Nackers
2009). However, this view mistakenly suggests that water management issues facing the South
are simple. Facing massive population in-migrations and runaway economic growth since the
post-war period, academic attention has only recently turned to the ‘southern’ approach to
managing water resources. In the meantime, the multi-decadal growth trajectories of Georgia,
Florida and Alabama have placed increasingly more complex and competing demands on federal
and state water managers. These contradictory demands often include protecting ecological
health without disrupting the molecular processes of capital accumulation. The unrelenting
competitive pressures for both capital accumulation and access to water have confounded
historical regimes of water governance, production and distribution.
Against this background, this study will apply an environmental-economic-geography
(EEG) framework to test the aforementioned hypothesis. This framework is adapted primarily
from the works of David Harvey (2001, 2003, 2007, 2009), Giovanni Arrighi (1978, 2004) and
Peck, Theodore and Brenner (2010) on structural capitalist crises. Crisis theory holds that
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capitalism, which is simultaneously a system of relations between capital and labor and an
economic system predicated upon capital circulation and accumulation (Harvey 1982), is
inevitably and necessarily prone to crisis. Crises can manifest as trends of overconsumption,
underconsumption, overaccumulation, underaccumulation, and a plethora of other circumstances
– all of which limit the ability of capital to circulate and produce value. Most germane to this
study are the crises of capital overaccumulation and of ‘natural’ limits. These respective crises
result in capital lying ‘dormant,’ ‘fixated,’ or ‘negated’ (Marx, as quoted in ibid, 85) and thus,
unproductive and unprofitable.
This study’s EEG framework treats metropolitan Atlanta’s suburban restructuring and
economic expansion as both distinctive responses to a crisis of overaccumulated capital, as well
as the causes of water scarcity. Recognizing that ‘natural’ is a contested term, Marx’s (1973)
concept of ‘natural limits’ will instead be referred to as a ‘biophysical limit’ to accumulation.
Within the literature on capitalist crises, Harvey (1981, 1989, 2001, 2003, 2010) identifies
spatiotemporal fixes as strategic responses to crises of overaccumulation. For Harvey,
geographical restructuring of the built environment and economic expansion into new markets
are two ways in which the disruptions of capital accumulation can be temporarily, although not
structurally, resolved. Thus, the concept of spatiotemporal fixes plays a central tenet in this
study’s theoretical framework.
This framework is useful in that it explains why, after World War II, Atlanta’s political
and economic elites sought to intitiate an economic transformation by expanding the region’s
transportation network and annexing underdeveloped counties surrounding the city. By
encouraging low-density suburban growth, Atlanta’s elites were able to transfer capital from less
profitable “hard” industries, like defense manufacturing, to more profitable “soft” services,
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thereby massively expanding residential real estate and commercial markets. The 1946 Lochner
Report and 1952 Plan for Improvement not only encouraged expansion of Atlanta’s spatial
economy, but strategically encouraged investment into projects with “long lag times between
investment and payoffs” (Sheppard 2004, 472), which thus acted as capital sinks providing future
streams of benefits to investors. This framework treats Atlanta’s expansion of residential real
estate and commercial markets as a strategic resolution to the crisis of capital overaccumulation.
However, this strategy was contingent upon producing water and thus, was only contested upon
Atlanta’s confrontation of the biophysical limits of water production in the ACF Basin.
In order to sustain metropolitan Atlanta’s post-World War II economic growth, Georgia
increasingly turned to managerialism to exploit existing water resources, on the one hand, and to
private sector ‘entrepreneurialism,’ on the other hand (Harvey 1989). In short, this means that the
states is increasingly seeking to acquire new sources of water to forestall a loss of
competitiveness, which inevitably results from a crisis of water scarcity. Although never
specifically applying the concept to biophysical limits, David Harvey (2003) introduced the
concept of a spatiotemporal fix to explain how economic and political elites have used strategies
of geographical displacement and temporal deferral to deal with capitalist crises of various kinds.
Therefore, this study will apply the concept of a spatiotemporal fix to yield a more
comprehensive and complex explanation of the ACF conflict. In this context, this study will
show how the State of Georgia, acting as a proxy for metropolitan Atlanta, confronted a
significant water shortage and sought to explore new avenues for resolving its water crisis by
exporting it to the territories of Florida and Alabama in the hope of creating both space and time
to deal with the problem. As Harvey (2010, 108), following Friedrich Engels (1845), argues,
“capital…never solves its crisis tendencies, it merely moves them around.” Similarly, it could be
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argued that the State of Georgia and metropolitan Atlanta, acting in their own territorial and
capitalist interests, are not actually solving their territorial water crises, but rather moving them
around to the riparian States of Florida and Alabama and, at the same time, deferring the search
for effective long-term solutions into the indefinite future. Thus, Harvey’s theory of
spatiotemporal fixes offers a compelling and systematic explanation for why the last 25 years
have not yielded any material progress in regard to equitably resolving what a former President
of the Metro Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, Sam Williams as quoted in Davidson (2007),
publicly declared as “an ongoing water crisis…the biggest and most imminent economic threat
to our region.”
In combination with Atlanta’s spatiotemporal strategies to deal with an interstate water
crisis, public and private officials have employed several discursive strategies to frame the crisis
as ‘natural,’ thereby allowing metropolitan Atlanta to justify water reallocations as a ‘correction’
of the region’s water problem. Similar to Maria Kaika’s (2003) exposé of the burgeoning water
crisis in Athens, Greece, a period of severe drought in the southeastern U.S. raised serious
concerns among metropolitan Atlanta’s public officials about the future prospects of economic
growth in the region. In the case of Athens, Greece, a drought-induced water crisis allowed the
newly elected, fiscally conservative government to initiate a strategic effort to commercialize
water production and distribution. According to Kaika, in order to justify the commercialization
of the publicly-owned distribution network, conservative politicians discursively framed the
drought as natural and unavoidable, thereby chilling political opposition and inducing
compliance and consent amongst the public to create, in effect, martial (water) law. Employing
this discursive sleight of hand, Greek water authorities successfully introduced drastic changes to
the water regime with limited public input and debate. Similarly, the discourse used to frame the
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water wars in the mainstream media (Seabrook 1999, 2000; Pruitt 2000; Shelton 2003a; 2003b)
has allowed the State of Georgia and metropolitan Atlanta to pursue their goals of constructing
Promethean projects to control the water situation, including new reservoirs and pipelines
(Kempner 1993; Wrinn 2000; Bennett 2009), in addition to increasing water prices for residential
consumers (Shelton 2003c), and gaining preferential access to freshwater resources over and
against their downstream riparians. By framing the region’s water problem as a crisis of scarcity
(Mehta 2005), metropolitan Atlanta may be seeking to justify water reallocations from Georgia’s
rural farmers, (Seabrook 2000) and the States of Florida and Alabama.
By extending Harvey’s conceptual framework to the scholarship on water and
supplementing it with theoretical insights from Kaika’s study of Athens, Greece, and Erik
Swyngedouw’s (2000, 2005a, 2007) studies of the ‘governance-beyond-the-state’ movement
with respect to water, this study seeks to contribute a new way of understanding and explaining
the long delays in the water compact negotiations. In this context, the almost 18 years of compact
negotiations will be treated as a hegemonic governance innovation. It is hypothesized that by
hijacking compact negotiations, a globally aspiring region like metropolitan Atlanta, which is
doing whatever it takes to secure sufficient quantities of freshwater in order to sustain its rate of
urbanization and economic growth, has been able to displace and delay its water crisis at the
expense of its regional competitors.

Organization and Chapter Outline

Following the introduction, this dissertation is organized into seven chapters. Chapter 2
will introduce and describe the methodological design, including the ontological assumptions
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and limitations of each selected method. Chapter 3 will contextualize the interstate water conflict
by describing the history of economic development and the urbanization of water in the
American South. Chapter 4 will build upon the history outlined in chapter 3 by spatializing the
effects of metropolitan Atlanta’s search for water. This chapter will also introduce competitive
federalism and demonstrate how the competitive logic for water became institutionalized in
southern water governance. Chapters 5 and 6 will introduce the views and opinions collected
with respect to the research questions and begin to situate the interview and archival data in the
aforementioned theoretical framework. Chapter 7 will analyze and interpret the data, which have
been collected for this study in order to provide answers to the central research question. Finally,
the concluding chapter will summarize the findings of this study and describe its limitations,
contributions to existing scholarship and also provide suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER TWO:

STUDY METHODOLOGY

Introduction to Methodological Design and the Interpretivist Approach

This doctoral dissertation is an exploratory and descriptive study seeking to provide an
empirical explanation as to why multiple efforts to resolve the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint
River conflict, otherwise known as the ‘water wars,’ have been unsuccessful and largely
counterproductive, despite 13 governors of the States of Georgia, Florida and Alabama
attempting for 18 years to negotiate a water compact before negotiations ended in 2008. By
making use of in-depth interviews with federal and state water managers, river and estuarine
biologists, water lawyers, compact mediators, regional economic planners, industrial recruiters,
environmental groups, oyster harvesters and state officials, this study of the tri-state ‘water wars’
provides an historiographical account of the conflict as told through the subjective lenses of
those involved. In addition, special attention has been paid to discursive clues found in
newspaper articles, policy memoranda, federal and state water studies, legal documents, press
statements and preexisting interviews-of-record which, it is hoped, provide additional insights
into the negotiating strategies and tactics used by competing stakeholders in order to either
maintain or secure greater access to the waters of the ACF Basin.
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This study has been conducted using a single-case study methodological design in order
to investigate how and why the actors and institutions involved in the ACF conflict have failed to
resolve one of the longest standing interstate water conflicts in U.S. history. According to Yin
(1994), a single-case study design, as opposed to a multiple-case design, is appropriate where the
phenomenon in question represents a critical, unique or revelatory case. Moreover, Walsham
(1995) finds that single-case study design is useful in that the researcher may gain a deeper
understanding of social processes at work and allows for exceptionally detailed descriptions of
actors and events. Accordingly, the approaches of Yin and Walsham are commensurate with the
study’s goal to capture the often-overlooked complexities and intricacies behind the ACF
conflict, particularly each state’s strategy to secure access to freshwater. It is of course the case
that the number of strategies and tactics used by hypothetical stakeholders to secure greater
access to any freshwater are potentially limitless, given wide variations in water geographies,
regional water laws, political milieus, industrial geographies and the stakeholders themselves, to
name only several factors from a long list of phenomenological variables.
Nevertheless, in order to capture the complexity of conflict strategies and gain a deep
understanding of research participants’ experiences as parties to the ACF conflict, this study has
adopted an interpretivist approach as described by Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991) and Walsham
(1995). This approach is based in the process of achieving Verstehen, which is often described as
a way of interpreting or finding particular meaning in an action by “grasping the subjective
consciousness or intent of the actor from the inside” (Schwandt 2003, 296; bolded for emphasis).
The interpretivist research paradigm maintains that it is indeed possible for a researcher or
interpreter to “get inside the head” of an actor, although this epistemological stance is the subject
of debate (e.g. Geertz 1979). However, it is the intent of this study to focus attention on the

	
  

14	
  

	
  
historical and cultural context in which actors act, thereby imbuing the complex voices and
actions of ACF conflict stakeholders with meaning (Darke, Shanks and Broadbent 1998), and
thus eliminating the need for multi-case study analytical comparisons between the ACF conflict
and other water conflicts.
By making use of the interpretivist approach, this case study offers new insights as to
why compact negotiations between the States of Georgia, Florida and Alabama have not yet
resulted in a permanent and equitable resolution of the region’s water woes. It is hoped that this
study will also make both theoretical and empirical contributions to the emerging body of
literature on the increasingly contested political economy of freshwater resources at all
geographic scales (Gleick 1993; Gandy 1997; Bakker 2002; Swyngedouw 2004), including
providing a coherent theoretical framework which is grounded in the strategic actions of key
political, bureaucratic and industrial stakeholders as they compete to either maintain or secure
greater access to freshwater from the ACF Basin. In combination, this study hopes to provide a
theoretically informed empirical explanation of the environmental and economic geographical
(EEG) dynamics of the conflict in order to contribute to the nascent body of literature on “water
resource management and water politics throughout the American south” (Meindl 2011, 616).

Single-Case Study Framework

According to Yin (2003), there are several factors that determine whether or not a singlecase study research framework is appropriate for the study phenomena. Single-case study design
may be appropriate when one or several of the following conditions are met: (a) when the study
intends to answer “how” and “why” questions regarding a phenomenon; (b) it is impossible or
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inappropriate to manipulate the behavior of those involved in a study; (c) it is believed that
contextual conditions may be relevant to the phenomenon in question; or, (d) the boundaries are
not clear between a phenomenon and context. An excellent example of the operationalization of
this methodological framework is the case study mentioned in chapter 1 by the environmental
geographer, Maria Kaika (2003, 2004), in which she investigated how the effects of an historic
drought in the Greek city of Athens were discursively constructed so as to legitimize the
implementation of new neoliberal governance practices in the water sector. This approach shares
much in common with the water conflict between the States of Georgia, Florida and Alabama
and will therefore provide a guide for this study.
Single-case study research is frequently used in historical, government and public policy
research, particularly among studies seeking to explore the multiple factors influencing the
formulation of public policies (Crow 2008). Moreover, this approach has been used to great
effect by a growing number of environmental geographers (e.g. Bakker 2002; Gandy 1997;
Jordan and Wolf 2006; Kaika 2004; Swyngedouw 1999, 2004) seeking to explore and describe
the multiple factors driving changes to water law and policy at all geographical scales. In
accordance with the environmental geographic studies listed above, this study uses a processbased unit of analysis to explore the ways in which information can lead to action (Rubin,
Pronovost and Diette 2001). In the context of this study, process analysis means exploring how
political and economic factors affect what is being done to drive (potential) changes to the
management and distribution of the waters of the ACF Basin.
Critics of single-case study design claim that this methodological framework is limited
by its inability to produce generalizable conclusions and also that it may tempt researchers into
amassing large amounts of unnecessary data. To deal with the first critique, some methodologists
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(Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss 1987) have attempted to operationalize the process of
inductive theory-building so as to allow for generalizable conclusions to be drawn. Still, other
methodologists (Yin 1984; Miles and Huberman 1994; Eisenhardt and Bourgeois 1988) have
criticized inductive theory-building as “prescriptive” and claim that it is unclear whether or not
non-generalizable conclusions are a strength or a weakness of case-study research. Table 1 below
displays the process of generating theories from case study research (Eisenhardt 1989). As
described in Step 5, this study will make use of a case-specific analytical technique known as
“triangulation,” which is the practice of employing multiple methods and data sources to secure a
deeper understanding of a particular phenomenon, in order to generate preliminary theories
explaining why the ACF conflict has not yet been resolved (Flick 1998; Denzin 1989a, 1989b).
In addition to producing non-generalizable conclusions, a second pitfall of case study research is
that researchers may easily become overwhelmed with data. The quote below demonstrates that
this pitfall plagued the study from the outset.

“I have received your email request concerning seeing all the documents on the ACF
water litigation issues. Please be aware there are over 100,000 pages of documents in
the Administrative Records” (USACE Department of Legislative and Public Affairs).

In order to avoid this common pitfall, Yin (2003), Baxter and Jack (2008) and Stake (1995)
suggest that establishing study parameters and bounding data are critical practices in single-case
study research which will limit data collection. The most common ways to bound data collection
are via time and place (Cresswell 1998), activity (Stake 1995), or definition and context (Miles
and Huberman 1994). The ACF conflict among the States of Georgia, Florida and Alabama
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began 25 years ago and has become the topic of thousands of published and unpublished legal
opinions, journal and newspaper articles, water studies and policy memoranda. Thus, to limit
data collection, this study is bounded according to the activity of litigation, negotiations and
other attempts to resolve the conflict (Stake 1995) so as to allow for a detailed exploration of the
factors underlying the failure to resolve the ACF conflict.

Table 1: Process of Building Theory from Case Study Research.

Source: Eisenhardt 1989.

Against this methodological background, the research question outlined in chapter 1 was
explored in this study by employing a variety of qualitative research methods. First, semi	
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structured interviews with key personnel involved in the ACF conflict were used to generate a
data set outlining the multiple and competing viewpoints for explaining the failure of the states
to negotiate a resolution. Second, this study made use of archival materials collected from
interviewees, federal and state water management agencies, newspapers, magazines, government
press releases and commissioned water studies, which have all been used to produce a detailed
chronological genealogy of the conflict including interested parties, relevant stakeholders and
key events that have taken place. Lastly, as mentioned earlier, as a researcher conducting
fieldwork related to an ongoing and current water conflict, several opportunities arose during the
data collection process to engage as a participant observer durings meetings and discussions
related to the production of water demand studies and also water management policies and
procedures.

Research Methods and Sampling Design

Conversational Methods

In line with the commonly accepted practice in qualitative research of sampling in order
to maximize the variation, or range, of interview responses (Weiss 1994), participation criteria
for this study were purposefully left broad so as to include the greatest number of stakeholders
willing to detail their experiences as parties to the ACF conflict. Moreover, the ACF conflict is at
once a politically, economically, legally and environmentally sensitive and divisive topic. As
will be discussed in chapters 6 and 7, due to the sensitive nature of this study and also because of
a court-imposed gag order preventing parties to the conflict from speaking, establishing “trust”
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with the research participants proved to be an exceptionally difficult task. The January 2010 U.S.
District Court Order stipulates that, “[t]he ongoing negotiations among the three States of
Alabama, Florida and Georgia concerning the issues presented by this litigation are, and shall
be kept, confidential.” The court order also states that “[t]his Order extends to all documents,
data or other materials prepared in anticipation of or exchanged in the course of such
negotiations and to all statements made during negotiations” (3:07-md-00001-PAM/JRK, see
Appendix A). In anticipation of potential participants being unwilling to go on record and speak
at length about the ACF conflict, a preliminary sample of research participants was constructed
from relevant documents and a snowball sampling technique was used to recruit additional
participants, where possible.
Snowball sampling is a chain-referral method, which relies on initial research participants
to refer others to participate in a study, thereby generating a larger sample. With this method,
participants recruit their peers to participate in the research in two ways. One, by providing the
researcher with contact information so that the researcher may contact the referred or two, a
“gatekeeping” method where the participant assumes control over the sampling process by
introducing the researcher to the referred (Groger, Mayberry and Straker 1999; Johnston and
Sabin 2010). As an advanced recruitment technique, snowball sampling can be helpful for
gaining access to hard-to-reach populations such as the deprived, the socially stigmatized, and
elite participants (Atkinson and Flint 2001) and is most appropriate for instances in which the
research is qualitative, exploratory and descriptive (Hendricks, Blanken and Adriaans 1992) and
also where obtaining respondents requires some degree of “trust” to initiate contact.
For a hard-to-reach research population such as elite policymakers and ACF water
managers, the only feasible way to gain access to this world was to initiate contact with a trusted
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confidant who was willing to “vouch” for the validity of the research and researcher.
Accordingly, a purposive sample of potential participants was constructed by reviewing source
materials such as newspaper articles, academic journals and other published accounts of the
conflict and then compiling the names and titles of every person, agency and institution relevant
to the conflict. Based on that preliminary sample of potential participants, contact was
established with each potential participant via one of three ways: e-mail, phone call, or in person.
On three occasions, I attempted to make contact with participants face-to-face by showing up to
events where they were scheduled to be in attendance and there sought to recruit them as
potential participants. At times, the source materials only provided an agency or institutional title
and not a name. In those instances, contact was established with either a press secretary or
communications officer via e-mail or a phone call and that person was recruited to seek out those
who were knowledgeable or who had participated in the ACF conflict.

Interview protocol

In order to avoid raising any suspicions among potential research participants as to the
purposes of this research, interview subjects were initially asked to participate in an in-depth
interview regarding their experiences and understandings of the water conflict. By representing
the research as a study focusing on their experiences, the confidential topics of politics, litigation
and compact negotiations were intentionally eschewed so as avoid being “shut out” by
participants wary of violating the aforementioned confidentiality by providing information
related to the ACF conflict. With participants aware of the limitations imposed on them by the
U.S. District Court, the potential existed for participants to deviate from the established interview
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path, which occurs frequently when interviewing the political elite even without a confidentiality
agreement in place (Lilleker 2003). Consequently, the protocol for conducting the semistructured interviews included a list of 15-20 potential questions and 3-5 potential subtopics,
which were used to “steer the interviews on to the desired course” (Lilleker 2003, 210) and keep
the discussions on topic when participants began to stray from answering the original interview
questions. According to Weiss (1994), preparing a list of potential questions and subject areas
allows research participants to lead the interview to interesting destinations while also providing
coherence and depth of meaning to their responses.
For the purposes of this study, 11 research participants agreed to an in-depth interview,
while 25-30 provided brief conversations and/or helped triangulate data collected from other
sources. The in-depth interviews continued until the participants had first detailed their
experiences as parties to the ACF conflict and either: (a) provided information related to conflict
resolution, or (b) until it became clear that the participant would not provide that information, at
which point, the interview was ended. Although the sampling method used here has been
successfully employed in other case studies of water conflicts (Lach, Rayner and Ingram 2005;
Samuelson, Peterson and Putnam 2003), theoretical saturation was not achieved in this study due
to court-imposed restrictions limiting data availability. As the quotes below indicate, in response
to requests for interviews, potential participants often declined, citing the District Court’s
confidentiality order as a reason for not participating.

“Any documents produced during compact negations are confidential, per judges’ orders,
which are attached” (State of Florida, Department of Environmental Protection Press
Secretary).
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“Because I continue to be employed by the State of Georgia, and because our water
negotiations with Florida and Alabama continue to be very active, I am afraid I must
respectfully decline to sit for an interview at this time” (State of Georgia Water
Manager).

“…With there being no signs of finality in the legal and political disputes, we feel it best
to keep our efforts focused on behind-the-scenes support in achieving a workable
resolution” (Georgia Chamber of Commerce Representative).

In an effort to supplement the limited number of interviews conducted, the collection of archival
data and document analysis was substantively enhanced in order to add methodological rigor and
offer a more comprehensive narrative with which to test the research hypotheses.

Elite participants and interview limitations

One of the major limitations of using qualitative interviews to generate data is that
conversational methods maintain an individualist focus and privilege the individual mind
(Gergen and Gergen 2003). The ontological assumption underlying the use of interview data to
explore the historiographical dimensions of the conflict and explore negotiating strategies is that
research participants can reify the “self” and offer an “authentic” story (Riessman 2005).
However, the notion of the individual as sole arbiter of knowledge has been challenged by
postmodern, constructionist, and dialogical epistemologies. Qualitative researchers like Haug
(1987) and Crawford, et al. (1992), for example, suggest that during the course of interview
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research, stories are co-constructed by researcher and participant through mutual dialogues and
(re)interpretations of meaning, making interview responses difficult or impossible to reproduce
and thereby limiting the conclusions which can be drawn from the data. Sikes (2000) provides a
second critique of the use of interview data, which involves questioning the authenticity of
stories constructed during a qualitative interview. Sikes warns that there is an extreme likelihood
that all qualitative researchers will, at some point, discover that participants have lied during the
research process and that this is even more likely when a researcher uses an explicitly
conversational approach to data analysis because there is a temptation for researchers to treat
interview data as fact and overlook data misrepresentations. Ozga and Gewirtz (1994) suggest
that lies and misrepresentations of events are even more common in interviews with elites than
with regular participants, because elites are very adept at constructing self-identity and are “very
aware of their place in the narrative they [constructed]” (Ozga 2000, 264).
In order to deal with the “authenticity” limitation of interview methods as described by
Gergen and Gergen (2003), and to validate the use of conversational methods in this study, a
technique known as “data triangulation” (Decrop 1999, 159) was applied to interview data. This
technique views interview data as a means of providing an alternate perspective to theories
generated from the analysis of textual and discursive documents in order to produce more
credible and reliable theories and “guard against the accusation that a study’s findings are
simply the artifact of a single method, a single data source, or a single investigator’s bias”
(Henderson 1991, 11). Yet, triangulation does not seek to “verify” or “validate” statements made
by research participants (Denzin and Lincoln 1994, 2). Accordingly, data triangulation does not
seek to verify that interview data has captured an “objective reality” in the way that Sikes (2000),
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Ozga and Gerwitz (1994) and Ozga (2000) describe. Rather, it should be understood as a strategy
to add depth to a study’s theoretical findings (Flick 1992).
Interviews with elites present a unique challenge to researchers using conversational
methods to study a given phenomenon. In qualitative literature, elites are commonly described as
individuals that occupy senior or middle management positions and who have institutional value
systems, industry experience, and a vast network of professional contacts. Recruiting participants
with these characteristics may present a challenge to researchers as the balance of power in the
interview space may shift away from the researcher and to the elite participant. In order to
overcome the power imbalance, Welch, et al. (2002) suggest that researchers strive to adopt the
persona of an informed outsider and present herself/himself as a powerful individual, both
professional and precise, while conducting the interview. Alternatively, some feminist
researchers (Dalton 2011; England 1994) suggest that researchers might strive to highlight the
power imbalance by adopting the persona of a supplicant while conducting interviews with elite
participants. For England (1994), researchers perform supplication in the interview space by
sharing topical knowledge with the elite participant, exposing the researcher’s weaknesses, and
addressing the researcher’s dependence upon the participant for information. Still, other
researchers claim that the power exerted by elites in their professional spaces will not necessarily
be exerted in the research space. Kvale (2007), for example, suggests that a researcher who
demonstrates a sound knowledge of the interview topic may be able to gain respect from the elite
participant by generating an interesting conversation and requiring the participant to derail from
“talk tracks” and pre-prepared viewpoints which they wish to communicate. In this context,
Smith (2006) suggests that the researcher remain flexible and able to adapt her/his approach to
the interview and participant by switching between informed outsider and supplicant.
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The overlapping complications of (a) interrogating power dynamics in the research space
and (b) determining who “controls” the study have both practical and epistemological
consequences when using a conversational method to conduct research. Herod (1999), for
example, argues that it is problematic to assume that the validity of one’s research can be tied to
one’s positionality and that performing insider/outsider personas do not necessarily produce
“more objective” or “truer” data. While this study recognizes the epistemological consequences
of performing “insider” and “outsider” personas while conducting interviews with elite
participants, it would be incorrect to assume that a researcher’s performance has no effect on the
ways in which knowledge is co-constructed by researcher and participant. Consequently, this
study used an approach advocated by Sikes (2000), in which reflexivity may provide the
researcher with a deeper understanding as to why participants respond to interview questions in
particular ways. Here, reflexivity is taken to mean the process of interrogating and questioning
oneself (Reinharz 1997, 5). Accordingly, this study preserved a reflexive position by maintaining
a detailed research journal with annotations describing any interactions between researcher and
participants ex ante and ex post interview sessions.

Archival Research Methods

For some, archival research is a process of finding, collecting, sorting and analyzing
various sources of materials which may be considered as study “data” (Rapley 2007). Other
archival methodologists, like McBurney and White (2009) and Jackson (2008), characterize
archival research as simply a process of collecting data which has been provided by other
researchers in order to test one’s own hypothesis. While both descriptions maintain that the use
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of existing source data can be an appropriate research method under certain circumstances,
McBurney and White (2009) and Jackson (2008), unfortunately, characterize the process of
collecting archival data as inherently “passive” or “neutral” with respect to the researcher. On the
contrary, with forms of data ranging from video recordings to audio recordings of interviews and
focus groups to newspaper and journal articles and photographs and maps, the researcher
becomes an active participant in the “production” of archival data by discovering and selecting
source materials and then collecting and cataloging them. Moreover, as a researcher collects data
to build a topically-specialized library of source materials, the sorting and analysis of one’s own
“researcher-generated” data may also be considered archival research (Rapley 2007, 9).
Due to the difficulties in recruiting participants to provide interviews, chaining was used
to generate archival data in the form of document-based sources. Chaining is an “informal means
of finding information” (Duff and Johnson 2002, 475) preferred by subject matter experts and
academic researchers (Green 2000; Tibbo 2003). This study’s collection of archival materials
was produced by using three archivist chaining techniques known as: (a) “keyword chaining;”
(b) “author chaining;” and, (c) “citation or footnote chaining” (Kaufmann 2007). To generate
chains for this study, background information was acquired by reading and browsing secondary
source materials in order to identify relevant keywords, authors and citations. Once a list of
relevant keywords, authors and citations was compiled, the terms and keywords were then
entered into academic databases, subject indexes, catalogs and search engines in order to
generate chains of increasingly relevant source materials related to the ACF conflict. This
process is akin to using source materials to build a source tree and “is an effective means of
retrieving the most relevant and highest quality secondary sources in the shortest period of time”
(Duff and Johnson 2002, 476).

	
  

27	
  

	
  
Archival protocol

In the context of this study, background information on the ACF conflict was found and
collected from four primary sources: (a) the digital archives and microfiche cards of the Atlanta
Journal-Constitution newspaper; (b) publications cataloged in the USACE Mobile, AL District
Command Library; (c) scholarly journal articles; and (d) technical publications and press releases
provided by research participants. Using the LexisNexis scholarly search engine allowed access
to the digital archives and microfiche aperture cards provided by the Atlanta JournalConstitution newspaper, dating back to the early 1900s. From there, keyword and author
chaining techniques were used to locate relevant newspaper articles, opinion pieces and
photographs by querying Advanced Boolean Phrases (Barker 2012) such as “ApalachicolaChattahoochee-Flint River AND compact negotiations” or “Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint
River AND litigation.” Accessing materials collected in the USACE Mobile District Library
proved to be slightly more challenging. According to an USACE Command Librarian, the
Mobile District Library, unlike many other USACE district libraries, does not provide reference
materials to the public unless accompanied by a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request
(Personal conversation, September 27, 2013). Because there are no standardized requirements for
how to file a FOIA request, each federal agency may establish its own specific requirements for
how to request source materials (U.S. Department of Justice 2010). The quote below from an
email conversation with a USACE FOIA specialist, demonstrates the challenge of locating
source materials from the USACE Mobile District Library.
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“While I have received and reviewed your FOIA request, below, you should be advised
that the scope and depth of your request falls well outside of the scope and authority we
can allow under the FOIA.

In order to process a FOIA request we would need you to identify specific material(s)
you are seeking to obtain. The FOIA does not allow for assistance in looking for
documentation, nor can we accommodate assistance in your research.

That said, I cannot take any action with regard to the FOIA with your request, but I
have passed your inquiry along to my supervisory chain, in the hope that they may be
aware of other resources which you may find useful for your research” (Personal
conversation, January 17, 2013).

Due to the limited accessibility of the USACE Mobile District Library, it was not possible to
locate relevant source materials firsthand by chaining and therefore, a legal counsel for the
USACE Mobile District and a Public Affairs and Legislative specialist, were recruited as
references to suggest and/or recommend which source materials may have been relevant to the
study.
In contrast, there are many easily accessible scholarly journal articles on the ACF
conflict. Keyword, author and footnote chaining techniques were all used to find and collect
relevant source materials and to provide increasingly more background information on the ACF
conflict. Furthermore, using this archival method revealed that there is surprisingly little in-depth
qualitative literature written on the topic of the ACF conflict and that the vast majority of

	
  

29	
  

	
  
scholarly research employs positivist legalistic and economic frameworks to explain the failure
to achieve a politically acceptable resolution, including studies that focus on water budgets and
demand (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 1997; Peterson and Wallick 2006); the role of eastern
water law in instigating the ACF water conflict (Dellapenna 2006); and conflict resolution
options predicated upon game theory models (Wolf, et al. 1999). This search method revealed
that despite the numerous quantitatively driven inquiries, significant gaps in the literature remain,
which only serves to highlight the need for new approaches to determine why the ACF conflict
has persisted for so long. Finally, several research participants volunteered to add source
materials to the study archive. While some high-ranking state water managers from Florida and
Alabama offered source materials as a way to support and clarify the narratives produced during
interview sessions, others like a Georgia State industrial recruiter, provided source materials as a
way to participate in the research while declining to sit for an interview.

Observational Methods and Protocol

Ethnographic research is a process in which a qualitative researcher studies a welldefined community, group of individuals or society by “getting in the field” and observing
and/or personally interacting with the research participants. Conducting ethnographic research
literally means “to describe the people” (Angrosino 2007, 1) and one of the most common
techniques for collecting data in this way is for a researcher to gain access to a community and
live alongside its members while observing their behaviors and dynamics. Yet, such simple
descriptions betray the nature of the strategic, analytical and ethical complexities inherent to
doing ethnographic research. Trend (1978) suggests that while conducting ethnographic research
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even trained methodologists often collect observational data unsystematically, which can lead to
researchers unknowingly invalidating her/his study by producing data that cannot be properly
analyzed or codified. Moreover, because ethnographic data is produced by a researcher who
must first observe the phenomenon in question and then interpet its significance, validating a
study’s findings requires researchers to determine what has been observed and what is significant
(Hansen 1979; Pelto and Pelto 1978).
Although this study was not designed to feature ethnographic methods, nor was
participant observation intended to be used as a method to collect data, two important
opportunities arose during the data collection process to engage as a participant observer by
attending meetings and discussion panels related to the ACF conflict. One was an April 2013
meeting of the governing board of the ACF Stakeholders group, which is described as “a diverse
group of individuals, corporations, and non-profit organizations throughout Alabama, Florida,
and Georgia that represent all of the interests within the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint
basin” (ACF Stakeholders 2013). Another was an informal group discussion between five water
managers across the three states and myself while attending the November 2012 American Water
Resources Association (AWRA) conference in Jacksonville, Florida. While at the ACF
Stakeholders governing board meeting, all of the statements recorded were volunteered by
members of the governing board without prompting. While at the AWRA conference, the
recorded conversation occurred in the context of a group discussion in which I was a participant.
Accordingly, some statements were offered spontaneously while others were prompted or
elicited by members of the group.
In contrast to Trend (1978), who argues that observational data must be produced
systematically in order to ensure validity, this study recognizes that it is impossible to control all
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elements in the research process (Angrosino 2007) and that there is no single accepted strategy
for collecting observational data in the field (G. Gibbs 2007). The opportunities to participate in
and observe group meetings and discussions is attributed more to serendipity than to strategy.
Although unplanned, these discussions offered unique perspectives on the ACF conflict and have
been treated in the same way as interview data, including reflexively reviewing field and
research journal notes (Sikes 2000) to provide a deeper understanding as to why participants
offered their statements.

Data Treatment: Discursive and Textual Analysis

In-depth semi-structured interviews with federal and state water managers, river and
estuarine biologists, water lawyers, parties to the compact negotiations, regional economic
planners, industrial recruiters, environmental groups, oyster harvesters and state officials were
used to gather exploratory and descriptive data on the underlying causes of the ACF conflict and
the failure of the three states to negotiate a resolution. The interviews were audio recorded and
then transcribed into Microsoft Word (.docx) format using a peer-to-peer transcription service
known as oDesk, which uses a secured and encrypted connection to transfer data files between
customers and transcriptionists, in order to maintain privacy and data confidentiality (oDesk
2013).
After receiving transcribed documents, the files were uploaded to the NVivo 9 qualitative
data management software, where narrative analytical techniques were used to examine and code
the research participants’ accounts of the conflict and compact negotiating process by developing
analytical themes in the data. The themes were then cross-referenced to supplement the data
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collected from archival source materials. Secor (2010) describes narrative analysis as a process
of aggregating or condensing data according to emerging themes, which places significance upon
the content of the participants’ stories, how the stories are composed, any (implicit or explicit)
historical knowledge necessary to understand the specific context of the stories, and the strategic
purposes the stories serve. Emerging themes were identified using an approach suggested by
Riessman (2005), in which themes are coded according to descriptive details and events that
interviewees select as important, why the selected details and events are significant, how
multiple and overlapping details and events are condensed into fluid stories, and how details and
events are connected to one another.
The transcribed interviews were treated as textual data and thematically coded
recognizing that each theme may offer only partial insights into the water conflict, and that
interview data may, to differing degrees, diverge from the data collected from other sources.
Statements made by research participants and their descriptions of events were used to provide
an alternate perspective to theories generated from the analysis of textual and discursive
documents, as suggested by Decrop (1999), and offer deeper insights to the ACF conflict than by
evaluating data obtained elsewhere (Lilleker 2003). Interview data and archival source materials,
however, do not have a single putative meaning (Codd 1988) as these texts are socially
constructed and produced for an intended audience, which requires locating them in the social,
cultural, local and regional context within which they were produced (van Dijk 1997). For
example, the USACE Master Water Control Manual is in the process of being updated in order
to “improve operations for authorized purposes to reflect changed conditions since the manuals
were last developed…to enable managers to strike the best balance possible for the many
purposes and demands [on the ACF River Basin]” (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2013).
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Clearly, the Master Water Control Manual update is intended for “water managers” to “improve
operations” and should not, therefore, be taken at face value. Rather, data collected from textual
sources require critical analysis. In this context, this study drew on Fairclough’s (1995, 2003)
method of critical discourse analysis (CDA). As Fairclough states, “discourse” is a way of
representing aspects, or themes, of the social world from a particular ideological angle, where
“ideology” contributes to asymmetrical social relations of power. Texts, therefore, “have causal
effects on…people (beliefs, attitudes, etc.), actions, social relations, and the material world”
(Fairclough 2003, 8-9, 129).
In order to analyze the relationship among discourse, ideology and power, Fairclough
developed a three-dimensional framework for CDA, built on the dialectical relationship between
discourse as text (the properties of the text itself), discourse practice, and discourse as sociohistorical context. The three levels correspond with three types of analysis: descriptive text
analysis (content, form and linguistic features); processing analysis (text production and
consumption/interpretation); and explanatory social analysis (institutional contexts and
ideologies) (Fairclough 1995, 96-111). It is important to understand that words are politicized, as
they “carry the power that reflects the interests of those who speak” (McGregor 2003, 46), and
that discourse assumes a hegemonic function in the “engineering of consent” (Codd 1988, 235).
As regards CDA in this study, an exhaustive and systematic use of this technique would
be impossible because of the large volume of data that was collected and analyzed. However,
Fairclough’s (1995, 2003) techniques of textual description, interpretation and explanation have
been applied to interview data and archival materials, where appropriate, to reveal their
hegemonic or counter-hegemonic functions and the purposes for which they were constructed by
the competing parties to the ACF conflict. Likewise, the positionality of interview participants is
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described in the study’s field notes and research journal. Finally, the analytical treatment of the
various interviews and archival materials in the study has been combined with dramaturgical
coding.

Dramaturgical Coding

Dramaturgical coding is a directed technique of document analysis which is useful for
analyzing the firsthand experiences and actions of participants engaged in a conflict (Saldaña
2009). This directed coding technique can use predetermined and/or emergent themes, based in
existing theory, to code a textual document and reveal the causes of a conflict and also strategies
to achieve a resolution (Potter and Levine-Donnerstein 1999). Some of the more common
predetermined themes used in dramaturgy include, but are not limited to: (a) conflict
participants; (b) obstacles to achieving each participant’s goals; (c) strategies to overcome
obstacles; (d) emotions of conflict participants; (e) attitudes expressed toward other participants
and toward the conflict, in general; and, (f) participants’ unspoken thoughts or impressions
(Saldaña 2009, 102-103). While the strength of this analytical technique is that it allows the
researcher to draw inferences about actors’ motives, strategies, and tactics when engaged in a
conflict, a primary limitation of dramaturgical coding is that the motives of actors are inferred by
the researcher and can, therefore, be interpreted incorrectly (Saldaña 2009). A second limitation
of this technique is that using predetermined themes, as opposed to constructing a grounded
theory, can bias the identification of themes in the text, thereby limiting thematic specificity and
leading researchers to find evidence in support of their hypotheses rather than disputing them
(Hsieh and Shannon 2005).
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In order to overcome thematic identification bias, as described by Hsieh and Shannon
(2005), a hybrid coding procedure developed by Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006) was applied
to code this study’s textual documents. The six-stage procedure developed by Fereday and MuirCochrane (2006) has been adapted from Boyatzis (1998) and Crabtree and Miller (1999) and
includes: (a) developing the code manual; (b) testing the reliability of codes; (c) summarizing
data and identifying initial themes; (d) applying a template of codes and additional coding; (e)
connecting the codes and identifying themes; and, (f) corroborating and legitimating coded
themes.
In the context of this study, the code manual was first developed using predetermined
dramaturgical codes adapted from Saldaña (2009). Because many of this study’s research
participants consented to interviews on the condition of complete anonymity, and evaluating the
reliability of codes requires independent reviews by auditors (Boyatzis 1998; Hsieh and Shannon
2005), it was determined that the reliability of codes would be confirmed by the researcher’s
knowledge of the conflict, as acquired by “chaining” (Duff and Johnson 2002; Green 2000;
Tibbo 2003). Recognizing that this is not a perfect solution to the problem, this was the only
feasible way to legitimate the use of codes without violating the privacy and confidentiality of
research participants. Next, via the suggestions of Boyatzis (1998) and Fereday and MuirCochrane (2006), texts were read, re-read and summarized before codes were applied to the data
in order to “consciously [process] the information” (Boyatzis 1998, 45). Steps (d) and (e) were
combined into one where Saldaña’s (2009) predetermined themes were applied to the texts
alongside themes which emerged from the data such as descriptive details and events, the
significance of details and events, how the multiple and overlapping details and events were
condensed into fluid stories, and how the details and events were connected to one another
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(Riessman 2005). Finally, codes and themes were corroborated by using the analytical functions
of the NVivo 9 software, including “word frequency queries,” “coding queries” and “cluster
analysis,” as well as by the researcher upon subsequent reviews of coded documents.
The following chapter offers a select historiography of metropolitan Atlanta’s growth
from an agricultural-dominant economy to a hegemonic region in the American South. In the
context of the ACF conflict, it is important to first contextualize the conflict with respect to
metropolitan Atlanta’s rapid rise from a stopover destination to a global-aspiring region. Only
then does it become clear that Atlanta’s geographic restructuring is driving the region’s thirst,
and subsequently, its search for a secure source of freshwater.
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CHAPTER THREE:

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF SOUTHERN DEVELOPMENT

New Deal Agenda

Three years after the great stock market crash of 1929 and the unprecedented economic
depression that followed, Democratic Presidential candidate, Franklin D. Roosevelt, outlined a
policy agenda designed to radically transform the social and economic geographies of American
society. At a time when the U.S. was reeling from the collapse of uninsured banking institutions,
the sudden and drastic decline of stock valuations and agricultural underproduction due to the
Dust Bowl on the Great Plains and the Mississippi Valley drought, Roosevelt shaped a sweeping
national response to the crisis founded upon the expansion of federal welfare policies. After
being elected in 1932, Roosevelt declared his agenda to be America’s New Deal, which was to
usher in a new era of political and economic liberalism (Edsforth 2000). During his 1937 State of
the Union address, Roosevelt explained, “the most far-reaching and the most inclusive problem
of all is that of unemployment and the lack of economic balance” and that “fluctuations in
employment are tied to all other wasteful fluctuations in our mechanism of production and
distribution” (Roosevelt 1937). The wasteful fluctuations Roosevelt referred to were what he
called the “three evil sisters” of overproduction, underproduction and speculation, which he
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believed were leading to unpredictable rates of production, mostly affecting the commodity and
agricultural markets (Skocpol and Finegold 1982).
While also seeking to stabilize chronic production fluctuations plaguing domestic
commodity and agricultural markets, Roosevelt believed that full employment of the labor force
was the most important precondition to economic recovery. Studies have estimated that between
the years 1931 and 1937, civilian unemployment ranged from 14.3% to 24.9%, meaning that at
the height of the Great Depression, nearly 1 in 4 American laborers were out of work (Smiley
1983). Meanwhile, a growing contingent of liberal economists, inspired by John Maynard
Keynes, provided Roosevelt the intellectual justification for deficit spending as a way to “inject
government funds into circulation” (J. Smith 2006, 137). Roosevelt, drawing from various
adaptations of Keynes’ work published by American economists such as Chase, Currie, Eccles
and Ezekiel, began to view public works projects as the necessary vehicle for absorbing capital
investments (J. Smith 2006). Deficit spending as a means to fund public works projects
effectively resolved the economic crisis, at least for a short while (Harvey 2003), by investing
surplus money capital in infrastructure and putting excess labor power to work constructing
public works projects. As a result, between 1933 and 1939, more than two-thirds of federal
emergency expenditures were allocated to public works programs, representing a 1,650%
increase since 1929 (J. Smith 2006), thereby “growing state interventionism in the name of
economic stability” (Harvey 2001, 31).

	
  

39	
  

	
  
Developments in the South

The Southern economy fared poorly during the Great Depression. The three evil sisters of
overproduction, underproduction and crop value speculation caused agricultural markets to be hit
particularly hard. With a large number of laborers employed in agriculture and with per capita
incomes roughly half the national average: $313 versus $619 (U.S. Department of Commerce
1984), pockets of extreme poverty existed throughout the rural American South (Wallis 1989).
For Roosevelt, federal expenditures in southern states were not only intended to resuscitate a
lagging agricultural sector, but also to modernize a region plagued by diseases such as typhoid,
diarrhea and malaria due to inadequate swamp drainage, faulty water and sewer systems and the
uneven production of electricity (Wright 2009). The largest public works undertaking in the
southern states was undoubtedly the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) project and between
1933 and 1941, seven major dams were constructed under the authority of the Works Progress
Administration (WPA). By early 1942, the TVA’s construction employment reached a peak of
28,000 laborers (Tennessee Valley Authority 2013).
Much like the urbanization projects sweeping through Europe at the end of the 19th and
beginning of the 20th centuries, the construction of New Deal dams across the American South
went hand in hand with the desire to expand and modernize humble cityscapes. Having secured
roughly $2 billion ($28 billion in 2013) of capital investments and federal grants, many southern
cities were able to upgrade water production and distribution networks free of cost, while prior to
the New Deal, the very same cities lacked either the financial capabilities and/or political will to
provide residents with even the most basic of services (Wright 2009). For example, in 1932,
roughly 33% of the U.S. urban population lacked access to treated drinking water, but as a result
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of freely circulating capital and the urbanization of water (Kaika 2006), this number was
virtually zero by the end of 1940 (Tarr 1988).

World War II and the Effect on Federal Public Works

Alongside America’s involvement in World War II, the decade of the 1940s marked an
important turning point in the history of public works projects, transforming both the purpose
and configuration of dam construction. While dams of the 1930s were constructed in order to
help achieve the nation’s goals of modernizing urban geographies and to deliver water to city
residents, dams built in the 1940s were primarily designed to serve the industrial war effort by
supplying electricity to oil refineries and military-contracted manufacturers (Billington, Jackson
and Melosi 2005). Between 1940 and 1945, total reservoir storage was increased at nearly all
federally managed dams, with some regional dams increasing storage by a magnitude of five
times and in a few instances, even more (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 1996). This change
signaled the beginning of the Big Dam Era, in which the massive structures were pushed to their
engineering and operational limits in the hope of “maximizing the ‘efficient use’ of a vital natural
resource” by providing water for multiple needs, primarily the production of electricity but also
irrigation and municipal water supply (Billington, Jackson and Melosi 2005).
As World War II drew to a close, production of water infrastructure once again shifted
focus, although this time not as drastically. Rather than focusing primarily on electricity
production, post-war period dams were increasingly authorized as multipurpose projects
constructed to serve the needs of improved navigation, irrigation and flood control, in tandem
with electricity production. Congress embraced the idea of multipurpose dam projects as early as
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1907 (Teclaff 1967). However it was not until changes to the federal accounting system in the
1940s that these projects became economically feasible and began to dominate the landscape
(Reisner 1986). According to a series of leaked USACE documents (Douglas 1952; Grunwald
2000; 2007), during the 1940s and 1950s, USACE officials often grossly inflated the projected
benefits of public works projects while simultaneously underestimating the costs in order to “get
to yes.” For Atlanta, multipurpose dam projects promoted industrial diversification and reputed
the city as a highly diversified regional metropolis comparable to Dallas, Kansas City,
Minneapolis-St. Paul, Denver and Cincinnati (Rodgers 1957; Goodrich 1945).

“As I see it, the benefits to Atlanta from such a [multipurpose dam] project would be
manifold: (1) the profit from the production and sale of electric power; (2) the profit from
the production and sale of forest products; (3) the protection of the city’s water supply,
including protection from stream pollution; (4) the use of the park for recreation
purposes-fishing, hunting, hotels and tourist cabins; (5) the construction of toll roads for
use by motorists. All these activities count up into big money and there is no reason why
Atlanta should not follow the lead of cities like Cincinnati and go in for this kind of
business. Such an investment made now will certainly reap huge rewards 15 or 20 years
from now” (Ernest P. Goodrich 1945).

Rivers and Harbors Acts of 1945 and 1946

In 1945, the 79th U.S. Congress approved a Rivers and Harbors Act (RHA), which
authorized the construction, repair and preservation of a number of public works projects. The
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public works projects authorized by the legislation were to be constructed “in the interest of
national security and the stabilization of employment” (79th U.S. Congress 1945, 2) as “facilities
adapted to possible future use in the development of hydroelectric power” (ibid, 3). Then, one
year later and prior to construction of the projects, Congress amended the 1945 authorization
with the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1946. The 1946 Amendments contained an attached report by
USACE Lt. General R.A. Wheeler, which outlined a comprehensive plan for basin wide
improvements to the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River system (R. Wheeler 1946). As a
result of this addition, the legislative language was narrowed and specified so as to record the
specific congressional intent behind authorizing 50 public works projects spanning across 30
states.
Among the 50 public works projects authorized by the 1946 amendments was the Buford
Dam, which was explicitly suggested by Lt. General Wheeler. Prepared in conjunction with
USACE Brigadier General James Newman, the Wheeler Report called for construction of the
Buford Dam in order to control floods and generate hydropower and it was to be located near
Gainesville, Georgia, approximately 45 miles northeast of Atlanta (Rivers and Harbors Act, 1946
Amendments). Created by way of the Buford Dam, construction of Lake Sidney Lanier was
authorized as an impoundment for the Dam’s runoff, with a surface elevation of 1,071 ft. above
mean sea level and flood storage capacities up to 1,085 ft. (Tetra Tech, Inc. 2003).
By attaching the Wheeler Report to the 1946 RHA Amendments, Congress further
clarified the legislative intent as, in addition to the language of the act, the report specifically
noted that hydroelectric production was the primary benefit resulting from the construction of the
projects. In addition to hydroelectric production, the amendments added that public works
projects were approved contingent upon them being utilized and managed in the public interest
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to strike a balance between three primary benefits of hydroelectric production, navigational and
flood control. Following those three primary benefits, the legislative text also declares: (a)
irrigation and (b) “purposes incidental [to works of improvement of rivers, harbors, and other
waterways]” to be secondary benefits to the works of improvement (Rivers and Harbors Act,
1946 Amendments, 634). Similarly, in the Wheeler Report, construction of the Buford Dam was
justified on the grounds that it would provide the primary benefits of flood control and
hydroelectric production. However, additional benefits of the Buford Dam included in the
Wheeler Report were improvements to navigation coming via nine foot deep channels alongside
the Apalachicola River and a municipal water supply for the City of Atlanta coming via storage
allocated in Lake Lanier for this purpose (Sherk 2005). Although navigation and municipal water
supply were listed as benefits originating from the construction of the Buford Dam and Lake
Lanier, the primary purposes for which the 79th U.S. Congress allocated the project funds is a
highly disputed fact (Rankin 2009; Chapman and Keefe 2009; Department of the Army, Office
of the Chief Counsel 2012). As shown in Figure 1 below, a 1945 pronouncement by then-Mayor
of Atlanta, William Hartsfield (1937-1941, 1942-1962), suggested that Buford Dam would
provide the region with an “adequate water supply…for all time.” However, Hartsfield’s 1945
proclamation was turned on its head only three years later when he exclaimed in a (1948) letter
to U.S. Representative James C. Davis (D-GA):

“Frankly, in our zeal I think we have just laid too much emphasis on the Chattahoochee
as a water supply…In our case the benefit so far as water supply is only incidental and in
case of a prolonged drought. The City of Atlanta has many sources of potential water
supply in north Georgia. Certainly a city which is only one hundred miles below one of
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the greatest rainfall areas in the nation will never find itself in the position of a city like
Los Angeles…[I]n view of other possible sources of Atlanta’s future water we should not
be asked to contribute to a dam which the Army Engineers have said is vitally necessary
for navigation and flood control on the balance of the river.”

Similar to Hartsfield’s conflicted views regarding Buford Dam and Atlanta’s municipal water
supply, the purpose of the dam’s construction is currently the subject of debate and is a
disagreement, which is ongoing despite a 2011 ruling by the Eleventh U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals. Given the complicated history of the ACF conflict, the disagreement is not likely to be
definitively settled until all opportunities to appeal have been exhausted.

	
  
Figure 1: News Clip from the Atlanta Journal Constitution, “'Waterfront' for Atlanta Imperative, Officials Say”,
April 1, 1945.
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Construction of the Buford Dam and Lake Sidney Lanier

	
  

As Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5 show below, on March 1, 1950, authorities led a groundbreaking

ceremony for the Buford Dam, thus marking the beginning of a seven-year construction project
(U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2006). Crowds, including Georgia Governor Herman Talmadge,
gathered in Forsyth County to celebrate the project, which Congress provided to metropolitan
Atlanta without expectations of repayment for its benefits and which would generate “millions of
dollars worth of value annually from hydropower generation, flood control, and
navigation…estimated at $3,377,000 annually [($31 million in 2013)]” (Department of the
Army, Office of the Chief Counsel 2012, 8,9).

	
  
Figure 2: Buford Dam Groundbreaking Ceremony, Hall County.
Source: Georgia historical photograph collection, Hall County Library System.
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Figure 3: Photograph of Crowd at Buford Dam Groundbreaking, Georgia, 1950, Mar. 1.
Source: Vanishing Georgia, Georgia Division of Archives and History, Office of Secretary of State.

Figure 4: Photograph of Groundbreaking for Buford Dam, Georgia, 1950 Mar. 1 (to the far left is Georgia Gov.
Herman Talmadge).
Source: Vanishing Georgia, Georgia Division of Archives and History, Office of Secretary of State.
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Figure 5: Photograph of Construction on Buford Dam, Forsyth County, Georgia, c. 1950-1953.
Source: Vanishing Georgia, Georgia Division of Archives and History, Office of Secretary of State.

The Rise of Metropolitan Atlanta

Atlanta’s Growth in a Southern Context

A large city by the standards of the American South, Atlanta’s population surpassed
100,000 by the beginning of the 20th Century. With a modest population of only 11,000 residents
at the beginning of the Civil War, Atlanta’s rapid population growth and superior railway
infrastructure propelled it to become Georgia’s largest economic region by 1895, overtaking the
port city of Savannah and the old manufacturing centers of Augusta, Macon and Columbus. Over
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the next 50 years, the City of Atlanta cemented its position as a leading beneficiary of investment
capital from northeastern cities, in part because of aggressive and highly successful advertising
campaigns highlighting Atlanta’s booming cotton and textile industries and also portraying it as
an important stopover destination connecting the cities of New York and Miami (Hartshorn and
Ihlanfeldt 2000).
Atlanta benefited greatly from flows of northeastern capital investment leading up to the
1950s, thus allowing the city to garner a reputation as a significant industrial center in the South,
if only for its production of non-durable goods. Meanwhile, many of the region’s old
manufacturing centers (Birmingham, Alabama is the classic example) experienced drastic
declines in production output while facing ever-increasing pressure to converge into the national
economy (Wright 1987). Federal policies to standardize wages and labor conditions further
increased economic competition between the North and South and ultimately contributed to an
out-migration trend of low-skilled workers, particularly black teenagers, who constituted the
majority of the labor market in many industries, such as lumberyards and steel and sawmills
(Cogan 1982). Although the passage of national wage and labor regulations resulted in the
targeted decline of many labor-intensive industries in the South (Van Sickle 1943), the region
overall experienced a dynamic growth of its economy, making progress toward closing the per
capita income gap between North and South (Wright 1987).
In contrast to the volatile market conditions plaguing the national economy overall,
which resulted in highly variable rates of growth, Southern development remained remarkably
consistent during the war period. With abundant oil and natural gas refineries, weak labor unions
and a laissez-faire approach to business regulations, the South was a leading destination for
federal funds allocated to defense contracts, thereby encouraging the growth of higher wage
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sectors of the regional economy (Malecki 1984; Markusen 1985; Wright 1987) and thus marking
the beginning of what Cypher (2007) and Custers (2010) call “military Keynesianism.” But,
while the allocation of military contracts and relocation of defense industries, such as Delta
Airlines, to the South suggests a national vested interest in further developing and modernizing
the region’s economy (Whitelegg 2000), policies formulated by Southern economic and business
elites truly defined the trajectory of the region’s future growth.
By the end of World War II, factions representing metropolitan Atlanta’s business elite,
led by utilities, banks, land developers, media and other commercial interests grew increasingly
aware of the need to transform the region’s then-dominant modes of production from defense
manufacturing and “heavy” industries to “soft” services (Stone 1989). Key to achieving this
transformation were coordinated efforts by Atlanta’s downtown business elites to secure the
requisite votes and funds allowing for redevelopment of Atlanta’s central business district.
Moreover, building political coalitions across the existing ward-based governance structure
allowed business elites to complete the pre-war efforts by Mayor William Hartsfield to clear
inner-city slums and public housing in order to encourage suburban development, as shown in
Figure 6 (Rice 1983; Stone 1989). However, water department officials in metropolitan Atlanta’s
East Point, College Park and Hapeville suburbs voiced opposition to Hartsfield’s expansionary
project. As early as 1940, water managers from the three districts claimed that Atlanta’s
“inconsistent water supply” had been a major inconvenience to the southern suburbs for several
years, leaving residents to deal with “insufficient water pressure and inadequate supply during
dry spells” (Atlanta Journal Constitution 1940). Despite the warnings only several years earlier,
in 1944, Atlanta officials initiated a plan which would comprehensively restructure the entire
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metropolitan region and thus, provide a means of expanding capital accumulation into new
markets.

Figure 6: Views of Substandard Housing Which Would Be Razed By the Expressways.
Source: 1946 Highway and Transportation Plan for Atlanta, Georgia (“Lochner Report”), State Highway
Department of Georgia.
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Lochner Report and the Suburbanization of Atlanta

Commissioned in 1944 and completed in 1946, the Highway and Transportation Plan for
Atlanta, Georgia (the “Lochner Report”) served as Atlanta’s municipal version of Roosevelt’s
national public works blueprint, outlining plans for how the metropolitan region was to manage
its anticipated population and economic growth following the war. Prepared in conjunction with
the State Highway Department of Georgia and the Federal Public Roads Administration, the
Lochner Report proposed a capital improvement plan, costing in excess of $48 million ($438
million in 2013), to upgrade the city’s transportation network by constructing a series of eight
expressways with one downtown expressway connector (see Figures 7 and 8). Completing
construction of a massive expressway network, widening and extending arterial streets and
advancing efforts to enterprise parking facilities in the city were metropolitan Atlanta’s answer
to resolve its burgeoning capital surplus problem:

“There is every indication that Atlanta is approaching a period of great growth and
prosperity. Improved highway and transit facilities are essential if the community is to
capitalize on its natural assets. Failure to take prompt action would not only retard
growth but add to the overall cost of the capital improvements required” (H.W. Lochner
& Company 1946, XI).

With this plan entering its implementation stage, Harry Lochner did for Atlanta what
Robert Moses had done for New York City only years earlier and what Georges-Eugène
Haussmann had done for Paris in the previous century (Harvey 2010). Rather than planning for
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development at the city scale, the transportation designs published in Lochner’s blueprint
demonstrate clear intentions to develop the entire metropolitan region into one sweeping, semiborderless unit. By (a) controlling the flows of traffic in to, out of, and around Atlanta’s central
business district; (b) attracting commercial development outside urban wards; and, (c) pushing
neighborhood development increasingly further from the traditional city center, a clear
“restructuring of the geographical region” (N. Smith 2007, 200) was underway. Figures 9, 10 and
11 below demonstrate a transformation in the geographical imagination of the metropolitan
region. Figures 9 and 10 from the 1946 Lochner Report reflect a planner’s view (Bolan 1967) of
the city and many landmarks which were visible in Figure 10: 1940 Streetcar Map, have been
omitted.

Development and the Black Community

While the City and Metropolitan Planning Commissions began carrying out plans to
construct a massive highway network, as proposed in the Lochner Report, racial unrest within
the city further encouraged the relocation of housing away from downtown Atlanta’s and toward
the urban fringe. The longstanding Mayor of Atlanta, William Hartsfield, once called Atlanta,
“the city too busy to hate” when describing a 1950s anti-discrimination and anti-segregation
political agenda formulated by a loose alliance between white city politicians and black business,
civic and religious leaders (Hein 1972).

	
  

53	
  

	
  

	
  
Figure 7: Present Land Use in the Atlanta Area.
Source: 1946 Highway and Transportation Plan for Atlanta, Georgia (“Lochner Report”), State Highway
Department of Georgia.
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Figure 8: Location and Design of Expressways.
Source: 1946 Highway and Transportation Plan for Atlanta, Georgia (“Lochner Report”), State Highway
Department of Georgia.

	
  

55	
  

	
  

	
  
Figure 9: Planner's View Showing the Recommended Arterial Street System.
Source: 1946 Highway and Transportation Plan for Atlanta, Georgia (“Lochner Report”), State Highway
Department of Georgia.
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Figure 10: Planner's View Showing the Recommended Improvements of Existing Traffic Facilities.
Source: 1946 Highway and Transportation Plan for Atlanta, Georgia (“Lochner Report”), State Highway
Department of Georgia.

	
  

57	
  

	
  

	
  
Figure 11: Transportation Map of Atlanta Showing Street Car, Trackless Trolley and Bus Lines, c. 1940.
Source: Georgia Power Company.
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Hartsfield may have successfully articulated a political economic message to the nation,
skillfully branding Atlanta as a cosmopolitan city located “in” the South and not “of” the South,
a process Rice (1984) calls the “Atlanta-ization” of the metropolis. However, for Atlanta
residents, it was becoming more and more obvious that Hartsfield’s claim was false on two
accounts. First, christening Atlanta as “the city too busy to hate” unfairly overlooked the
concerted effort to open the urban center and connect it to the surrounding suburban
communities, thereby destroying the urban base of black empowerment and eliminating the city
through a process of regionalization. “The entire metropolitan area can be considered the
terminal of this vast network of transportation arteries” (H.W. Lochner & Company 1946, 1).
Second, “the city too busy to hate” [strikethrough for emphasis] indicates a very evident white
privilege on behalf of Mayor Hartsfield, apparently oblivious to much of the “soft racism” (H.
Dalton 1995) perpetuated by the business elite, politicians and urban planners, which may have
been as detrimental to the black community as more overt racism.
However, Hartsfield’s message was clear: the primary concern of post-war metropolitan
Atlanta was to be economic growth and attracting business rather than controversy. It was not,
however, conclusive that Atlanta’s specific brand of economic growth would not attract
controversy. The implications of the Lochner Report were also clear, particularly to those
residing in Atlanta’s urban center. The report may have been advertised as a plan to provide
vehicle owners with a modern mode of transportation, allowing access to every part of the
region, but the blueprints suggest that the expressway system was designed to form a buffer zone
between Atlanta’s central business district and black neighborhoods east of downtown (Stone
1989). The development of Atlanta’s suburbs and the construction of expressways to connect the
urban and suburban were advertised as projects necessary to attract investment capital to the
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region. Yet, this one aspect of the project concealed the secondary goals of luring the urban black
community away from Atlanta’s central business district (Bayor 2003) and encouraging
relocation so as not to hamper efforts to revitalize the downtown area (Thompson, Lewis and
McEntire 1960). Atlanta’s experience provides evidence to counter the dominant theory that
suburbanization caused ‘white flight’ away from the city (Molotch 1972; Denton and Massey
1991; Boustan 2010) and begs for a critical reexamination of suburban development goals using
a single-case study and city-specific approach.
The following chapter discusses the geographic implications of metropolitan Atlanta’s
Plan for Improvement and grounds the region’s suburban and economic expansion. In the second
half of the chapter, the rise of competitive federalism will be introduced and its impacts on
transboundary water resource governance will be discussed. Of particular importance are the
effects that competitive federalism had on federal and state power sharing and water management
and planning.
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CHAPTER FOUR:

PLAN FOR IMPROVEMENT AND THE SELLING OF THE SOUTH

Atlanta city officials adopted the Plan for Improvement in 1952 as the second major
phase of its strategy to spatiotemporally fix its crisis of capital overaccumulation, cleverly
disguised as an urban renewal agenda. With construction of the expressway system already
underway, the Plan for Improvement expanded the northern boundary of Atlanta’s city limits to
include the majority white, affluent neighborhood of Buckhead (Whitelegg 2002). The addition
of the Buckhead District was a major victory for the region’s economic and business elite, who
continued to push for a service economy transformation and, in many ways, the annexation of
Buckhead is symbolic of Atlanta’s economic and urban reimagining. Prior to the Plan for
Improvement, the City of Atlanta consisted of only 37 square miles (roughly one-tenth the size
of New York City) with a population of 330,000. Following annexation, the city tripled in size to
118 square miles and added 100,000 new residents. A wealthy suburb, Buckhead added many
recognizable landmarks to the city that are now considered symbols of Atlanta, including several
convention centers and arenas, the famous Lenox Square shopping complex, Peachtree Road
(Atlanta’s landmark street) and the Governor’s mansion (Atlanta Convention & Visitors Bureau
2013).
Construction of the expressway system and expansion of Atlanta’s northern boundary, in
combination with a massive influx of soldiers drawn to the city after the war, led to one of the
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greatest suburban building booms in American history. For Hartshorn and Ihlanfeldt (2000, 17),
Atlanta’s “prevailing laissez-faire market economy-driven approach to growth” has driven
economic growth in the metropolitan region through policies promoting urban-suburban and
suburban-suburban competition. Harvey (1981, 1989, 2001, 2003) discusses the capitalist
tendency toward geographical expansion, geographical restructuring and “regionalization” as
medium-term solutions to deal with crises of overaccumulation. Harvey, like Karl Marx and
Rosa Luxemburg submit that geographical expansion offers a solution to capital
overaccumulation by creating “effective demand” (Luxemburg 1951, 138-146) and “widening
[a] sphere of circulation” (Marx 1973, 407-409). Viewed in this way, Atlanta’s efforts to
revitalize its downtown and expand the city through expressway construction and annexation of
surrounding counties, represent a very thoughtful and highly strategic shift in the spatial
organization of capital and labor.
For metropolitan Atlanta, regional economic growth has been encouraged via creation of
a highly fragmented (in terms of race, income and geography) system of urban county units, all
highly competitive for developmental capital. As opposed to many other metropolitan regions
across the U.S., even the unincorporated neighborhoods in counties surrounding the City of
Atlanta have services typically only provided to city residents (Hartshorn and Ihlanfeldt 2000).
Provisions to the surrounding counties can include services such as water, waste disposal, fire
and police protection and street maintenance. With urban services provided to the entire
metropolitan region, each county has become a viable center of residential and commercial
development, thereby creating suburbs that compete for developmental capital and labor on the
basis of geographic variability (Whitelegg 2002).
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Examining the processes of regionalization in 1950s Atlanta highlights the importance of
urban-suburban and suburban-suburban competition as a unique feature of the region’s economic
growth. However, since the end of World War II, the absorption of the South into the national
economy has pitted northern and southern cities against one another, in direct competition for
developmental capital. A systematic strategy of deregulation has been used to attract capital to
the South and has resulted in territorial and capitalist logic sometimes called the “race to the
bottom,” due to its negative social, environmental and geographical effects.
The “race to the bottom” is a concept emerging from economic theory and has been
adapted to explain the interplay between the territorial and capitalist logics. The twin logics
operate to require state and business actors to compete to make themselves more attractive sites
for capital accumulation by taking actions to promote a “superior” business climate. In what
Cobb (1982) calls the “the selling of the South,” in order to compete with the North, which
offered skilled labor, longstanding education complexes and technological innovations
unmatched in the South, southern politicians were forced to attract developmental capital by
advertising the city’s traditional Southern charm, modern amenities and a desireable climate
(Hartshorn and Ihlanfeldt 2000). In combination with those more innocuous amenities,
politicians often offered locational incentives like tax breaks and municipal bonds for
construction projects, and promises to construct industrial plants and research complexes (Wright
1987). On the one hand, these incentives were successful in attracting developmental capital, but
on the other hand, the result was that disadvantaged populations often shouldered the economic
and social burdens of the twin logics. Figure 12, below, shows three of Atlanta’s industrial
recruitment posters, which attempted to glamorize the region’s southern charm and business
climate.
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The strategy of industrial and environmental deregulation, in combination with reduction
or elimination of business taxes has fueled rapid economic and population growth within the
Sunbelt, but it has also resulted in the collapse of metropolitan Atlanta’s environmental standards
(D. Wheeler 2001), highly unequal tax burdens across the region (Graves 1970) and difficulty
securing funds to finance the construction of water infrastructure (Whitt 1994; Chapman 2009).
Speaking in 1999 about a proposed project to upgrade Atlanta’s sewer lines in order to prevent
pollution from flowing into Georgia’s Lake Allatoona, State Representative Steve Stancil (RCanton)

“said he hopes the state Department of Natural Resources will chip in to get the process
started. He plans to ask Gov. Roy Barnes to set aside money in next year's budget for
continuing operations. The authority could also apply to state and federal agencies for
grants…A key problem is that there is no money to fund any of the plans. The authority
has the power to issue revenue bonds for public improvements, but no source of revenue
has been identified that would repay the bond holders” (Bennet 1999).

Maturation of the Regional Service Economy and the Decline of the Central City

Over the course of only 20 years, the Atlanta metropolitan region underwent a massive
restructuring of its urban geography and economic base, and completely overhauled its mediumterm strategy to continue and accelerate growth. Moreover, industrial and environmental
deregulation, in combination with policies to reduce corporate taxation, had been successful in
shifting the location of economic activity from older industrial cities in New England and the
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Midwest to the American South and Southwest (Newman 1983). This phenomenon became
known as the migration from the “Rustbelt” to the “Sunbelt,” evoking images of older
manufacturing facilities in various stages of disrepair and decay retreating from the North to seek
refuge in the warmer climates of the South, like snowbirds transitioning into retirement.

	
  
Figure 12: (Left) Atlanta Has Everything Vast Lakes Party Boats, c.1962; (Middle) Atlanta Has Everything Golf All
Year, c. 1963; (Right) Atlanta, Georgia…Something in Atlanta, c. 1965.
Source: Vintage Ad Browser 2013.

Migratory inflows of both industry and population in the 1960s and 1970s allowed the
“Sunbelt” to become the fastest growing region in the U.S., with ten major metropolitan regions
leading the growth, Atlanta included, from the Atlantic Coast all the way to the Phoenix-Mesa
metropolis (Hartshorn and Ihlanfeldt 2000). Between 1960 and 1970, the Atlanta metropolitan
region added 450,000 new residents, amounting to a 34% population increase in just ten years
(Social Science Data Analysis Network) and landing it a ranking as the 20th most populous
region nationwide (U.S. Department of Commerce 1982).
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The relocation of economic activity to the “Sunbelt” should not, however, be regarded as
simply a movement of old-guard industries to the New American South. More important than the
southern relocation was the commensurate restructuring of the economy from industrial and
defense manufacturing to financial, legal, intellectual and technological services. In great
contrast to the American economy, which was once dominated by production and durable-goods
manufacturing, over 90% of the jobs created between 1960 and 1980 were in service-oriented
and non-goods-producing industries (Urquhart 1984; Personick 1987). This statistic highlights
not only the comprehensiveness of the restructuring (90% of the jobs), but also the speed with
which it has occurred (only 20 years). Harvey (1989, 1990) calls this mode of economic and
geographic restructuring “flexible accumulation through urbanization,” and argues that it should
be contextualized within the historical geography of American capitalism. Although for modern
southern metropolises like Atlanta, and many in the west which never had a strong industrial
base, growth of the service sector and non-goods production has resulted in intensification and
maturation of “soft” services, as opposed to a wholesale transformation of a new service
economy (Jaret 1987).
As early as 1945, metropolitan Atlanta’s business elites realized the need to foster the
growth of the burgeoning service economy. The region’s business coalition sought to attract this
category of industries with expansive suburban development, which was made possible by the
construction of expressways (1946) for transport and later (1946), water and electricity provided
by the construction of Buford Dam (1950). While metropolitan Atlanta grew to more than two
million people as early as 1975 (U.S. Department of Commerce 1982), due to suburbanization
and annexation, the population within the central city reached its zenith in 1970 and continued to
decline over the course of the decade (Ambrose 2004). The decline of the central city sent
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greater proportions of Atlanta’s population further and further toward the urban and suburban
fringe. With more counties than any other metropolitan region in the U.S., the sprawling growth
of Atlanta continued to spread out to the surrounding counties of Cherokee, Fulton, Gwinnett,
DeKalb, Rockdale, Henry, Clayton, Fayette, Douglas and Cobb, and this does not include fringe
counties of the suburban outer ring (Cartographic Research Laboratory 1999).

	
  
Map 1: Atlanta County Metropolitan Statistical Area.
Source: Metropolitan Atlanta Chamber of Commerce.

In 1974, Atlantans elected their first black mayor, Maynard Jackson, and signaled a
shakeup to the then-hegemonic ruling coalition of business and community leaders that had long
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dominated the urban political landscape. Jackson’s election campaign urged the development of
a new regime, making political and economic power more accessible to the black community.
“Jackson likened the political and economic life of Atlanta to a table provided with food: He did
not want to push anyone away; he only wanted to see that previously excluded groups could join
in the feast” (Stone 1989, 81). For despite a decade of sustained growth in the financial, legal and
intellectual sectors, especially in the categories of transportation, retail, communications and
technology services (Helling 1998), wage distribution across the Atlanta region remained highly
unequal. Contrasting the abundance of images marketing Atlanta as “the city too busy to hate” in
the 1960s and as the “Mecca for black businessmen” in the 1970s (Dameron and Murphy 1997),
more than 50% of Atlanta’s black families had: (a) total incomes of less than $6,500 ($30,000 in
2013); (b) a relatively low percentage of blacks employed in professional-managerial positions
(Abbott 1981); and, (c) quality of life indicators far below the standards of metropolitan
Atlanta’s white communities (Bederman 1974). Alongside urban ecologists then advocating the
idea of economic “convergence” (Feagin 1985), Jackson’s term as Mayor of Atlanta was marked
by the pursuit of economic growth in the belief that prosperity would “trickle down,” thus
reducing socioeconomic inequality among the races.

The Search for Water

The “Trickle Down” Effect and the Rise of Competitive Federalism

It is widely acknowledged that India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru (19471964), was one of history’s most enthusiastic dam supporters, often calling dams “the temples of
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modern India” (Roy 1999, 3). A complex public figure and (anti)hero to 20th century India,
Nehru at once recognized dams as symbols of progress and development, capable of
modernizing India and helping to bridge the gap between the first and third worlds, while also
sharply conscious of the damaging and irreparable effects resulting from the altered flows of the
nation’s massive rivers. Speaking to a crowd of villagers - some facing state-sponsored
relocation and others, complete displacement – in 1948, Nehru said of the effects of the Hirakud
Dam: “if you are to suffer, you should suffer in the interest of the country.”
An apologist for the displacement of villagers due to the nation’s modernity projects,
Nehru was simultaneously a vocal critic of England’s notorious imperial and colonial project in
India, which ravaged the nation economically, politically, culturally and also in ways which may
never be fully comprehensible. Nehru is often recognized as the first public figure to use the
expression “trickle down” in an economic context (Arndt 1983), and was quoted in 1933 saying
that “the exploitation of India and other countries brought so much wealth to England that some
of it trickled down to the working class and their standard of living rose” (Allen and Unwin
1962, 24). Since Nehru first introduced “trickle down” to the world in 1933, the expression has
vacillated into and out of American lexicon over the decades, undoubtedly reaching a pinnacle
during the decades of the 1970s and 1980s. It was during this era that a global political coalition
led by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan promoted a dictum of TINA, meaning that there is
no alternative [to capitalism].
Both Thatcher and Reagan, rebelling against the highly-centralized Keynesian economic
policies of the 1950s and 1960s, sought to dismantle state-sponsored market regulations in favor
of laissez-faire, “supply-side” economic policies. Only a few short years after the elections of
Thatcher to Prime Minister of the U.K. in 1979 and Reagan to President of the U.S. in 1981,
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neoliberal ideology had gained a strong foothold among policy think-tanks (Yergin, Stanislaw
and Tergin 1999), international institutions (Harvey 2003), and most germane to this study,
federal and state governments (Dye 2005).
Stateside, during the 1980s, financial and economic policies of revenue-sharing between
federal and state governments experienced a severe transformation under the Reagan
administration. Having severely restricted and/or completely cut funding for many social welfare
programs created under Roosevelt’s New Deal and Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society, state and
local governments were no longer able to rely on the federal government for financial and state
planning support. Believing that the move to cut funding would promote states’ financial
independence, Reagan’s instituted a political economic agenda known as competitive federalism
(elsewhere called new federalism, cooptive federalism, uncooperative federalism or fend-foryourself federalism). This brand of power-sharing forced states into rigorous competition for
whichever federal development grants had been preserved, as well as competition for private
investment capital, leading some to describe this period as the “rise of the entrepreneurial state”
(Eisinger 1988; Leitner 1990). What resulted was an extremely heightened sense of competition
between “entrepreneurial states” and entrepreneurial regions for (a) advanced positioning in the
division of labor; (b) advanced positioning as centers of consumption; (c) attracting control and
command functions (such as financial and administrative power); and (d) gaining access to
governmental redistributions (Harvey 1990). Mimicking the “fratricidal” competition strategies
taking shape on the international scale (Crotty 1993), these policies finally culminated in the
institutionalization of a classical beggar-thy-neighbour, winner-take-all economic policy.
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Neoliberal Shifts in Water Policy

The period between 1960 and 1980 witnessed an important cultural development with the
rise of environmentalism and environmental awareness among the American population. People
paid increasing attention to the ecological and environmental conditions of the nation’s
waterways, as opposed to pursuing conservation as a way to maximize the economic benefits of
water, which characterizes many of the environmental-ish policies borne of the New Deal era,
elsewhere called market environmentalism (Bakker 2005, 2007). Passage of the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act in 1968, National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in 1970, Clean Water Act
(CWA) in 1972 and Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 1973 underscore the growing desire to
establish fish and wildlife protections, waterway and wetland preservations, and standards to
regulate water quality. Yet, with the rapid rise of the entrepreneurial state vis-à-vis competitive
federalism, efforts were soon underway to revamp the highly-centralized water policies shaped
during the 1960s and 1970s. This was pursued by shifting water governance authorities and
responsibilites from the federal scale to the state and regional scale, thus resulting in expanded
roles for powerful metropolitan regions like Atlanta to have greater say over the management of
their water resources (Gerlak 2005). However popular the environmental policies of the 1960s
and 1970s had been, the environmental agenda of the 1980s was led by those vigorously opposed
to top-down government, and was highlighted by the rise to national prominence of Sagebrush
Rebels and the election of Ronald Reagan as U.S. President (Fischman and Williamson 2011).
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Figure 13: News Clip from the Los Angeles Times, “Water Is a Commodity, So Let’s Treat It as One.”
Source: Los Angeles Times 1984.

Soon after the nation welcomed the newly-elected President from California, it was
evident that Reagan’s policies of extreme fiscal conservatism would have profound effects upon
the nation’s approach to producing and managing water. As a first-term President beginning in
1981, Ronald Reagan’s success in the White House hinged upon his ability to fulfill his
campaign promises to “make America great again.” In his campaign leading up to the election,
Reagan promised to reestablish greatness by providing financial relief for American taxpayers
with a new tax credit and rebate system, which he believed would lead to a reduced tax burden
for middle- and upper-income earners (Reagan for President 1980). The plan, often called
“Reaganomics” by supporters and critics alike, was designed to reduce tax receipts, thereby
reducing federal tax revenue, which would necessitate a drastic reduction of federal expenditures
for state projects that the administration considered “wasteful spending” or “pork-barrel
projects.” Long considered geographically-limited and economically inefficient arrangements for
legislators to deliver “pork” to their constituencies (Maass 1951; Drew 1970; Ferejohn 1974;
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DelRossi and Inman 1999), water projects became an easy target for the administration to
eliminate.

Continuing the Carter ‘Hit List’

Although it was President Reagan who culled a reputation as a “revolutionary” fiscal
conservative bent on eliminating wasteful spending from the federal budget (Weatherford and
McDonnell 2005), it is arguable that his predecessor, Jimmy Carter, worked harder to dismantle
federal water projects than any other President in American history. Only one month after taking
office as President, the former Georgia governor shocked members of Congress by submitting a
federal operating budget which completely eliminated all federal funding for 19 congressionally
authorized water projects, and drastically reduced funding for hundreds more, many already in
various phases of construction (Kirschten 1977, 2). According to President Carter (1995, 81):

“I had inherited the largest deficit in history-more than $66 billion-and it was important
to me to stop the constantly escalating federal expenditures that tended to drive up
interest rates and were one of the root causes of inflation and unemployment.”

Then, in a follow-up review of 337 active USACE and Bureau of Reclamation water projects,
the administration expanded the number of projects facing a potential veto and eliminated federal
funding for 30, up from 19 (J. Carter 1977), with some labeling these projects as items on
Carter’s “hit list.” Although some of the 30 projects were eventually approved upon further
review and were able to secure federal funding, later in his term, Carter announced new plans to
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implement stricter criteria for assessing the economic and environmental costs and benefits for
each water project proposed to Congress (Scheele 1978). Carter’s new analytical criteria for
water projects had the effect of making it more difficult for Congress to pass water legislation
without facing an executive veto, and represented Carter’s last battle in his “water war” (Frisch
and Kelly 2008).
While Carter justified the elimination of funding for water projects as fiscal
conservatism, critics are torn as to whether the “hit list” was an economic policy intended to
reduce the federal deficit or if it was actually the result of something more personal. As a former
peanut farmer and self-professed outdoorsman from Georgia’s rural South, it is often believed
that Jimmy Carter shared a deeper personal connection to nature than many of his Washington
colleagues (Roskelley 1977). Carter’s rural roots made him an “outsider” to many urban elites in
Washington (Scheele 1978) and also caused him to be particularly suspicious of water projects
intended to “modernize” the American landscape. In 1971, Carter displayed this attitude when he
fought to stop a USACE dredging project in Georgia. Carter believed that the project would have
destroyed the fish and wildlife habitat along St. Simons Island, and he threatened that if USACE
did not halt its dredging, he would deploy Georgia’s game rangers and have the Corps stopped
by force (Scheele 1978). Then, two years later, while still serving as Governor of Georgia, Carter
discovered that the Corps had embellished the projected economic benefits of a proposed dam
along the Flint River (Kirschten 1977), leading him to not only veto the project, but also write an
18 page letter accusing USACE of lying to the people of Georgia and manipulating data for the
Corps’ own benefit (Clymer 1977).
When Americans elected Ronald Reagan in 1980, many were unsure whether the new
president would break from the conventions established by the preceding Democratic
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administration or if Carter’s principled stance against water projects would carry over. Early
glimpses of Reagan’s legislative approach to water projects would indeed raise more questions
than answers. The first five years of the Reagan presidency shared remarkable continuity with
the Carter administration’s attitude toward water projects. Just like Carter before him, Reagan’s
first year in office was spent attempting to delay the construction of several water projects,
including those which had already been added to Carter’s “hit list” (Wilkinson 1989). Yet,
whereas Carter was only able to manipulate the federal budget in order to de-fund water projects,
Reagan institutionalized a long-term solution to eliminate construction. By proposing a program
in which construction costs would be split between federal and state governments, Reagan never
allowed the federal government to become the primary financier for any state or regional water
project. By drastically increasing states’ financial burden to complete their projects, Reagan was
able to succesfully delay construction and pre-planning for all but the “most critical” water
projects, thus pushing back the completion timelines for 70 of the more than 300
Congressionally approved sewage treatment, water supply and dam improvement projects
(Christian Science Monitor 1981).
After signing the Water Resources Development Act in 1986 (WRDA-86), the Reagan
administration moved to limit the size and scope of all future federal water projects and instituted
financial controls to prevent Congress from authorizing any “pork barrel” water projects.
Operationally, WRDA-86 instituted: (a) cost ceilings to limit the size and scope of USACE
construction projects, and also, (b) a policy of 50/50 cost-sharing between federal and state
governments for all future USACE and Bureau of Reclamation projects (Gerlak 2005). In a
report presented to USACE’s Institute for Water Resources, Army Corps Historian Martin Reuss
(1991, 1), captured the tenor of Reagan’s efforts, proclaiming that WRDA-86:
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“signifies major and probably enduring shifts in the nation’s attitude toward water
resource planning. The legislation reflects general agreement that non-federal interests
can, and should, shoulder more of the financial and management burdens, that
environmental considerations are intrinsic to water resource planning, and that
uneconomic projects must be weeded out.”

	
  

While Reagan was able to fulfill his campaign promise to eliminate “pork-barrel

projects” with the passage of WRDA-86 and delay the construction of many federal water
projects, his administration soon suffered backlash from a contingent of Republican senators
representing 14 western states. The 14 senators, led by Department of the Interior Secretary,
William P. Clark, criticized Reagan’s move to decrease funding for many large-scale water
projects on the grounds that Republican politicians would lose votes in the west if unable to
deliver a cheap and secure supply of water to their constituents (Noble 1984). Despite the threats
to his reputation as an extreme fiscal conservative and penny-pincher (Gerlak 2005), Reagan
relented to the pleas from his fellow Republicans and reversed course, eventually committing to
complete the construction of many western water projects which Congress had already approved
(Noble 1984). Many have suggested that the administration’s policy reversal came as an attempt
to build consensus among the ranking Republicans as well as distancing Reagan-era water
policies from former-President Jimmy Carter’s “hit list” approach to western water projects of
the late 1970s (Miller 1985; Holland and Moore 2003) while others simply claim that Reagan
was not as fiscally conservative as his reputation indicates (Stewart 1991; Montopoli 2011).
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Reagan’s “go it on their own” Approach

Having acquired experience crafting several landmark environmental programs while
serving as the Governor of California, Reagan appeared to be more sympathetic to the plights of
his Western cohorts in the Senate dealing with water scarcity (Denning 2011). Well before
Reagan was elected president, many western water managers and policymakers had predicted
that the economic livelihoods of the western states would soon be threatened without gaining
access to more water. In 1977, Governor Scott Matheson of Utah warned that “water has
suddenly surpassed time as the traditional Western luxury and we have little time left to take
charge of the small amount of water that gives us life” (Mathenson, as quoted in Salt Lake
Tribune 1977). Even Reagan himself had been forced to deal with water scarcity issues while
presiding over California’s massive aqueduct systems. California’s geographically expansive
aqueduct systems have sometimes been called “the eighth wonder of the world” (Cannon 2003)
and were designed to transport water from the state’s wetter north to the drier south, establishing
what was, in effect, an informal state scale water market (Lefkoff and Gorelick 1990). While
Western Senators may have forced Reagan’s hand on the issue of water production, leading to
the authorization of more than 50 federal water development projects in 1986 alone (Water
Resources Development Act 1986), it was Reagan’s decision to defund river basin commissions
which would have the most profound and longest-lasting effects upon the ways that federal and
state governments manage their water resources.
In a 1967 statement to the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Water and Power Resources,
Governor Reagan presented California’s plan to deal with “imminent and widespread water
deficiencies” in the Colorado River Basin and the Pacific Southwest. Reagan claimed that limited
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water resources and a booming population made the need for action unmistakable. California’s
proposed actions were twofold. First, Reagan proposed increasing inter-basin transfers of water
from the north to the south, establishing the aforementioned in-state water market and second, he
urged California to discover and develop new supplies to supplement existing sources of
freshwater. For the second phase of the project, Reagan appealed to the subcommittee for greater
state autonomy in seeking out additional water sources.
In a highly strategic and counterintuitive move to leverage Congressional support for the
second phase of California’s project, Reagan pledged California’s support for the establishment
of an impartial National Water Commission to supervise exploratory studies on water resource
development. Although Reagan (1967, 3) expressed concern that a federal water management
commission could duplicate existing efforts at the state and regional scales, he supported the
creation of a National Water Commission:

“conditioned on: (1) immediate implementation of the Pacific Southwest regional study
so that alternative solutions will be available for comparison by the early 1970’s, and (2)
assurances that the commission will not be used as a mechanism for delaying those
studies.”

Thus, in order to hasten Congressional approval for California’s proposed projects, Reagan
pledged his support for the federal commission while also providing clues to suggest that his
support was politically motivated and that he preferred for California to manage its own water.
Reagan even went so far as to suggest that Congress reconsider the function of the National
Water Commission, saying that it “could be directed to consult with the Western States Water
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Council in developing western states water programs” (R. Reagan 1967, 4) and that water
management responsibilities were best left to the states, recommending that Congress should
“continue to seek a regional solution to what is truly a regional problem” (ibid, 5).
Reagan’s preference for state-centric management of water resources, as revealed while
Governor of California, followed him to the White House. A key component of Reagan’s agenda
of competitive federalism, as it pertained to water, was to expand the roles of states and regions
to manage their own water resources. To accomplish this, the administration drastically reduced
funding, or otherwise weakened, both the Water Resources Council and the River Basin
Commissions in 1982 with remarkable ease (Allee 1986), by “suggesting that states were to go it
on their own” without management or planning assistance from the federal government (Gerlak
2005, 238). What resulted, however, was only management confusion and administrative and
governance fragmentation (Graf 2001). Despite varying degrees of management success by river
basin and interagency commissions in the west and the Great Lakes Basin Commission (1955),
Delaware River Basin Commission (1961) and the Susquehanna River Basin Commission (1971)
in the east, Reagan’s Executive Order 12319 moved to terminate six basin commissions
established by the Water Resources Planning Act of 1962 (Exec. Order No. 12319). For several
reasons which will be discussed in further detail later in chapters 5 and 6, decentralization and
governance fragmentation profoundly affected the way that water is managed in the ACF Basin,
not the least of which is because metropolitan Atlanta is located at the headwaters of five
different river basins shared with other states and operates an integrated water system that relies
upon politically and ecologically-sensitive interbasin and interstate water transfers (Dellapenna
2005).
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The following chapter will introduce the views and opinions of various stakeholders,
which were collected with respect to answering this study’s central research question. The data
will be presented in an interpretive manner in order to make sense of the multiple and conflicting
accounts of the ACF conflict.
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CHAPTER FIVE:

COMPACT NEGOTIATIONS AND THE TRANSITION TO LITIGATION

It is in this context that the study will now turn to research question 1, namely, what is the trend
in respect of freshwater consumption by the various stakeholders to the ACF Basin conflict?
What are the sources and competing uses of water among the conflicting states? The following
views and opinions were collected.

Hydrology of the ACF Basin

As Maps 2 and 3 below demonstrate, the watershed of the ACF Basin is separated into
three physiographic provinces: (a) Blue Ridge; (b) Piedmont; and, (c) Coastal Plain, and is
divided among four land use categories: (a) forested and (b) agricultural land account for 59%
and 29% of surface cover in the basin, respectively; (c) wetland areas, which account for 5.4% of
the basin; and, (d) urban areas, which account 5.3% of the entire basin (Wangsness 1997, 11-12).
Although urban areas contribute the least amount of land cover in the watershed, water use in the
basin is predominantly urban consumptive uses and the rate of water withdrawals for this
purpose has been steadily increasing since 1970 (Marella and Fanning 2011, 1-2). As Figure 14
shows, in the ACF Basin, approximately 1,591 million gallons of surface water are consumed
each day. Of that total, nearly 50% was used for hydroelectric production while 34%, or
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approximately 609 mgd, was withdrawn for municipal water supply. The vast majority of the
609 mgd was withdrawn in the Piedmont physiographic province of the ACF Basin, in which the
only major water user is metropolitan Atlanta and which includes the City of Atlanta as well as
the surrounding counties of Gwinnett, DeKalb, Fulton and Cobb. In the Coastal Plain, which is
the southernmost physiographic province, the major water uses are irrigation as well as power
generation from the Farley nuclear plant located near Dothan, Alabama. However, the Coastal
Plain province relies principally on groundwater supplied from the Cretaceous, Clayton,
Claiborne and Floridan aquifers rather than the Chattahoochee or Flint Rivers (Marella and
Fanning 2011, 10-11).
That metropolitan Atlanta is the only major water user in the Piedmont province has a
drastic effect on the region’s hydrogeography due to urban and suburban sprawl. Because
metropolitan Atlanta is located at the narrowest point of the basin’s watershed, water withdrawn
from the Chattahoochee River is often distributed to residential users that live outside of the
watershed. Largely due to public-supply systems which cross hydrographic boundaries into other
watersheds, about one-third of metropolitan Atlanta’s municipal water supply is lost as a “net
use,” or consumptive use, and not returned to the system (Metropolitan North Georgia Water
Planning District 2009). In the narrowest point of the Piedmont, Chattahoochee River water is
lost from its “immediate water environment” as a result of evaporation, transpiration and being
discharged into other water basins (U.S. Geological Survey 2012, 18-21).
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Map 2: Land Use in the ACF River Basin Watershed.
Source: U.S. Geological Survey 1997.
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Map 3: Location of Physiographic Provinces Within the ACF River Basin.
Source: U.S. Geological Survey 2011.
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Figure 14: Water Withdrawals in the ACF Basin, 2005.
Source: U.S. Geological Survey 2011.

Significance of the ACF Rivers

As mentioned in chapter 1, the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint Basin is an integrated
system of three rivers, which flows through the States of Georgia, Florida and Alabama. As Map
4 below shows, the Chattahoochee River is the northernmost of the three rivers with its
headwaters located in northeast Georgia’s mountainous Blue Ridge physiographic province. The
Chattahoochee River flows south by southwest for 430 miles (692 km), passing into the
Piedmont physiographic province as well as metropolitan Atlanta’s northern boundary before
forming the border between Georgia and Alabama in the Coastal Plain province. The Flint River
also originates in the State of Georgia, near Atlanta’s Hartsfield International Airport. From
there, the river flows to the south for approximately 120 miles (193 km), dominating the eastern
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side of the ACF Basin, before flowing southwest to where it forms a confluence with the
Chattahoochee River at the Georgia-Florida state line. Where the Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers
meet, the Apalachicola River is formed, and flows south through the Florida panhandle before
fanning out to form a wide floodplain and emptying into the Gulf of Mexico via Apalachicola
Bay (Couch 1993). The total ACF watershed is comprised of three sub-basins draining into the
Apalachicola, Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers, respectively. Combined, the three sub-basins
drain an area of nearly 20,000 sq. mi. The majority of the drainage belongs to Georgia’s
Chattahoochee River, which has a watershed of 8,770 sq. mi. (U.S. Geological Survey 2014).
The ACF River Basin is such an integrated freshwater system that, discursively, the three
rivers are almost always referred to in collective terms as the “ACF” or “ACF Basin.” Only
occasionally are the rivers referred to as separate bodies of water. Table 2 below shows a wordfrequency count from the September 2003 Allocation Formula Agreement, which was coauthored by representatives from the three states, demonstrating the preferred terminology to
refer to the river system. Although officials from all three states discursively represented the
water as a single, integrated river system, for Georgia and metropolitan Atlanta officials, this
“collective” discourse is more symbolic than material and only serves to underscore the state and
regional officials’ unwillingness to share the waters of the ACF Basin with Florida and Alabama.
In a symbolic action to demonstrate the three states’ commitment to equitably dividing and
allocating the integrated river system, Chief Negotiators in 2003 signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU). The MOU was an agreement created by the states, intended to serve as a
baseline allocation formula, from which the riparians could then craft their own detailed
proposals for how to equitably allocate the ACF Basin.
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Map 4: Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin.
Source: Apalachicola National Estuarine Research Reserve.

The MOU was signed in July of 2003 and in September of that year, the states then
submitted a detailed Allocation Formula Agreement for public review. According to the text of
the September 2003 ACF Allocation Formula Agreement, which is the most recent version
obtained, the agreement was designed for the purpose of “establishing an allocation formula for
equitably apportioning for the term of this agreement the surface waters of the ACF Basin
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pursuant to Article VII of the ACF Compact” (Signatory States 2003, 5). The above quote shows
that in the most recent compact negotiations, the major point of contention among the states was
not whether or not to share the ACF waters, but rather, to what degree the freshwater was to be
shared and to determine which competing uses deserve priority in receiving freshwater from the
ACF Basin. Yet despite this 2003 public pronouncement, negotiations failed once more and, as
of 2013, the three states are not participating in negotiations. Of course, for the three riparians,
the ACF Basin is a significant source of freshwater. However, the significance of the river is
different for each respective state and will be discussed in the following sections.

Table 2: 2003 ACF Allocation Formula Agreement Word Count.

Word

Frequency Count

ACF

132

ACF Basin

66

Basin

74

Apalachicola

5

Chattahoochee

22

Flint

4

Apalachicola River

4

Chattahoochee River

16

Flint River

4

Source: Wong, J.

	
  

88	
  

	
  
The Significance of the Apalachicola River to Florida

In the State of Florida, freshwater from the Apalachicola River flows directly into the
Apalachicola Bay estuary, where it provides critical support to the commercial fishing industry
(Glennon 2002). For Apalachicola Bay’s commercial fishing industry, oysters represent one of
the most important and profitable species, but these shellfish are also extremely sensitive to
ecological conditions. Figure 15 below shows Apalachicola Bay oyster and shrimping boats
docked on the coast during harvest season. As the Apalachicola Bay estuary’s salinity levels
continue to increase, boats are often docked for months on end.

Figure 15: Apalachicola Bay Seafood Boats.
Source: Northwest Florida Water Management District, 2009.

According to a former Governor of Florida who was interviewed for this study, the preservation
of the oyster industry was a major concern for his administration. Accordingly, when it became
clear that Apalachicola Bay was not receiving enough water for the seafood industry to prosper,
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he felt compelled to protect the Apalachicola River’s water supply from the thirsty metropolitan
Atlanta region:

“Apalachicola must have some good balance for its entire seafood industry to do well…It
has it be a proper mix of freshwater and saline water for oysters and other sea life to
prosper…and that part of the state depends on rivers that go interstate…So, as a result of
that, you have to be defensive to be sure that your supplies aren’t cut off” (Interview,
April 25, 2012).

The Governor later mentioned that, while in office, his administration took action to protect
Florida’s water supply from metropolitan Atlanta’s water withdrawals, because he believed that
the region was withdrawing water without considering its downstream impacts on neither
Apalachicola Bay’s ecology nor the panhandle’s prospects for economic development:

“[Atlanta] can take [water], but you have to remember that there is a downstream
factor…It’s a multi-state river, so therefore [withdrawing water] has consequences
downstream…[oyster farmers] would be impacted the most immediate, but you also have
an imbalance in bay ecology and the river system ecology, which would
deteriorate…Second, if you did that, at some point the panhandle, when it engages in
development like it did, it, too, is going to need water…so, you want to protect the future”
(Interview, April 25, 2012; brackets added).
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The Governor later suggested that metropolitan Atlanta’s rapid economic and population growth
should have forced politicians, business elites and/or water managers to locate more water, but
instead only increased its withdrawals from the ACF Basin. With this action, it became clear that
metropolitan Atlanta was unwilling to explore any of a range of alternative sources of
freshwater:

“Atlanta has continued booming, as far as I can tell…so, they require more [water] and
they ought to find alternative sources” (Interview, April 25, 2012; brackets added).

In the Governor’s view, metropolitan Atlanta did not adequately manage its limited water
supply, but rather bowed to pressure from the business community and citizens to supply the
booming region with cheap water from the Chattahoochee River as opposed to finding a
sustainable, and most likely, costlier solution such as water conservation, recycling or tapping
groundwater supplies:

“[Atlanta] reacted…I am sure there was pressure from their citizens for water…they felt
they needed water, so they want to take it…They hadn’t put enough restrictions to all the
users…they wanted them to continue to use water as had been used when it was
plentiful…They had no plan to augment their water system towards these kinds of
problems…I felt that Atlanta didn’t use all sources of water - you can put wells in, you
can engage in an aggressive recycling program…There are lot of things you can do, it
just costs more and everybody wants cheap water…The issue is about cheap
water…everybody wants the cheapest water possible…It ought to be the duty of the
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government to find [a solution that] extends their resources the most, not just what’s the
cheapest” (Interview, April 25, 2012; brackets added).

An estuarine biologist, who has worked for the State of Florida for more than 22 years
and privy to the ACF conflict since the very beginning, offered additional insights. The biologist
had studied the potential technical and ecological impacts of water allocation proposals, the
results of which were part of the USACE Comprehensive Study. When describing Florida’s
water problems, he uses a bio-ecological approach to explain the effects of increased water
withdrawals on Florida’s estuarine ecology. Below is how he explained why only an equitable
allocation based on historical water flows would suffice, and why Georgia’s proposal to deliver
minimum stream flows to Florida would not sustain the ecosystem due to unpredictable salinity
balance and the introduction of salt water predators to a sensitive ecosystem (Liu and Acker
2011):

“The system, both the riverine and the estuarine system, operate in a very dynamic
way…They have historically operated in a very dynamic way and they require a great
deal of variation…it doesn't have always to be the average flow in the river…We'd like to
see large floods, small floods…you don't wanna see a stabilized minimum
flow…[consistent stream flow] is harmful towards the whole system…This is an alluvial
river system and an alluvial river system is one that is characterized by periodic flooding
and so is the vegetation community…[species] of [the] community that live in the flood
plain are dependent upon, not only some seasonal, but also inter-annual flooding…It
doesn't have to flood the entire flood plain every year, but if it does that every four years
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or six years or something like that, then that's enough to maintain the system as it is…A
large proportion of fish species spawn and have their juvenile stages back out in the
tributaries and parts of the flood plain where there is adequate food and refuge from
predators…They need that back water area and, if all you get is some minimum flow, it
doesn't even inundate the flood plain…Then all of those species are going to be restricted
from their habitat where they would naturally undergo part of their life history
processes” (Interview, February 1, 2013; brackets added).

Speaking about why Georgia has proposed delivering minimum stream flows to Florida, as
opposed to maintaining a historical flow regime, even though this would negatively impact
Florida’s estuarine ecology, the biologist opined:

“They want to be protective of their water supply for both [sic] municipal, industrial and
agricultural…They want to give as little as possible to Florida…I can only surmise that's
because they think they have social and economic reasons for doing that, and those
outweigh ours” (Interview, February 1, 2013).

The estuarine biologist also offered an educated opinion as to who is primarily responsible for
the ACF conflict:

“Look at what [USACE is] doing right now. They are operating the system not agreed
upon…they decided how they wanted to manage [the ACF Basin] and that favors the
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upstream states because they are holding more storage upstream [and] releasing less
water downstream” (Interview, February 1, 2013; brackets added).

He then explained why, in his opinion, USACE granted metropolitan Atlanta increased storage
capacity in Lake Lanier, in spite of the negative effects that reduced water availability continues
to have on Florida’s ecology:

“I guess the political clout that Atlanta and Georgia, in general, has with the Corps…the
Corps is providing that increased storage and certainly, if you look at the way they
revised the operating procedures, they favor that increased storage very much…That's
why we in Florida have gotten this minimum level since about May…only a couple of
times have we got little bumps in flow, but it has been stable at little over 5000 cfs [cubic
feet per second]” (Interview, February 1, 2013; brackets added).

While Florida received only 5,000 cfs, in the biologist’s professional opinion, a much greater
stream flow of approximately 15,000 cfs would be needed for several consecutive weeks in order
to provide Florida’s ecosystems with the flood flows required. Only then would Apalachicola
Bay’s salinity levels stabilize and continue to support the sensitive estuarine ecology.

The Significance of the Chattahoochee River to Alabama

The Apalachicola Bay seafood industry, and oysters in particular, is an important user of
freshwater. According to Florida’s stakeholders, their economic and ecological uses require
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access to more water from the ACF Basin. For the State of Alabama, however, it is the overall
state economy that deserves priority of access. In the 1990 lawsuit filed by the State of Alabama
against USACE, the State alleged that increasing metropolitan Atlanta’s water withdrawals
would reduce stream flows in the Chattahoochee River, which in turn would have inflicted a
heavy economic burden upon the state’s agricultural sector, industrial mining operations,
recreational and forestry industries, as well as limit the ability to produce electricity and transport
goods via waterway (Williams 1991). Accordingly, the lawsuit claimed that by USACE granting
additional water withdrawals to metropolitan Atlanta, Alabama would sacrifice “badly needed
economic development” (Williams 1991), mainly due to reduced electric production at the
Joseph M. Farley nuclear power plant near Dothan, Alabama. The power plant, shown below,
generates nearly 20% of the state’s electricity and uses water from the Chattahoochee River to
cool spent fuel cells (Alabama Power 2010, see Figures 16 and 17 below). A high-ranking water
manager from Alabama, who is described as “an authority on the ACF conflict” by employees of
the Alabama Office of Water Resources, described the significance of the ACF Basin to
Alabama as follows:

“We are looking for opportunities for economic growth in Alabama, for the state, like
anybody else…Of course, we want to be able to look at that in terms of what the potential
might be, though, and evaluate the terms of the availability [of freshwater], as well… we
have industries and municipalities [which need] power supply on the Chattahoochee, as
well…It's an area that is important from Alabama’s standpoint…from the water supply
standpoint…from the waste assimilation standpoint…Farley nuclear plant…Farley is a
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central, a significant part of the Southern power grid, as well” (Interview, January 31,
2013; brackets added).

	
  
Figure 16: Farley Nuclear Plant near Dothan, Alabama.
Source: Alabama Power 2010.
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Figure 17: Spent Fuel Cooling Pool at Farley Nuclear Plant.
Source: Alabama Power 2010.
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Similar to the former Florida Governor and estuarine biologist from Florida, the official from
Alabama suggested that metropolitan Atlanta’s suburban growth has come at the expense of
downstream stakeholders and that USACE has provided tacit approval of Atlanta’s regional
growth strategy by not requiring payment for increased water withdrawals from the basin:

“We understand Atlanta's growth…we understand and we are not jealous, as has been
categorized of us, as far as Atlanta’s growth…There are lots of benefits to Atlanta's
growth for the southeast, so that's good for us, as well…but, we feel like, and it's
summarized and stated in articles, as well…we feel like we've been having to pay the
price for Atlanta's growth…In other words, Atlanta is growing, but they haven't made
any type of arrangement or anything like that for the water supply…so, what they've done
is they increase use of the federal project and haven’t gone through the Corps of
Engineers, as well…haven't gone through and followed the law to have all the reservoirs
reauthorized for their water supply…therefore, they just continue to take these increased
withdrawals…It would've mattered less if water was flowing downstream for Alabama
and for Florida, but there is none…They are not making any arrangements or paying for
it, or anything like that…They aren’t trying to make an arrangement to either increase
storage somewhere else…or develop better water supplies, things like that…Instead, they
just withdraw more…the Corps is not making them do anything for that and so, as a
result, there is just less water flowing downstream” (Interview, January 31, 2013).

	
  

98	
  

	
  
The Significance of the Chattahoochee and Flint Rivers to Georgia

The Chattahoochee River is the largest river of the ACF system and provides
metropolitan Atlanta with approximately 70% of its total water supply (Andreen 2005). The only
other significant source of freshwater for metropolitan Atlanta is Lake Allatoona, which is a
diversion from the Etowah River, and is concurrently the subject of a second dispute between the
States of Georgia and Alabama (Fitzhugh and Richter 2004). As mentioned in chapters 3 and 4,
flow from the Chattahoochee River is regulated by the Buford Dam, which stores water in Lake
Lanier. From there, some water is released for hydroelectric production; remaining water is used
for recreation and for metropolitan Atlanta’s municipal water supply. By the time the
Chattahoochee River flows south of metropolitan Atlanta, municipal, industrial and even some
agricultural wastes have significantly degraded water quality. As a result of industrialization,
suburbanization and damaged and aging water infrastructure, point and nonpoint sources in the
region contribute chemical and biological contaminants to the river vis-à-vis outflow from storm
and sanitation sewers (Frick, et al. 2000). Thus, as the Chattahoochee River flows south of
metropolitan Atlanta’s southernmost suburbs to supply Georgia’s agricultural interests,
pesticides, herbicides and lawn fertilizers have severely degraded the water. Similarly, the Flint
River, which has its headwaters just miles south of the Atlanta metropolitan region, gradually
degrades in quality as it flows south through agricultural lands in the sub-basin. Before it joins
with the Chattahoochee River at the Georgia-Florida state line, the Flint River accumulates
chemical and biological contaminants and wastes from livestock and poultry production facilities
in southern Georgia (Wangsness 1997, 11). As will be discussed further in chapter 7, these
examples of Georgia’s southern agricultural interests degrade the water before it flows across the
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Georgia-Florida state line. Nonpoint agricultural waste, undiluted industrial and municipal waste,
in combination with nutrient loading in retention ponds, further degrade the water before it flows
to Apalachicola Bay (Davis and Jordan 2006).

With respect to research question 2, namely, what is the policy and regulatory framework that
currently exists for the allocation and distribution of the water resources among the three ACF
riparian states? the following views and opinions were collected and analyzed.

Water Management Authority at the Federal and State Scales

Chapter 4 discussed how during the 1980s, a new political-economic ideology grounded
in laissez-faire economic policies and often called competitive federalism was promoted as a
viable alternative to the highly-centralized Keynesian economic policies of the 1950s and 1960s
(Harvey 2005). Starting in the 1970s and maturing in the 1980s, a global political coalition led
by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and U.S. President Ronald Reagan materialized
neoliberal ideology by reducing the tax burden for citizens in the upper income brackets while
also reducing federal expenditures. In the U.S., Reagan’s neoliberal ideology emerged in the
form of drastic and selective reductions in federal grants and capital investments, which then
forced states into rigorous competition for the remaining federal development grants and capital.
Reagan promised that cutting funding would lead states down a path to financial independence
and that only ultra-competitive interstate and regional economies could bring prosperity to the
nation, because, as Reagan put it in 1982: “[e]xcellence demands competition…without a race
there can be no champion, no records broken, no excellence.”

	
  

100	
  

	
  
Conceived of as a way to reduce the federal budget, Reagan’s plan to foster interstate
competition resulted in many unforeseen consequences and ultimately complicated many issues,
particularly those which cannot be confined to one political jurisdiction, including environmental
protection efforts (Esty 1996), resource management practices (Earl and Czerniak 1996) and
questions of resource ownership (Krutilla, et al. 1983). In 1987, Reagan signed Executive Order
12612, committing the federal government to take a hands-off approach to inter-jurisdictional
issues, stating that:

“[i]t is important to recognize the distinction between problems of national scope (which
may justify Federal action) and problems that are merely common to the States (which
will not justify Federal action because individual States, acting individually or together,
can effectively deal with them).”

Believing water management to be a problem “common to the States,” the Reagan administration
recommended that Congress not provide states with management or planning assistance to
govern water resources (Gerlak 2005, 238). As a consequence, states were forced to shoulder the
burden of producing and allocating water, disposing of sewerage, implementing water laws, and
most germane to this study, engaging in interstate action to govern water use and development
(Engelbert 1957). In this context, the USACE had to defer decisions to allocate interstate waters
to states and local governments. Abrams (2009) suggests that the Corps ceding its power to
allocate water to states has become “hallmark of water federalism” and, therefore, it is clear that
no single scale of government has full authority over water allocation decisions. As a
consequence of power sharing between the federal and state water agencies, with neither
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assuming full authority over the waters of the ACF River Basin, managing the basin has become
a highly contested political exercise.
It is against this background that a high-ranking water manager, who works for the
USACE Mobile (AL) District, suggested in an extended interview that the lack of definitive
guidelines for allocating the waters of the ACF River has made it very difficult for USACE to
manage the basin. Perhaps demonstrating that he was only recently appointed to the USACE’s
ACF working group, the manager also suggested that an eventual resolution might still be
reached. According to this official, the working relationship between federal and state water
managers allowed the process of establishing allocation guidelines to move forward. As a water
manager with a strong legal background, he also suggested that when USACE finally releases its
updated water control manual, the expectation is that the Corps will be sued by a number of
stakeholders. Moreover, in this water manager’s view, it is only through a multi-jurisdictional
process of litigation that the USACE can resolve some of the more complex issues related to
water allocation in the ACF Basin:

“If we can get a final water control manual up there, we might as well. We get sued…we
might. But, you know, that kind of…the law solves a lot of the issues, because then we are
moving forward pursuant to a manual for the Basin, and we will have sort of a guideline
set up” (Interview, January 25, 2013).

Although hopeful that an allocation guideline would eventually be established, the water
manager admitted to being jaded about whether or not compact negotiations were the best way to
achieve this long sought after goal. He described the negotiating process as painstakingly slow:

	
  

102	
  

	
  
“If the states ever did reach an agreement…then the Army Corps reviews the agreement
and they will make a recommendation…and send that to Congress and then Congress
will either approve or disapprove, ratify it or not ratify it…And so, you know,
unfortunately, the states never get to that point where they really are going
forward…They have been living in that little provision [not reaching an agreement] for a
number of years…we want a definitive answer” (Interview, January 25, 2013; brackets
added).

Later, he added that USACE’s process of producing its own guidelines for managing the ACF
Basin is similarly time-consuming, but that it does differ from compact negotiations in one major
respect. In his view, allocation guidelines established as a result of compact negotiations would
have received feedback from experts at USACE and members of Congress. The ACF water
control manual, which “outline[s] the regulation schedules for each project, including operating
criteria, guidelines and guide curves for varying conditions as well as specifications for storage
and releases from the reservoirs” (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2014), will receive feedback
only from state water managers and the general public, as demonstrated in the quote below:

“[To produce the updated ACF Operations Manual], one of the things we need to look
at is, of course, the comments that people provided and we just got those in…so now, we
are going to those and trying to address those…and we did not come up with any array
of alternatives yet…After we’ve gone over all the scoping comments, we will be able to
come up with an array of alternatives…Then, we'll put those array of alternatives in to
be modeled…Then, what we will do is we'll go out with the draft EIS [Environmental
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Impact Statement] and draft water control manuals…And remember, this is probably a
year out, plus…At that point, we once again will travel from several locations to get
feedback and explain things…find out what the public thinks about this, what modeling
we may need to do additionally and things to consider…There would be a whole other
round of comments and everything at that point…After that, then, at that point, we'll go
ahead and go for it and do a final EIS of water control manuals, taking into account all
the comments and the information we received on the draft” (Interview, January, 25,
2013; brackets added).

The quote above clarifies that updating the current ACF Master Water Control Manual is an
iterative and time consuming process; left unsaid is the fact that the manual has not been
comprehensively revised since 1958 (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2013). Accordingly, the
Corps has spent years producing a comprehensively revised manual draft.
In January 2008, the Secretary of the Army directed USACE to begin making minor
updates to the water control manual for the first time since 1989. As a condition of drafting an
EIS, the USACE Mobile District collected what are called public scoping comments in order to
“determine the range of issues to be addressed and to identify the significant issues to be
analyzed in depth with respect to the proposed action” (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2013,
ES-1). Scoping comments were collected over a period of four years from fall 2008 until fall
2012, resulting in 3,261 comments from 965 individuals (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2013,
ES-2). The distribution and categories of comments received by USACE are shown below in
Table 3.
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Table 3: Distribution and Categories of Scoping Comments Related to the Update of the Water Control Manual for
the ACF River.

Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 2013.

In concluding the interview, the abovementioned USACE water manager expressed uncertainty
that further compact negotiations among the states would result in a conclusive allocation
agreement because the conflict has been dragged out with very little progress made over the
course of 25 years. Moreover, even with the involvement of federal policymakers, including the
U.S. President, a resolution is not in sight. The following section will explore this issue and offer
explanations as to why compact negotiations failed to produce an equitable allocation formula.
Despite the numerous failures, the water manager still held out some hope for the prospect of
achieving a final resolution to the ACF conflict:

“[Compact negotiations] were all the way up in the DC level…they had a meeting
between the governors…you had, you know, the President involved and they couldn't
reach it in the early 2000s, not just in the 1990s, in the early 2000s they couldn't reach an
	
  

105	
  

	
  
agreement then!...I don't know if they will now, but having said that, I think at this point
this is the first time we haven't had active litigation on the ACT [Alabama-CoosaTallapoosa Basin] or state litigation…and there is only one phase still active on the ACF,
which is Phase 2, which is the ESA [Endangered Species Act], but this is the most calm
time as far as litigation that we got [in] a long time” (Interview, January 25, 2013;
brackets added).

The next section will now turn to a discussion of the research data related to research question 3,
namely, how did the three states strategically orchestrate the failure of compact negotiations in
order to push the problem into the future and at the same time to develop facts on the ground?

Compact Negotiations as Highly Contested Political Exercise

In 1992, the States of Georgia, Florida and Alabama signed a formal agreement to
generate a temporary compromise to the increasingly contentious dispute over the right to
withdraw water from the ACF Basin. Under the agreement, the State of Alabama agreed to
suspend a lawsuit it filed in 1990 against USACE, which sought an injunction against the
Corps’ decision to increase water withdrawals out of Lake Lanier to supply the booming
northern Atlanta suburban counties with water (Seabrook 1988). In exchange for Alabama
suspending the lawsuit, USACE agreed to halt its plan to increase water withdrawals on behalf
of suburban Atlanta until it completed a feasibility study (Yardley 1992). The feasibility study
was designed as a collaborative effort between the three states and USACE to produce a
technical report from which the states and USACE would then collectively determine an
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allocation formula. The goal of the study, commonly referred to as the USACE Comprehensive
Study, was to model future water demand projections for eastern Alabama, western Georgia and
the north and central regions of the Florida panhandle. Operationally, the study was designed by
the states and the Corps to assess how USACE should manage the region’s water resources in
order to satisfy projected water demands of each state while also satisfying the region’s
economic and ecological needs and to provide a scientific basis for a future allocation formula.
Authorities originally planned to complete the study within three years. Marred by
successive delays, however, the study dragged on for five years and was finally abandoned in
1997. But, according to a high-ranking USACE water manager, by December of 1996, the states
collectively determined that the Comprehensive Study was becoming “too technical” and
negotiations could proceed despite the absence of the report (Interview, February 7, 2013). The
states then signed a new agreement and decided to hold compact negotiations in order to produce
an allocation formula rather than use the USACE Comprehensive Study to produce allocation
guidelines, as per the 1992 agreement. Thus, as a result of this new agreement, each of the three
state governors appointed one official, a Chief Negotiator, to represent his state’s respective
interests in the compact negotiations (Seabrook 1996). President Bill Clinton appointed thenSpeaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Newt Gingrich (R-Georgia), as the first federal
representative to the negotiations. Gingrich was charged with overseeing the interests of federal
agencies with a stake in the outcome of the negotiations, including the Corps, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) (Ezzard 1997).
The 1996 agreement by the states to hold compact negotiations without the assistance of
USACE is yet another example of federal agencies deferring to Reagan’s doctrine of state’s
rights with respect to water management. As a result, the decision to produce an allocation
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formula by negotiating, instead of using the USACE Comprehensive Study as a guide,
significantly diminished the management role of USACE. Thus, as Abrams (2009) suggests,
managing the basin thus became an infinitely more complex and highly contested political
exercise among the three riparian states. It is against this background that another high-ranking
water manager for the USACE Department of Legislative and Public Affairs offered an
explanation for why the ACF conflict remains unresolved. In an extended interview, this water
manager argued that the decision to remove USACE as an active party to the negotiations
downgraded the Corps’ responsibilities to simply providing technical assistance to the states,
which, in his view, contributed to the inability of the states to achieve a resolution:

“The Comprehensive Study was an agreement between the three states and the Corps to
look at the Basins [ACT and ACF] and try to come up with a solution…That study was
never completed because the states went to what's known as a compact…The
negotiations, at that point, became between the three states…then the compact fell apart
and what negotiations have occurred since then, we have not been involved with…We’ve
only offered our assistance to the three states…technical assistance if they wanted
it…we've not been an active member for the negotiations since the compact study went
away years ago” (Interview, February 7, 2013; brackets added).

For this water manager, the 1996 decision by Georgia, Florida and Alabama to hold compact
negotiations and not use the commissioned USACE Comprehensive Study as a guide lay at the
root of the federal agency’s reduced status as a technical assistant to the respective states’
parochial interests. Ultimately, the agreement to negotiate an allocation formula forced the Corps
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to take a hands-off approach to both the ACF conflict and the management of the ACF Basin, in
his view:

“The Comprehensive Study was a collaboration between the three states and the
government, with the Corps of Engineers providing the technical portion for the federal
government…The Comprehensive Study was looking at a lot of different aspects…stream
flow requirements…economics…environmental issues…looking at the requirements for
Apalachicola Bay…just all kind of different elements involved in that study…but, the
Comprehensive Study went away when the compacts were formed between the three
states and then authorized by Congress…Then, the negotiations strictly became the three
states’ negotiations…At some point they decided that the Comprehensive Study was not
achieving the goals that it was intended to achieve…the states decided to go the route of
forming a compact, and then, the negotiations became strictly between the three states
and we were there only to provide technical assistance, as required” (Interview, February
7, 2013; brackets added).

Similar to the previously quoted USACE water manager, this water manager also suggested that
the lack of definitive guidelines for allocating the waters of the ACF River system, coupled with
recurring droughts, made it very difficult for USACE to manage the basin, particularly while
having to meet the Congressionally mandated uses of ACF water of hydroelectric production,
flood control and navigation:
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“Our role is to manage the Basin under the authority given to us by Congress…Water
withdrawals out of the Basin are, unless it's coming out of the federal reservoir, is a state
issue and not something the Corps has any control of…but, getting to the drought
situation we've been into for the last summer then, your basic releases are for meeting
requirements, and the endangered species act for water quality in the river, and for the
water supply requirement that you can meet…Ok, so what tends to not get 100% or 80%
[of the water necessary to meet demand], depending on the severity of the situation - it’s
recreation, or navigation and, in some cases, hydropower…There is no priority in this,
you do the best you can with the available resource and it's usually a matter of how much
resource is available to be used…It's like I said, you know, if it's in the drought situation
and you are only making minimum releases and you are not getting the inflow into [Lake
Lanier], then obviously recreation is an authorized purpose that is gonna be
impacted…We follow the requirements of the law and we try to meet all the authorized
purposes as best we can with the available resource…Obviously in a drought, some
things aren't gonna be met to the extent you would like to see them met…it's just there
isn't enough water” (Interview, February 7, 2013; brackets added).

Successive Failures to Negotiate a Resolution Lead to Litigation

The tri-state conflict over the waters of the ACF Basin is a unique case among water
disputes. Unlike the vast majority of transboundary water disputes, the ACF conflict has not been
successfully resolved through cooperative action, which is here taken to mean compact
negotiations. As Wolf (1998) and Matsumoto (2002) suggest, it is rare for a transboundary
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dispute over water rights to segue into an extended conflict. Thus, the continuation of the 25year-old conflict over the ACF Basin is in many respects both historically and geographically
unique. For Wolf (1998) and Matsumoto (2002), water disputes often act as a catalyst for
upstream and downstream riparians to cooperate in the hope of promoting ‘water peace’ (Allan
2002). Cooperative actions may include: (a) exchanging policy ideas; (b) committing verbal
support for common goals; and, (c) enacting cultural agreements and major strategic alliances
(Yoffe, et al. 2004). Although, on the one hand, the States of Georgia, Florida and Alabama have
expressed rhetorical support for achieving a resolution to the ACF conflict, on the other hand,
every attempt to negotiate a resolution to the conflict has either failed or been stymied. Since the
first attempt by the states to negotiate in September of 1990 (Teegardin 1990) until the last
attempt in February of 2008 (Eberly and Shelton 2008), compact negotiations were marred by
successive delays, missed deadlines and time extensions, as shown in Figure 18 below.
The three states attempted to negotiate a resolution to the ACF conflict for a period of 18
years. However, it is still unclear whether negotiations yielded any material progress in terms of
reaching an equitable resolution. Rather, the State of Georgia and metropolitan Atlanta appear to
have secured their right to withdraw unlimited water and that this has caused material harm to
the stakeholders of Florida and Alabama. In this context, it is reasonable to claim that as of 2013,
the states are no closer to achieving an equitable resolution now than they were in 1990.
Moreover, it does not appear as if the State of Georgia, metropolitan Atlanta or the U.S.
Government were actually committed to the process of equitably allocating water in the ACF
Basin. Instead, extended interviews with parties to the conflict yielded evidence which strongly
suggests that Georgia and Atlanta were only committed to the idea of sustaining metropolitan
Atlanta’s suburban “growth machine” (Molotch 1976).
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Three years after compact negotiations were formally abandoned by the three states, the
2011 Appellate Court ruling dealt a final blow to the States of Florida and Alabama. As
mentioned in chapter 5, the landmark court ruling obligated the Corps to operate the basin
according to a preferential “ask and ye shall receive” relationship with metropolitan Atlanta. This
decision likely ensured that the states will never again return to the negotiating table. From this
action, it is clear that compact negotiations failed to meet the stated goals of “[developing] an
allocation formula for equitably apportioning the surface waters of the ACF Basin among the
States” (Signatory States 2003, 1) and “reaching substantial agreement in principle regarding
many of the terms of an allocation formula” (ibid, 1). Bearing in mind the failure by Georgia
officials to cooperate and achieve a resolution, the question then becomes: Did the three states
strategically orchestrate the failure of compact negotiations or was the failure capricious? The
study will continue to explore this question after first describing the politics of confidentiality
with respect to compact negotiations and the events which led a conflict mediator to decry
Georgia’s attitude toward the negotiations as uncompromising and committed to “bad faith”
negotiating.
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Figure 18: ACF Compact Negotiations Timeline.
Continued on page 114.
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Figure 18: ACF Compact Negotiations Timeline (Continued).
Source: Wong, J., History compiled from Atlanta Journal-Constitution “Water Wars” Archival Materials.
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Strategic Silence

Chapter 2 discussed how, when recruiting research participants for this study, the subjects
of politics and compact negotiations were intentionally eschewed so as to avoid being “shut out”
by potential participants. It was feared that potential participants might decline to participate in
the study because they would be wary of violating the 2009 and 2010 court-ordered
confidentiality agreements. The first motion for confidentiality was filed by the States of Georgia
and Alabama in December of 2009 in the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Alabama (see
Appendix A). The second motion for confidentiality was collectively filed by the States of
Georgia, Florida and Alabama in January of 2010 in the U.S. District Court, Middle District of
Florida (see Appendix B). In approving the January 2010 confidentiality motion, U.S. District
Court Judge Paul Magnuson opined that:

“[T]his litigation will be fully resolved only when all parties participate in settlement
discussions. However, it is the Court’s firm opinion that a settlement of such a
complicated and inflammatory case such as this can occur only if some negotiations,
whether among all parties or among only some of the parties, are conducted privately”
(U.S. District Court 2010, 1).

Judge Magnuson determined that the confidentiality order extended to all documents,
data, materials and statements made in the context of compact negotiations. Furthermore, the
confidentiality order was applied to both past and future compact negotiations, and thereby
prevented stakeholders from even recounting the details of past public meetings regarding the
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ACF conflict. In the context of this decree and consistent with the literature on interviewing
political elites (Aberbach and Rockman 2002; Smith 2006; Cochrane 1998; England 1994) and
interviewing reluctant participants (Adler and Adler 2002; Becker and Geer 1970; Johnson and
Clarke 2003), securing interviews with stakeholders to the ACF conflict proved to be a
particularly challenging task.
The court-ordered confidentiality agreement presented tremendous obstacles during this
study and discouraged data collection regarding research question 4 in three identifiable ways.
First, parts 3 and 4 of the 2010 confidentiality agreement ordered that:

“3. This [Confidentiality] Order extends to all documents, data or other materials
prepared in anticipation of or exchanged in the course of such negotiations and to all
statements made during the negotiations;
4. All parties participating in such negotiations also shall be bound by this Order and
shall keep confidential the negotiations and related documents of which they may become
apprised” (U.S. District Court 2010, 2).

Parts 3 and 4, therefore, effectively prevented stakeholders from aiding, assisting and/or
participating in the study in any meaningful way, not least of which was participating in
extended interviews. Second, for those stakeholders who did consent to be interviewed for this
study, those participants were painstakingly cautious to broach and/or avoid the confidential
topics of compact negotiations and litigation. Third, many potential participants utilized
“gatekeeping” as a way to distance themselves from the study and either (a) declined to be
interviewed, but offered the names of others who they believed would participate in the study, or
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(b) agreed to be interviewed, but declined to offer the names of others. Considering these effects
in conjunction with one another, the court-ordered confidentiality agreement was effective in that
it established a cloak of secrecy surrounding the compact negotiations and resulted in
stakeholders giving compact negotiations the “silent treatment.”

Declining to Participate in the Study

Parts 3 and 4 of the 2010 confidentiality agreement prevented the parties to the ACF
conflict from revealing the details of negotiations, litigation, and also from disclosing any
information about statements made in the context of negotiations. In short, these provisions of
the confidentiality agreement effectively worked to prevent stakeholders from participating in
this study for fear of violating the order. As mentioned in Chapter 2, and as the four quotes
below indicate, potential participants who declined to be interviewed for this study often made
either explicit or implicit references to the U.S. District Court’s confidentiality order as a reason
for not participating. In the first quote below, a Florida water manager explicitly referenced the
confidentiality order and used it to justify his refusal to provide documents requested for this
study:

“Any documents produced during compact negations are confidential, per judges’ orders,
which are attached” (Personal conversation, May 9, 2013).

In the two quotes shown below, a former Georgia Chief Negotiator and a member of the Georgia
Chamber of Commerce, respectively, declined to participate in the study and justified their
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responses with language adapted from Part 2 of the confidentiality order, also shown below for
comparison, which stated that the topics of ongoing negotiations were to remain confidential:

“Because I continue to be employed by the State of Georgia, and because our water
negotiations with Florida and Alabama continue to be very active, I am afraid I must
respectfully decline to sit for an interview at this time” (Personal conversation, April 25,
2013).

“…With there being no signs of finality in the legal and political disputes, we feel it best
to keep our efforts focused on behind-the-scenes support in achieving a workable
resolution” (Personal conversation, February 14, 2013).

“2. The ongoing negotiations among the three States of Alabama, Florida and Georgia
concerning the issues presented by this litigation are, and shall be, kept, confidential”
(U.S. District Court 2010, 1-2).

Similarly, before agreeing to be interviewed for this study, the water manager from USACE
Mobile District initially declined to participate. In the quote shown below, the water manager
also implicitly referenced part 2 of the confidentiality order in justifying his decision not to
participate:
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“I can refer you to historic data that is available, but since Phase II of the litigation is
still pending before the Eleventh Circuit, the Army Corps is unable to provide
interpretative interviews” (Personal conversation, January 18, 2013).

Sidestepping and Withholding Information Regarding the Compact Negotiations

Although the confidentiality order posed a major obstacle in terms of gaining access to
elite stakeholders, a more significant obstacle took the form of stakeholders who agreed to
participate in the study but meticulously broached and/or withheld information related to
litigation and compact negotiations. Accordingly, the vast majority of interviews conducted for
this study did not successfully yield any straightforward responses to help answer the fourth
research question: Did the three states strategically orchestrate the failure of compact
negotiations in order to push the problem into the future and at the same time to develop facts on
the ground? However, as chapter 7 will discuss, data was finally uncovered, which allows
conclusion to be drawn with respect to the research question.
The cloak of secrecy surrounding the topic of compact negotiations fully materialized
when an extended interview with the high-ranking water manager from Alabama yielded no data
in regard to both litigation and compact negotiations. In fact, from the first time the water
manager was recruited to participate in the study, he was very upfront that he would not provide
comments on the topics of litigation or compact negotiations, as the court order restricted the
disclosure of either. Furthermore, as an additional security measure to ensure that the water
manager would not even broach confidential topics, he was required to gain approval from the
Office of Alabama Governor Robert Bentley in order for him to participate in the study.
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After the water manager received provisional approval from the Governor’s Office, he
then suggested that he received guidance as to which interview topics were off-limits (Personal
conversation, January 16, 2013). Several times during the interview, the water manager avoided
lines of questioning and stated that he could not comment on certain topics, as demonstrated in
several excerpts from the interview, which are shown below. Specifically, the water manager
expressed uncertainty as to whether answering a question would potentially violate an order
(judicial or bureaucratic), and he chose to err on the side of caution. It is not clear, however,
whether he chose not to comment because: (a) he did not wish to violate the court ordered
confidentiality agreement or (b) he did not wish to violate the trust of the Office of Alabama
Governor Robert Bentley. Either way, his guarded participation in the study underscores the
challenges of studying issues of manifest national, state, and regional importance under a court
ordered confidentiality agreement. For example, when asked about the status of compact
negotiations, this was the typically cautious response:

“How can I say this?...Well, I think, I guess, I don't think I can really state, but I think you
can just summarize from how things are going” (Interview, January 31, 2013).

“Well, I don’t think it's…Well, I can't say that in terms of negotiations” (ibid).

“Well, I can't mention…I can't comment on the status of negotiations…I mean, we feel,
and I state this right here [pointing to a 2007 press release]: our long-standing position
has been in favor of negotiations between three states…That's the best for everyone and
so, we always have that mindset” (ibid; brackets added).
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“I can't answer that…[pointing to a 2007 press release] I mean I basically say what are
our premises as well as what we say publicly” (Interview, January 31, 2013; brackets
added).

Confidentiality and the Limits of Snowball Sampling

Whereas it has been suggested by some that snowball sampling can be used successfully
by researchers to open closed doors and gain access to elites (Welch, et al. 2002; Rivera,
Kozyreva and Sarovskii 2002), this study found the “gatekeeping” method (Groger, Mayberry
and Straker 1999; Johnston and Sabin 2010) to be an ineffective sampling technique due to the
clandestine nature of compact negotiations. Several potential participants utilized “gatekeeping”
as a way to distance themselves from the study and either (a) declined to be interviewed, but
offered the names of others who they believed would participate in the study, or (b) agreed to be
interviewed, but declined to offer the names of others. Upon being approached for the study,
several stakeholders declined to be interviewed but added that they wanted to assist in some way
and offered to provide the names of other potential participants. In one instance, Bill Cronin, the
Vice President for Economic Development at the Atlanta Development Authority, responded to
an interview request by offering the name of another potential participant, as shown below:

“We are not involved in the below [sic] mentioned activity…You might try [City of
Atlanta, Department of Watershed Management]…Attached is their public relations
representative's details. Good luck” (Personal conversation, February 6, 2013; brackets
added).
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Upon reaching out to Janet Ward, the public relations representative for the Department of
Watershed Management as referred by Mr. Cronin, she also declined to be interviewed for this
study. Then, in a follow-up request for her to participate, Ms. Ward once again declined to give
an interview, but then offered to assist and provided the name of another potential participant
(Personal conversation, February 12, 2013).
For those who agreed to be interviewed for this study, the gatekeeping technique was
even less effective in terms of expanding the sample of participants than for those who declined
to participate. Even before an interview was conducted with the high-ranking water manager
from Alabama, he declined to refer any additional participants for the study. During a preinterview phone conversation with this high-ranking water manager, a second water manager
from the same agency briefly joined the call. In the days after the pre-interview conversation, the
high-ranking water manager was asked to provide the name of the second water manager who
joined the call, to which he replied: “[John Doe] was on the call with me and he works in our
office but I will be the only one you need to talk with” (Personal conversation, January 22, 2013;
brackets added). The above quote may summarize the apprehension felt by research participants
when referring others to participate. However, because employees of the Alabama Office of
Water Resources described this high-ranking water manager as “an authority on the ACF
conflict,” it is not clear whether he declined to refer others because: (a) he wanted to distance
himself from the study; (b) did not want others to know that he was being approached for an
interview; or, (c) whether he truly felt that he would be able to provide an answer to any question
regarding the ACF conflict. Similar to the Alabama water manager, a former Governor of Florida
who was interviewed for this study also declined to provide the names of any potential
participants for the study. After the interview was completed, the former Governor jokingly
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stated that he knew the U.S. District Court’s confidentiality order prohibited him from speaking
about the ACF conflict and added that, if he referred any participants it could be mistaken as an
admission that he violated the order (Personal conversation, April 25, 2012).

The Research Process and the Politics of Confidentiality

It is clear that the 2010 confidentiality agreement ordered by the U.S. District Court acted
as a limiting factor in this study and thereby restricted data collection related to the sensitive
topics of litigation and compact negotiations. The confidentiality agreement not only imposed a
blanket of silence on all parties involved in either litigation and/or compact negotiations, it also
shifted the compact negotiations from the public and into the private arena. The decision was
lauded by some, including then-Governor of Georgia, Sonny Perdue, who stated that, “this
request [for confidentiality] is yet another proof point that all three states are committed to
working together to reach a tri-state water deal” (Redmon 2010). Then-Governor of Florida,
Charlie Crist, also weighed in and stated that, “[the confidentiality agreement] allows for free
and open discussions without the fear of compromising ongoing litigation” (ibid; brackets
added). Despite receiving praise from state officials who filed the motion for confidentiality, the
order was also met with criticism by some stakeholders including Sally Bethea, Executive
Director of the Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper, which is an organization committed to
protecting the ACF watershed. Following the order, Ms. Bethea called into question the decision
to conceal negotiations:
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“We actually keep asking ourselves, 'What is it that has got to be concealed here?' After
20 years, don't we all basically know the facts? Is this confidentiality arrangement really
something just to serve as cover for political leaders - the governors? Bottom line, we
think secrecy is not in the best interest of all the people in the three states who rely on
these river systems” (Redmon 2010).

One Participant Opens Up

Against this background, only one participant agreed to participate in the study in order
to speak at length on the topic of compact negotiations. In an extended interview, this participant,
a former high-ranking water manager for the State of Florida, shared stories of his experiences
while working as a mediator to the ACF conflict. The water manager became involved in the
conflict when a former Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regional administrator from
Atlanta recruited him to assist with the ACF conflict. The EPA administrator asked the water
manager to help mediate the compact negotiations between the states due to the water manager’s
prior experience working to resolve the Tampa Bay area water conflict in the 1990s. After the
water manager agreed to lend his expertise to the EPA, he was appointed as an assistant to a
mediation working group and charged with reviewing allocation formula proposals and
mediating any meetings among state officials. The water manager’s professional experiences
serving as a mediator to the conflict led him to proclaim that compact negotiations broke down
among the states due to a combination of power inequity and a lack of strategic planning.
Hereafter, the former water manager from Florida will be referred to as a “mediator” to reflect
his position with respect to the ACF compact negotiations.
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According to the mediator, an unequal power distribution existed between the parties to
the negotiations that discouraged compromise from the outset. The mediator suggested that
Georgia officials seemingly wanted only to preserve metropolitan Atlanta’s water supply and
that this came to the detriment of not only Florida and Alabama, but also Georgia’s southern
agricultural interests. As shown in the quote below, the mediator proclaimed that metropolitan
Atlanta appropriated Georgia’s state agencies to act as a conduit for representing its interests
during negotiations:

“You know, my sense was, and it still is that Georgia was negotiating on behalf of
Atlanta…And that was their sole interest - that Atlanta got enough water to not hurt any
existing, you know, water demands and any future growth that, in some form or fashion,
would be limited by a lack of water from, essentially, Lake Lanier…And again, they had
their negotiations done by…I think it was called DNR – [Georgia] Department of
Natural Resources…And it was a state agency but you felt like you were dealing with a
water utility for the City of Atlanta…And the reason I say that is, you know, you have
Atlanta and you have all of those Georgia cities downstream…And other cities who are
concerned about river flows, not only for drinking water...But, you know, they discharged
their wastewater out to the Caloosahatchee and they have to meet certain standards…If
there were low flows coming down the Caloosahatchee for whatever reason, they were
having trouble meeting their discharge limits from the wastewater treatment plants…But
it didn't seem to matter…It was kind of like Georgia was all in for the City of Atlanta.
Forget Alabama, forget Florida, and forget those cities downstream of Atlanta…They
didn't care…They didn't care about the farmers on the Flint River…They basically said,
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‘Hey, look, it’s all about public supplies for Atlanta. If we have to cut our farmers back
from irrigating and [minimize farmers’] impact on the Flint River, we’ll do it.’…It was
all about Atlanta…Of course, that’s where the folks are, that’s where the population is,
and screw the rest of Georgia was basically it…That’s what alarmed Alabama and
Florida” (Interview, September 19, 2013; brackets added).

According to the mediator, negotiations were also hampered by a looming conflict of
interest between Georgia and the federal government, which occurred due to the appointment of
a Georgia state official who served as the federal representative. In the mediator’s opinion,
Lindsay Thomas, who was named as the federal representative to negotiations and charged with
facilitating discussion among the states (Quinn 1998), was not interested in resolving the
conflict, as shown in the mediator’s quote below:

“Another mistake they had made was...He was a former legislator…House of
Representatives from the State of Georgia…And, he was the President or the Executive
Director of the Georgia Chamber of Commerce…And he was appointed to be the guy
who ran this whole thing…So, as I witnessed what he was doing and what he didn’t do,
my personal opinion is that I don't think he was too concerned about getting a
resolution…If you’re the Executive Director or whatever you call it, the President of the
Georgia Chamber of Commerce, why would you be the guy appointed to oversee all of
these negotiations from the federal government? Don't you think he had a little bit of a
vested interest?...You know what, when I got involved, he was already in there…So, I
always kind of scratched my head and said, ‘Why would you bring that?’…You need
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somebody who is good in mediation, you need an arbitrator, you need a facilitator,
somebody from another part of the country who doesn't have a vested interest and who
can keep things moving on…And this guy was, again, a Head of the Georgia Chamber of
Commerce…Watching him, I didn't think he really had a vested interest to see anything
really happen” (Interview, September 19, 2013; brackets added).

Finally, the mediator surmised that prior to the 2010 confidentiality agreement, which required
negotiations to be held in private, negotiators from Florida and Alabama were unwilling to
condemn Georgia officials for negotiating in bad faith. In the quote below, he proclaimed that
Florida and Alabama officials held their tongues because they did not want to publicly accuse
Georgia officials of submitting inequitable allocation proposals:

“You never got to say, when Georgia would put out a proposal on the table, and they do
their modeling and it was a bunch of crap…You never got to say, ‘this is really
bullshit’…If we were negotiating away somewhere, you’d kinda be able to be a little
more direct and say, ‘Guys, look, we gotta get some give-and-take here. Let's come up
with some alternative that will benefit, you know, let's come up with a consensus so
everybody could just walk away and say, ‘Yeah, we didn't get everything we
wanted’…But, because nobody is willing to do that in public, that was one of the major
issues” (Interview, September 19, 2013).

After compact negotiations were formally abandoned in 2008, the issue returned to the courts
and in 2009, a landmark ruling was handed down from the District Court.
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2009 District Court Ruling

For metropolitan Atlanta, the Chattahoochee River is such a significant source of
freshwater that Ken Salazar, Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior, once characterized
it as the “lifeblood” of the city (U.S. Department of the Interior 2012). According to a
communications specialist, who works for the Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC), and who
oversees the Tri-State Water Wars Resource Center, metropolitan Atlanta has thrived due to a
landmark decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. After engaging in
compact negotiations for 11 years without achieving any meaningful progress, the conflict for
water turned to the courts for relief. In 2009, Florida and Alabama rejoiced in a District Court
ruling which found that USACE had erred by granting metropolitan Atlanta to withdraw water
from Lake Lanier. However, in June 2011, an Appellate Court overturned the 2009 ruling by
U.S. District Court Judge Paul Magnuson that “water supply was not an originally authorized
purpose of Lake Lanier under the legislation that created Lake Lanier, but instead that Congress
intended for water supply to be an ‘incidental’ benefit of releases for hydropower and other
purposes” (Georgia Department of Natural Resources 2009).
In the 2009 ruling by Judge Magnuson, the Court examined the text, structure and
purpose of the legislation, which authorized the construction of the Buford Dam and Lake
Lanier. The Middle District Court of Florida found that neither the 1945 nor the 1946 Rivers and
Harbors Acts sought to allocate storage in Lake Lanier to provide metropolitan Atlanta with a
municipal water supply. The Court held that while the 79th U.S. Congress clearly understood that
metropolitan Atlanta would benefit from receiving a municipal water supply, this benefit was
only incidental to the release of stored water in order to generate hydroelectric power (U.S.
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District Court 2009, 74-75). As demonstrated by the transcription of USACE Colonel Potter’s
1952 testimony before Congress, as quoted in Judge Magnuson’s 2009 ruling:

“The question of Atlanta’s contribution to the costs of the Buford project surfaced again
in the hearings on the 1952 Army Appropriation Bill, H.R. 4386. Corps officer Colonel
Potter testified that ‘[t]he purpose of the project is flood control, water supply for the city
of Atlanta, which is growing by leaps and bounds, and the production of power.’ Civil
Functions, Dep’t of the Army Appropriations for 1952: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of
the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 82d Cong. 118 (1951) (statement of Col. Potter, Corps
officer) (SUPPAR026654). A member of the Subcommittee asked Colonel Potter if
Atlanta was ‘cooperating in this project in any way.’ Id. at 120 (question of Rep. Davis)
(SUPPAR026656). Colonel Potter responded:

No, sir; because this is not a problem of furnishing water directly or furnishing
storage for that purpose; it is the regulation of the river that gives [Atlanta] a
constant supply over the up-and-down supply now existing during the year. . .
.With this dam letting out a constant supply of water every day their water supply
problem is reduced immensely . . . .

Id. (statement of Col. Potter, Corps officer). Other committee members questioned
Colonel Potter further on Atlanta’s need for, and contribution to, the project:
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Mr. Ford: Where you have a project such as this particular project and water
supply is part of the justification for a community, does not the community make
any contribution to the project?

Col. Potter: Yes, sir, normally, but not in this case . . . .

This dam furnishes Atlanta with water due to the fact that it regulates the
discharge of floods. When a flood comes, it comes down in a certain set period—
say a week. We store that week’s terrific runoff of water and then let it out
gradually. . . . Hence we discharge that flood, we will say, for 3 months.

Then, in the production of electricity, we can discharge somewhere in the
neighborhood of 4,000 to 5,000 second-feet constantly. That [water] will always
be flowing by Atlanta; so that now they won’t have the river partially dry or full
of mud in the summer, but they will have a more or less constant flow of the river
past their door and will always be able to pull water out of it.

It did not cost the Federal Government 1 cent to supply that service, because it
was an adjunct to the power supply and flood control. Had we put in some
storage purely for water supply, which they would tell us to release at certain
intervals, we would then charge them for it, and they would have to pay for the
difference of that construction cost.”
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Thus, for Judge Magnuson, the decision by Congress not to charge the City of Atlanta for its
municipal water supply demonstrates clear congressional acknowledgement that water would be
supplied to Atlanta vis-à-vis incidental flow regulation of Buford Dam, but that Congress did not
wish to allow Atlanta to directly withdraw water out of Lake Lanier. Furthermore, the Court
ruled that USACE providing metropolitan Atlanta with municipal water constituted a major
operational change, which required congressional approval. Because Congress did not authorize
USACE to allocate storage for municipal water, the Corps’ actions were rendered illegal (U.S.
District Court 2009, 77-79). Judge Magnuson also concluded that by 2012, either USACE was to
secure congressional approval to allocate municipal water storage in Lake Lanier or the dispute
was to be resolved in another way. Of course, one year prior to the deadline established by the
District Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit overturned Judge Magnuson’s
ruling.
Contrary to the statement made by the communications specialist, metropolitan Atlanta
was booming long before the 2011 ruling provided the region with a secure municipal water
supply from Buford Dam. Recall that Chapter 3 discussed the historical context for metropolitan
Atlanta’s spatial, population and economic growth, dating back to the New Deal era of the
1930s. Because, while Big Dam Era dam construction projects supported hydropower,
navigation and flood control, municipal water supply was an ancillary benefit although not a
primary purpose behind dam-building efforts. In contrast to the history of the Big Dam Era, the
communications specialist stated:

“Our general feeling is that we need the Corps…yeah, the basic premise of the entire
court case was that we believed that Lake Lanier was instructed as a water supply
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reservoir as one of the regional authorized [purposes]…and that was finally validated by
the Court of Appeals…We believe that the Corps should operate Lake Lanier to meet the
needs of the metropolitan [read: Atlanta] water utilities…That has always been our
position…That was kind of the genesis of the Corps’ case from the beginning…The Corps
was developing the first authorization study, more specifically, formally reauthorizing
Lake Lanier for water [to provide] water supply for [the Atlanta] region, and that is why
the State of Alabama sued the Corps” (Interview, March 20, 2013; brackets added).

In the context of the statement above, it is reasonable to assume that, as the communications
specialist for the Atlanta city government, the interviewee merely reiterated the ARC’s
institutional position regarding the ACF conflict. Accordingly, the above statement by the
communications specialist was strikingly similar to remarks made in 2009 by Sam Olens, former
Chairman of the ARC, who stated that USACE should operate Buford Dam so as to satisfy the
water demands of metropolitan Atlanta and that not operating the dam in this way would be
detrimental to the region’s growth:

“Let’s be clear about the [Judge Magnuson’s] ruling. Never once has he said metro
Atlanta uses too much water. And never once has he said there is not enough water in the
basin to meet the reasonable needs of all users. His ruling is based on a very narrow
interpretation of the law that authorized the [Buford] Dam in 1946. His ruling says
simply that the 1946 authorization does not allow the Corps of Engineers to operate
Buford Dam for water supply. The judge’s ruling, if allowed to stand, would have
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devastating consequences for our region. Returning the Dam to base-line operations of
the mid-1970s is unconscionable” (Olens 2009).

A second communications specialist from the ARC provided a different take on the ACF
conflict, which is more consistent with the views of the two Mobile District USACE water
managers than the statements made by the former ARC communications specialist. In an
interview, this second communications specialist suggested that before the 2011 ruling, USACE
was unable to meet the freshwater demands of metropolitan Atlanta largely due to political
interference and pending litigation:

“Part of the problem with this conflict is it’s also political…sometimes, you can have
great technical people working on ideas and concepts and, you know, strategies and
resolutions, and some of the stuff comes down to politics…The Corps is the federal
agency that has responsibility for managing the operations, but obviously they were
hamstrung with, you know, one of the states sued them in the federal court...and they
were unable to exercise their diligence and their authority while under the lawsuit”
(Interview, March 20, 2013).

The two communications specialists later revealed that due to the 2011 ruling, ARC and USACE
now share a unique working relationship in which the Corps coordinates its water releases from
Lake Lanier with metropolitan Atlanta’s water utilities. Releases are coordinated in an attempt to
match the weekly water demand projections for the Atlanta metropolitan region:
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“We have a limited role in providing data to the Corps, as far as weekly supply demands,
and we provide that information to the Corps in order for them to help coordinate
releases…but, we defer to the Corps…Yeah, they’re gonna make their own decisions on
releases based on hydropower requirements and other downstream needs in the
basin…So, we have a measured interest, in terms of providing that information to them”
(Interview, March 20, 2013).

Upon further questioning, one communications specialist suggested that metropolitan Atlanta’s
own water demand projections figure heavily into USACE determinations of how much water to
release from the Buford Dam:

“We work with withdrawers from the river downstream of the dam…so, we just make it
easier for all concerned…We collect the water utilities’ projections as to how much
water they’re gonna need that week and relay that to the Corps…Then, the Corps uses
that and other information to decide about the releases” (Interview, March 20, 2013).

This point was also reiterated in a personal conversation (January 9, 2014) with a high-ranking
water manager for the USACE Department of Legislative and Public Affairs. The water manager
stated that, since 2011, metropolitan Atlanta’s weekly demand projections are assuredly met by a
combination of: (a) naturally-occurring stream flows in the ACF Basin, north of the Buford Dam,
and (b) USACE releases at the Buford Dam. The water manager went on to say that, regardless
of the proportion and combination of natural and USACE released stream flows, metropolitan
Atlanta’s weekly demand projections will certainly be met. With this statement, it appears as if
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metropolitan Atlanta’s booming growth and its demand for water is of prime importance to the
Corps.
The next section will now turn to a discussion of the collected data related to research
question 4, namely, how have stakeholders in Atlanta used a discourse of water scarcity to
construct a unique interpretation of the water conflict, which differs greatly from the
interpretations by stakeholders of Florida, Alabama and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers? In this
context, the following views and opinions were collected.

2011 Appeal, Atlanta’s Water Supply and Discourses of Water Metabolism

The 2011 ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit drastically
transformed the relationship between USACE and the Atlanta metropolitan region. In short, the
court ruling effectively transformed the Corps into a water wholesaler responsible for supplying
the region with water. In a 2012 USACE legal opinion, written in response to the ruling and the
operational changes required by the Corps to manage the basin accordingly, the Army’s Chief
Counsel summarized the ruling as follows:

“[t]he ACF basin was intended to provide benefits for the purposes of hydropower,
navigation, and flood control, estimated in annual average dollar values, and also to
provide benefits for the purposes of municipal and industrial water supply, recreation,
and fish and wildlife conservation, which were not quantified in the same manner” (U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers 2012, 27).
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As a result of the overturned ruling, USACE was forced to retroactively concede that the agency
had operated the ACF system in error for nearly 60 years. Consequently, in the same legal
opinion, USACE announced its institutional position in regard to the Appellate Court’s
justification for overturning the District Court’s 2009 ruling as follows:

“[i]t has always been apparent from the plain text of the Newman Report that the Corps
proposed, and Congress authorized, a system that was expressly intended to ‘ensure an
adequate water supply for the rapidly growing Atlanta metropolitan area’ downstream,
and the Corps designed, and has always operated, the Buford Project with that goal in
mind” (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2012, 27).

In this context, USACE reached the conclusion that Congress had always intended for the
Buford Dam to provide metropolitan Atlanta with municipal water, despite the Army’s Chief
Counsel, who admitted that “[i]n 2002 and 2009, I reached different conclusions regarding the
extent of the Corps’ authority for water supply associated with the Buford Project” (ibid, 2). The
above quote is referring to 2002 and 2009 opinions, in which USACE concluded that municipal
water was only an incidental benefit of the ACF system and that supplying metropolitan Atlanta
with municipal water was distinguished from other “expressly authorized purposes.” Municipal
water supply was distinguished from hydropower and navigation purposed because municipal
water supply was not generally a purpose of Corps projects, as established by the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1946, as was discussed in chapter 3. However, the 2011 Appellate Court decision
ruled to the contrary and thereby established the “bounds of Corps’ authority,” including
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requiring USACE to provide metropolitan Atlanta with municipal water (U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit 2011, 93).
In the 2011 ruling, the Appellate Court conceded that neither the 1945 RHA nor the 1946
RHA Amendments monetized municipal water supply as a “principal direct benefit” of the
Buford Dam project. However, the court later explained away this legislative omission as simply
congressional oversight because in 1945 and 1946, when the RHA and its amendments were
adopted, metropolitan Atlanta “had no immediate need for increased water supply, though such
a future need was ‘not improbable’” (ibid, 8). Therefore, the Appellate Court concluded that
municipal water supply was neither monetized nor discursively constructed as a principal benefit
“presumably because the benefit of this purpose [municipal water supply], unlike all of the
others, could only accrue in the future, rendering any valuation at that time speculative” which
is why the City of Atlanta was never asked to contribute money toward financing the
construction of Buford Dam (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 2011, 9). For the
Appellate Court, the Newman Report and hence, the authorizing legislation, specifically
concluded that municipal water supply was simultaneously an intentional and incidental benefit
of the Buford Dam, although this position required the Appellate Court to redefine the word
“incidental” as follows:

“In light of the foregoing statutory language, and particularly Congress’ intent that the
Corps should have authority to accommodate the Atlanta area’s water supply needs at
the expense of some detriment to ‘system power value,’ we cannot conclude that
Congress intended for water supply to be a mere incidental benefit. By definition, one
purpose that is to be accomplished to the detriment of another cannot be incidental. Thus,
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the language of Sections 79 and 80 clearly indicates that Congress intended for water
supply to be an authorized, rather than incidental, use of the water stored in Lake Lanier.
Appellees argue that the Newman Report’s references to water supply as ‘incidental’
demonstrates that water supply was not an authorized purpose of the Buford Project.
This is an attractive proposition due to its simplicity, but the context of these references
undermines this claim. The language in question is as follows:

The city of Atlanta and other local interests in that area have strongly urged that
the Roswell development, 16 miles upstream of Atlanta, or one or more other
reservoirs above Atlanta, be provided first, in order to meet a threatened shortage
of water, during low-flow periods, for municipal and industrial purposes. If the
regulation storage reservoir required for the economical operation of the
proposed developments below Columbus could be located above Atlanta, it would
greatly increase the minimum flow in the river at Atlanta, thereby producing
considerable incidental benefits by reinforcing and safeguarding the water supply
of the metropolitan area.

Newman Report ¶ 68 (emphasis added). We conclude that this single reference to water
supply as an ‘incidental benefit’ was an explanation for why the dam would be built
above Atlanta and was not meant to confer a subordinate status” (U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit 2011, 57-58).
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By redefining “incidental benefit” to mean “authorized purpose,” the Appellate Court was able to
justify its conclusion in the following way:

“The agency decided to locate the dam at Buford, approximately 47 miles upstream of
Atlanta. Paragraph 68 was an explanation for why the Corps deemed it beneficial to
build the dam at this location; the explanation: water supply. An upstream location
would allow the Corps to secure Atlanta’s water supply as an incident of the other
authorized purposes. That is to say that the aim of benefitting water supply could be
accomplished without any significant detriment to hydropower, navigation, or flood
control. The report stated that the revised location and size of the dam and reservoir
would result in ‘greatly increase[d] . . . minimum flow in the river at Atlanta,
thereby…reinforcing and safeguarding the water supply of the metropolitan area’” (U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 2011, 59).

In the process, the ruling not only transformed municipal water supply from an incidental benefit
to a bona fide and primary purpose of the Buford Dam but also “handed Georgia an enormous
victory in the tri-state water litigation” (Rankin 2011) with the following passage:

“Congress also clearly indicated that the Buford Project was intended to benefit the
Atlanta area’s needs by assuring the water supply. If water supply had been deemed a
subordinate purpose by Congress, the Buford Project would have been detrimental,
rather than beneficial, to the Atlanta area’s water supply needs. That is to say, if the only
water being supplied was to be a subordinate byproduct of power generation, then the
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City of Atlanta would have eventually found itself able to withdraw less water from the
river than it would have been had no dam been built at all. In light of the repeated
references in the authorizing legislation to safeguarding and ensuring an adequate water
supply for Atlanta, Congress very clearly did not intend the dam to harm the city’s water
supply. The language of the RHA clearly indicates that water supply was an authorized
purpose of the Buford Project” (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 2011, 6566).

USACE Bounded by Eleventh Circuit to Operate as Water Supplier to Atlanta

Changes to the ways in which the Corps manages the ACF Basin, as a result of the
Appellate Court ruling, were drastic and disproportionately favored the interests of Georgia
stakeholders, particularly metropolitan Atlanta’s commercial and residential interests. As the
following passage demonstrates, the 2011 ruling not only concluded that USACE was to provide
metropolitan Atlanta with increasingly more water over time but also that for USACE to not
provide the region with water constitutes a violation of the law:

“[t]he authorizing legislation in 1946 not only included water supply as an authorized
purpose but explicitly contemplated that the Corps was authorized to increase water
supply usage over time as the Atlanta area grew and that this increase would not be a
change from Congressionally contemplated operations at all. Thus, the Corps never
considered its authority under the RHA to substantially increase its provision of water
supply and reallocate storage therefor—authority which we hold today was granted by
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the RHA. And the Corps never considered its WSA authority to provide water supply as
an addition to (or as supplementing) its RHA authority. The failure of the Corps in these
respects renders its alternative reason for denying Georgia’s request arbitrary,
capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with the law” (U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit 2011, 72-73).

Speaking on the landmark decision, Bill Torpy and Bill Rankin, special reporters for the ACF
conflict, who write for the Atlanta Journal-Constitution (2011), argue:

“At stake for Florida are its seafood industry and agricultural interests, while Alabama's
fight centers around power generation and economic growth. But Stevens [ARC
Environmental Planning Chief] knew Georgia had something the courts could not
ignore: ‘We have 3 million people using this system; we are not going to go away.’”

Although interviews with communications specialists from the ARC suggested that the
agency defers to Corps decisions and that the Corps determines its water releases according to its
own operating criteria, the empirical evidence collected seems to suggest otherwise. It would
appear that USACE forgot that:

“to accommodate downstream water supply withdrawals therefore becomes a question
of how much conservation storage is available to make releases for downstream water
supply, while continuing to operate for all authorized system purposes, in keeping with
Congressional expectations” (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2012, 30).
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While the Corps now makes an effort to coordinate water releases to match the weekly demand
projections of metropolitan Atlanta, stakeholders from Florida and Alabama have suggested that
the other purposes of the system are not currently being met, nor is the mandatory protection of
several estuarine species under the Endangered Species Act being realized. According to the
Alabama water manager who was interviewed for this study, “the Corps of Engineers does not
coordinate releases from Buford Dam with any state agencies in Alabama” (Personal
conversation, November 11, 2013). The estuarine biologist from Florida came to the same
conclusion:

“I guess the political clout that Atlanta and Georgia, in general, has with the Corps…the
Corps is providing that increased storage and certainly, if you look at the way they
revised the operating procedures, they favor that increased storage very much…that's
why we in Florida have gotten this minimum level since about May…only a couple of
times have we got little bumps in flow, but it has been stable at little over 5000 cfs [cubic
feet per second]” (Interview, February 1, 2013; brackets added).

The high-ranking water manager for the USACE Department of Legislative and Public Affairs,
alongside the estuarine biologist from Florida and the high-ranking water manager from
Alabama, confirmed what the ARC communications specialist relayed during interviews. In
other words, it appears that the Corps now operates the ACF Basin according to a preferential
“ask and ye shall receive” relationship with metropolitan Atlanta’s water utilities, while the
demands for a more equitable distribution compact with Florida and Alabama are being
systematically ignored.
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The following chapter will continue to introduce the views and opinions of additional
stakeholders, which were collected with respect to answering this study’s central research
question: Why has the longest water dispute in U.S. history, the ACF River Basin conflict among
the riparian States of Georgia, Florida and Alabama, not yet been resolved? The competing
discursive representations of the ACF conflict and the regional water crisis will be discussed.
Additionally, the conditions leading to various failed attempts to negotiate a resolution will be
explored.
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CHAPTER SIX:

WATER SECURITY, METABOLIC SHIFT, AND DISCURSIVE REPRESENTATIONS

In a 2012 progress report written in response to the Appellate Court’s 2011 ruling, the
Metropolitan North Georgia Water Planning District expressed relief and contentment that the
Court granted metropolitan Atlanta a secure supply of municipal water. Thus, the Appellate
Court effectively voiced its approval for the region’s booming commercial and residential
growth. Against this background, then-Chairman of the Metropolitan North Georgia Water
Planning District, Boyd Austin, stated that:

“[T]he courtroom battle over water supply in the ACF/ACT basins ended. By denying to
hear petitions from Florida, Alabama and the Southeast Federal Power Customers, the
United States Supreme Court let stand the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision that
water supply is an authorized purpose of Lake Lanier. This decision affirmed that water
supply is indeed an authorized purpose of Lake Lanier and that metro Atlanta’s future
water supply is now more secure” (Metropolitan North Georgia Water Planning District
2012, 1).

That metropolitan Atlanta was granted a secure and plentiful supply of municipal water and that
the 2011 court ruling, in effect, ended the region’s water woes in perpetuity is strongly reflected
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by metropolitan Atlanta and Georgia State stakeholders’ discursive representations of: (a) the
significant threat posed to the water supply by “drought” conditions; and, (b) the need, or lack
thereof, to implement “water conservation policies” in order to avoid water shortages. In this
context, it is clear that the 2011 ruling drastically transformed the politics of water production
and distribution throughout the ACF Basin and that the Court demonstrated a clear bias in favor
of metropolitan Atlanta. The ruling thereby severely altered the ever-evolving metabolic
relationship between metropolitan Atlanta and freshwater in the ACF Basin.

Atlanta and Georgia’s Wholesale Avoidance of Drought Discourse

As shown in Figures 19 and 20 below, “[s]ince 1999, [the State of Georgia] has spent
more years in drought than in normal conditions. Federal maps show that more than half of
Georgia is now [2012] in extreme or exceptional drought” (Banerjee 2012, 1). Yet, despite the
far-reaching effects of the 2011-2012 drought, which were described by the Chattahoochee
Riverkeeper Water Policy Director, Laura Hartt, as, “yet another drought which for some
portions of Georgia may prove to be almost as severe as the one from 2006 to 2009”
(Chattahoochee Riverkeeper 2012, 2), the drought received scant attention from water managers
and state and regional officials, prompting some to criticize officials for giving the drought “the
silent treatment” (Banerjee 2012, 1).
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Figure 19: 2012 U.S. Drought Monitor.
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture 2012.

The 2006-2009 drought prompted a significant public response from state and regional
officials. In 2007, during the second year of the four-year drought period, metropolitan Atlanta
had suffered an 18-inch rainfall deficit by year’s end. The drought’s severity prompted thenMayor of Atlanta, Shirley Franklin, to call the situation a “dire, severe, extreme drought” (CNN
2007). Yet in 2012, the second successive year in which Georgia faced drought conditions and
which resulted in metropolitan Atlanta suffering a 13-inch rainfall deficit by year’s end, the
drought conditions barely prompted any responses from state or regional officials. As Gil
Rogers, a senior attorney with the Southern Environment Law Center in Atlanta, noted, “[i]t’s
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very odd that we are into the second year of an historic drought, and we’re still not hearing
about it” (Rogers, as quoted in Banerjee 2012, 2).

	
  
Figure 20: 2012 Southeast Drought Monitor.
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture 2012.

The failure of state and regional officials to comment on the threat posed to metropolitan
Atlanta’s water supply by the 2011-2012 drought likely contributed to the lack of media
coverage by the region’s largest newspaper, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution. Table 4 below
shows that an advanced Boolean search, conducted using the keywords “drought AND georgia”
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and “drought AND atlanta,” resulted in ten times as many newspaper articles on the topic of the
2006-2009 drought when compared to the 2011-2012 drought.

Table 4: AJC Newspaper Article Search Results Using Advance Boolean Phrases.

Year

"drought" AND "georgia"

"drought" AND "atlanta"

2005

70

169

2006

181

327

2007

659

1,037

2008

631

1,000

2009

148

257

2010

81

130

2011

84

131

2012

64

105

Source: Wong, J. via Access World News Database.

	
  
Not only did the drought fail to gain traction in the media, but some high-ranking Georgia
officials also chose to ignore and/or minimize the significance of the drought. When prompted
by reporters to comment on the looming threat of drought and its potential impacts on the state’s
water supply, avoidance of the problem was not feasible. Instead, Georgia officials chose to
outright deny the existence of a water shortage, and thereby significantly minimized the impact
of the drought by alluding that there were “other strategies” that the state was pursuing to
increase its water supply. At a 2012 press conference in which Georgia Governor Nathan Deal
was expected to explain why he had chosen not to issue a disaster declaration in response to the
statewide drought, the Governor’s Press Secretary, Brian Robinson, relayed the following
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message: “We don’t have wide-scale water shortages at this juncture…We can’t make it rain, we
can’t squeeze the washcloth, but we are taking active steps to increase our water supply” (Press
Statement, 2012). That Georgia did not fear that water shortages would result from an extreme
drought, which afflicted much of the state, was in stark contrast to only five years earlier. For
example, in October of 2007, then-Governor Sonny Perdue declared a state of emergency due to
the 2006-2009 drought (Lohr 2007). Then one month after declaring a state of emergency, the
Governor organized a candlelight vigil on the steps of the Georgia State Capitol and led
attendees in a group prayer to seek relief from the drought, exclaiming, “God, we need You. We
need rain.”

Ignoring the Problem: Water Conservation Policies Become Deprioritized

In 2012, despite much of the State of Georgia again being plagued by extreme and
exceptional drought conditions similar to those of 2006-2009, there were no dramatic
presentations or group prayers by state officials to seek heavenly relief. While the same cannot
be said for the rest of the state, metropolitan Atlanta maintained such a high degree of immunity
from the drought that efforts to encourage water conservation in the region were subsequently
characterized as unnecessary and reactionary by high-ranking state officials. For example, Nap
Caldwell, a former Chief Negotiator for Georgia and then-Head of the Georgia Environmental
Protection Division’s (GaEPD) Drinking Water Program, deemed an outdoor water conservation
program in metropolitan Atlanta to be an inconsequential and unnecessary effort to stave off
water shortages experienced by rural counties south of the metropolitan region. Caldwell claimed
that: “a gallon of water saved in the metro Atlanta area would fail to ensure that there would be
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adequate water for human consumption in southern parts of the state” (Banerjee 2012, 1). With
this quote, Caldwell implied that water conservation would not alone improve water quality in
southern parts of the state and that water pollution continues to be a problem due to chemical and
biological contaminants, which enter rivers and streams and accumulate in the basin vis-à-vis
outflow from storm and sanitation sewers in metropolitan Atlanta (Frick, et al. 2000).
	
  

The 2011 ruling, which established municipal water supply as an authorized purpose of

the Buford Dam, appears to be responsible for this shift in the attitudes of Georgia and
metropolitan Atlanta officials toward water, in which the problems of water scarcity and water
shortage were considered to be “under control” (Kaika 2003). Evidence for this discursive shift,
pre-2011 and post-2011, came in the form of contrasting statements made by public officials in
regard to the Appellate Court’s ruling between 2009 and 2013.
Immediately following the 2009 ruling by U.S. District Court Judge Paul Magnuson,
which declared municipal water supply to be an incidental benefit to metropolitan Atlanta, thenMayor Shirley Jackson agreed, saying that: “[Metropolitan Atlanta’s] water resources are not
unlimited…and we hope that Atlantans continue to do their part by conserving water wherever
possible” (Springston 2009, 1). However, Mayor Jackson was not alone in her calls to conserve
water, as officials from around Georgia also attempted to rally support to enact water
conservation legislation in the hope that legislative efforts would result in a more sustainable
water metabolism across the state. Acting in the same spirit as Mayor Jackson, State
Representative Debbie Buckner, introduced a bill to the 2010 state legislature, which advocated
for a partial outdoor watering ban to be implemented across Georgia as part of a statewide push
to conserve water. Speaking on why she called for a partial watering ban, Representative
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Buckner announced her support for the District Court’s 2009 ruling, observing that Judge
Magnuson’s ruling:

“has forced us to do what we needed to be doing for a long time…we have got to do
water conservation…we have got to show our neighboring states that we are serious
about doing things a little different in the way we handle our water in Georgia”
(Buckner, as quoted in Springston 2009, 1).

However, according to a high-ranking communications specialist from the ARC, who has been
involved in designing and implementing water conservation policies for metropolitan Atlanta for
a number of years, Atlanta decided to “promote” water conservation via a voluntary conservation
campaign called “mydropcounts” rather than supporting mandatory outdoor watering bans
similar to those enacted on a temporary basis in previous dry years.
Beginning in 2013, the “mydropcounts” campaign is currently metropolitan Atlanta’s
most serious effort to promote water conservation. However, the strictly voluntary effort seeks to
accomplish the goal of conserving water through a combination of thus far ineffective and
unproven tactics, such as promoting awareness of water issues among the general public and
educating metropolitan Atlanta’s residential users about their water consumption habits. The
campaign originated from a 2010 amendment to the Metropolitan North Georgia Water Planning
District’s Water Supply and Water Conservation Management Plan, Action Item 5.17, which
required that parties to the Metro Chattahoochee River & Lake Lanier Water Systems “provide
sufficient funding and staffing to implement the required water conservation measures [by]
maintaining a strong water conservation program [which] might include educating customers
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[and] responding to questions about water conservation measures” (Metropolitan North Georgia
Water Planning District 2012, 9).
The voluntary efforts to conserve water came in lieu of forcing residents to restrict
outdoor water use and, according to the ARC’s website, “[t]he ‘My Drop Counts’ campaign is
built around the theme ‘How Much Water Do You Use,’ with TV spots on local access TV
channels, radio spots, theater ads and billboards” (Atlanta Regional Commission 2013).
However, in a personal conversation with a high-ranking ARC communications specialist, she
cautioned that the campaign is not a success story for metropolitan Atlanta for several reasons.
First, the Metropolitan North Georgia Water Planning District did not “provide sufficient funding
and staffing to implement the required water conservation measures” (Metropolitan North
Georgia Water Planning District 2012, 9), as the supervisor confided that the ARC was unable to
secure enough money to finance television or radio advertisements. Second, she also admitted
that a major reason for the campaign’s lack of success has been due to the lack of an established
goal to conserve a specific amount of water. From that conversation with the communications
specialist, it is clear that the secure supply of water flowing to metropolitan Atlanta has resulted
in all water conservation efforts being hampered at both the state and regional scales. Moreover,
for those state and regional officials who have advocated for stronger water conservation
policies, the politics of the 2011 Appellate Court ruling have resulted in their efforts being
deprioritized. Thus, all policies designed to promote lasting changes to the politics of water in
Georgia and metropolitan Atlanta have either been temporally displaced into the future, or
denigrated as either unnecessary now or in the future. At any rate, all such efforts are currently
seen as unnecessary due to the security of metropolitan Atlanta’s municipal water supply.
Correspondingly, as Terry Lawler, the Executive Director of the Regional Business Coalition of
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Metropolitan Atlanta, reinforced in 2013: “we should go ahead and celebrate our recent [sic]
improved water situation…but we should also use this window of opportunity to plan ahead for
those days when water may not be so abundant.”

A Victory for Metropolitan Atlanta: Shifting the ‘Crisis’

The 2011 ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit that made
supplying metropolitan Atlanta with municipal water an authorized purpose of the Buford Dam
drastically altered the politics of water supply and demand between the Atlanta region, Florida
and Alabama. The 2011 decision, in combination with a 2010 ruling by U.S. District Court Judge
Paul Magnuson determining the Corps was not required to consider threats to endangered species
when considering how to manage the ACF Basin (Metropolitan North Georgia Water Planning
District 2012; Peters 2010), effectively dispossessed Florida and Alabama of their riparian rights,
thereby rendering them nearly powerless to challenge metropolitan Atlanta’s water grab in the
ACF Basin. Having nearly exhausted all of their options to (re)capture a historical stream flow of
the ACF Basin, some water managers and public officials from Florida and Alabama still hold
out hope that USACE can be convinced to operate the basin more equitably. A high-ranking
USACE water manager, mentioned earlier, expressed his opinion that the 2011 Appellate Court
ruling would not be the final chapter in the ACF conflict. Similarly, a leading water manager
from Alabama, mentioned earlier, also hinted that his state had not yet exhausted its options to
achieve a balanced resolution in the future. This is how he put it:
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“All [the 2011 Appellate Court ruling] did was just talk about the water flowing out of
Lake Lanier when there is generating power - that Atlanta could use that water, you
know…They can use those releases…for their water supply…Now, what the ruling didn't
mention in the Eleventh Circuit ruling was direct withdrawals from Lake Lanier…that's
still out there…The Eleventh Circuit didn't touch that…One of the things that the court
asked, the Eleventh Circuit asked the Corps, was to take a year and, you know, basically
evaluate upgrading, you know, the reservoirs for hydropower generation and the water
supply…So, in the end of June of this past year [2012; sic], they issued the opinion…And
so, we do have comments based on some things in the study that we took issue with, and
some of the assumptions in there, regarding those operations…so that's in our
comments” (Interview, January 31, 2013; brackets added).

As mentioned in chapter 5, metropolitan Atlanta has certainly enjoyed an “improved
water situation” (Lawler 2013) since the 2011 Appellate Court ruling was handed down. Without
facing a serious challenge to the 2011 ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit and with Alabama and Florida officials left with only the option to influence the Corps’
water management practices through scoping comments, the region has enjoyed a secure supply
of municipal water. Meanwhile, having suffered the consequences of recurrent droughts,
population growth and fleeting economic development prospects (Salzer 2007; Personal
conversation with a Georgia State industrial recruiter, February 6, 2013), the “crisis” of water
production has been spatially displaced to the States of Florida and Alabama (Elliott 2012). In a
2013 statement to the U.S. Senate Committee on Environment & Public Works, Deputy
Secretary of the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP), Greg Munson,
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testified that Florida was burdened with massive oyster deaths as a direct result of metropolitan
Atlanta’s water consumption habits, contending that:

“In 2012, Florida experienced widespread damage to its oyster resource resulting from
two years of prolonged low flow conditions. Indeed, last year set a record for the least
amount of water delivered to the Bay since records were started in 1923, although this
was not the year with the least rainfall” (Munson 2013, 4).

Munson later added that due to declining oyster harvests, “Governor Rick Scott requested the
Secretary of the U.S. Department of Commerce declare a commercial fishery failure for
Florida`s oyster harvesting areas in the Gulf of Mexico pursuant to Section 312 (a) of the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Management and Conservation Act [MSA]” (ibid, 4). Section 312
(a)(1) of the MSA determines the conditions under which an affected state may issue a disaster
declaration for fisheries and includes: “(A) natural causes; (B) man-made causes beyond the
control of fishery managers to mitigate through conservation and management measures,
including regulatory restrictions (including those imposed as a result of judicial action)
imposed to protect human health or the marine environment; or (C) undetermined causes”
(NOAA 2007; bolded for emphasis). Thus, Governor Scott’s disaster declaration simultaneously
brought attention to the damage suffered as a result of reduced stream flows in Apalachicola Bay
and fingered the 2011 Appellate Court ruling as having caused reduced oyster harvests.
Alabama also experienced the deleterious effects of the 2011 court ruling and relayed
these concerns to the U.S. Senate. As Brian Atkins, Division Director of the Alabama Office of
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Water Resources, noted in his testimony to the Senate Committee on Environment & Public
Works:

“Rather than go through the appropriate Congressional process to seek permission for
water supply usage at Lake Allatoona and Lake Lanier, Atlanta-area interests have
simply taken water without any legal authority to do so. It has been a ‘take first, seek
permission later’ mindset. And much to the dismay of Alabama, the Corps of Engineers
has been complicit in this improper water grab by taking no steps to curtail the
unauthorized use of federal resources. But it is even worse than that. Not only has the
Corps failed to prevent the massive and illegal water supply uses of these two federal
reservoirs, but the Corps also has taken steps to curtail operation of the projects for their
congressionally authorized purposes in order to protect Georgia's water supply usage at
the expense of the downstream states, Alabama and Florida…What is happening is
crystal clear. Georgia wants Alabama to take less water than it has always received
historically so Atlanta may take more water in order that Atlanta may expand at the
expense of downstream communities and without regard to the taking's ecological effect”
(Atkins 2013, 2-3).

Whereas the representatives of Florida and Alabama chose to testify about the harmful effects of
metropolitan Atlanta’s additional water withdrawals out of Lake Lanier, Judson Turner, Director
of the Georgia Environmental Protection Division (GEPD), praised the USACE’s updated basin
operations vis-à-vis the 2011 court ruling, noting that:
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“Georgia is proud of its water conservation and management record, and it has a long
history of working with the Corps to see that the waters in the State of Georgia are
soundly managed for the benefit of all users in the basins and for the environment.
Georgia is gratified that the Corps finally is updating its Water Control Manuals for the
ACF and ACT Basin reservoirs” (Turner 2013, 2).

The above statements made by stakeholders from the three riparian states demonstrated
competing understandings of the Corps’ operating criteria for managing the ACF Basin. In this
context, it is clear that Florida and Alabama, which suffered losses at the hands of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, attributed the widespread damage felt by their respective
economies and ecologies to: (a) metropolitan Atlanta’s water consumption and, (b) the Corps’
mismanagement of the ACF Basin as a result of the 2011 ruling. Meanwhile, since 2011, the
discursive representations of the ACF conflict by stakeholders from the State of Georgia and
metropolitan Atlanta focused attention on criticizing past events, even going so far as to
retroactively condemn the perceived mismanagement of the ACF Basin by USACE, prior to
2011, and also the “draconian” ruling of District Court Judge Paul Magnuson in 2009. As Marc
Goncher, Senior Assistant Attorney for the City of Atlanta, wrote in a 2012 legal opinion:

“Atlanta metropolitan region residents’ awareness of the impact of two of these factors
on its water supply, the Corps of Engineers and the litigation, was at its peak by the end
of July 2009. That month, the ninth largest metropolitan area in the United States seemed
on the brink of devastation after a Untied States District Court Judge issued an order
that essentially told millions of Atlanta area residents that within three years their State
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must make peace with their neighboring sister states and competitors for economic
growth…It seemed that the law, in the form of a self-described draconian ruling would
pour sand in the gears of the economic engine of the Southeast” (Goncher 2012, 1).

Speaking on the topic of metropolitan Atlanta’s secured municipal water supply, in a
brief interview for this study, Goncher suggested that in addition to the Corps and litigation,
drought conditions also had a significant effect upon the region’s water production. Goncher,
however, continued to retroactively condemn Judge Magnuson’s 2009 ruling, arguing that the
Judge’s ruling created severe and unnecessary panic for metropolitan Atlanta:

“The drought was another driver in 2006, ’07, ’08…We suffered a serious, probably the
worst drought we've experienced so far…in modern times, I guess…We were forced to
use water use restrictions…And, it forced us to curb water production by 10%...You
know, everyone was scared…The talk around town was, sort of, as close to panic as you
can get…You know, x many days of water left in Lake Lanier, and so on…So, the
consumption, you know, just plummeted…and then, toward the end of that drought, we
had the ruling by Judge Magnuson, that, sort of, just so you know, cemented the panic”
(Interview, February 7, 2013; brackets added).

Later in the interview, Goncher revealed that, following Judge Magnuson’s 2009 ruling,
metropolitan Atlanta had strongly considered a Promethean fix (Kaika 2003) to its water supply
crisis. That is, designing and financing infrastructure to supplement the region’s water supply.
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However, the 2011 court ruling rendered those plans moot, although Goncher suggested that the
fixes may be revisited in the future:

“There were a lot of reactions from Governor Perdue at the time [following the 2009
District Court ruling]…He coordinated his task force and folks were looking at, sort of, a
doomsday scenario for Atlanta and how it was gonna get worse…The engineering
community […] came up with contingency plans that were, necessarily, pretty
insane…They had [considered] spending billions of dollars on various structural
improvements if Magnuson's ruling was gonna stand, but it ended up, you know, the
Eleventh Circuit overturned [Judge Magnuson’s ruling] completely, so all those potential
plan were, sort of, put on the shelf” (Interview, February 7, 2013; brackets added).

Despite the continued protestations from Georgia’s co-riparians, stakeholders from the
State of Georgia and metropolitan Atlanta have continued to discursively represent the ACF
conflict as resolved, even going so far as to celebrate the Appellate Court’s 2011 ruling as the
state’s final victory in the “water war.” This attitude is demonstrated in the competing statements
below by Alabama Senator Sessions, Atlanta Mayor Kasim Reed and Georgia Governor Nathan
Deal, respectively:

“Even though the reservoirs were not built for Atlanta's water supply purposes, the
Atlanta area municipalities have made increasing use of those two reservoirs for that
purpose – water…Just this year, the State of Georgia asked the Corps for a 280%
increase in their contractually authorized storage allocation for Atlanta's water supply
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withdrawals from Lake Allatoona - almost three times [more storage allocation]!...In
addition, this year, Georgia has renewed its request for water storage at Lake Lanier,
where there is no current contract in place, seeking as much as 30% of Lake Lanier's
storage for the Atlanta water supply. And [these are] issues that raise questions from
Florida and the Apalachicola Bay and other areas” (Sessions 2013, 3).

“I am pleased with today's Eleventh Circuit Court water ruling, and it is a welcomed
departure from the draconian order which would have had serious consequences for
millions of metropolitan Atlanta residents. Had Judge Magnuson's ruling gone into effect
in July 2012, the water that millions of people depend on every single day would have
been cut off. As a result of today's action by the Eleventh Circuit and their ruling that
water supply is an authorized purpose of Lake Lanier, now that won't happen. Today's
decision is a win for the people of the State of Georgia and the City of Atlanta” (Press
Statement, Atlanta Mayor Kasim Reed, June 28, 2011).

“The State of Georgia has won a great victory…This means that the lake will continue to
be available to meet Georgia's needs” (Press Statement, Georgia Governor Nathan Deal,
June 28, 2011).

The following chapter will analyze the data collected in order to explore the central
research question. Interview and archival data will be interpreted with respect to the
environmental-economic-geography (EEG) framework, discussed in chapter 1, in order to make
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sense of the study’s collection of interview responses and archival documents. Then, the themes,
which became evident while analyzing the data will be discussed in order to provide a new
approach to understand the intractability and perdurability of the ACF conflict.
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CHAPTER SEVEN:

FOR WHOM AND FOR WHAT? COMPETING INTERESTS IN THE ACF BASIN

This chapter will analyze and interpret the data which have been collected for this study in order
to theoretically ground answers to the central research question, namely, Why has the longest
water dispute in U.S. history, the ACF River Basin conflict among the riparian States of
Georgia, Florida and Alabama, not yet been resolved?

Plagued by Multiple and Overlapping Conflicts

Numerous stakeholders to the ACF conflict have discursively characterized the struggle
for water rights as a ‘water war.’ As a shorthand reference to the conflict, the term ‘water war’
has been used to describe the decades long struggle between the States of Georgia, Florida and
Alabama for equitable access to the ACF Basin water. An extensive analysis of data collected
suggests, however, that this characterization barely scratches the surface of the multiple,
competing and overlapping negotiations, agreements and conflicts among a range of stakeholders
to secure their respective rights to the water of the ACF Basin. The findings of the extended
interviews and other data sources revealed that the struggle among and between the states for
water is a common denominator to several conflicts that have subsequently multiplied across
multiple scales. Thus, alongside (a) the conflict among the States of Georgia, Florida and

	
  

162	
  

	
  
Alabama for equitable access to the ACF Basin, there is also: (b) the conflict among and between
the three states and USACE for the right to manage the production and allocation of water from
Lake Lanier; (c) the conflict among and between Georgia’s urban and suburban stakeholders in
metropolitan Atlanta and Georgia’s southern agricultural interests; and, (d) the conflict among
and between the States of Florida and Alabama and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit (triggered by the 2011 ruling), which forced USACE into an ‘ask and ye shall receive’
relationship with metropolitan Atlanta. Each of these conflicts will be discussed in turn,
particularly their role in perpetuating the ACF conflict.

Interstate and Transboundary Conflict

The most widely accepted explanation for the origin of the conflict between the States of
Georgia, Florida and Alabama over the waters of the ACF Basin is the 1986 drought, which
impacted the entire southeastern U.S. (Erhardt 1992; Stephenson 2000; O'Day, Reece and
Nackers 2009). Meteorologists accorded the 1986 event a 100-year drought, meaning that the
recurrence interval of such an extreme drought is estimated to be between 100 and 200 years
(Cook, Kablack and Jacoby 1988). In order to stave off the drought’s harmful effects on
metropolitan Atlanta, the region’s water managers sought to tap a greater portion of its largest
water supply, the Chattahoochee River. Then in 1989, USACE water managers determined that a
portion of Lake Lanier’s water storage capacity for hydroelectric production should be
reallocated to meet metropolitan Atlanta’s municipal water demands (Jordan 2006). This
decision resulted in USACE contracting with the region’s northern suburbs to increase their
water withdrawals out of Lake Lanier. Upon learning of the contract, in 1990, the State of
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Alabama filed a lawsuit against USACE, which alleged that increasing metropolitan Atlanta’s
water withdrawals out of the lake would inflict a heavy economic burden on Alabama’s
agricultural sector, industrial mining operations, recreational and forestry industries, as well as
limit the state’s ability to produce electricity and transport goods via its waterways (Williams
1991). Shortly thereafter, Florida became a party to the Alabama lawsuit against USACE
(Beaverstock 1998) and thus, giving birth to the ACF water conflict.
When Florida joined the lawsuit, both states alleged that additional water withdrawals to
metropolitan Atlanta would cause economic injuries due to reduced flows downstream. Extended
interviews with several high ranking and knowledgeable Florida stakeholders revealed that
Florida’s interests in the ACF Basin were related specifically to Apalachicola Bay’s ecology and
once-prosperous seafood industry, on the one hand, and the prospect for future economic
development of its underdeveloped panhandle counties, on the other hand. As described in
chapter 5, an estuarine biologist, who has studied Apalachicola Bay’s ecology for over 20 years,
explained the ACF’s significance to the riverine ecosystem in the Florida panhandle by stating
that a diverse range of estuarine species have historically relied on the ACF’s periodic flood
conditions for their survival (see Figure 21 below). Of the species mentioned in this context,
several are designated as ‘endangered’ or ‘threatened’ species under the Endangered Species Act
(ESA), including the Gulf Sturgeon and the Fat Threeridge and Purple Bankclimber mussels, as
well as a host of riverine flora (Interview, February 1, 2013). Map 5, pictured below, shows the
critical habitat for these riverine species, which extends across all three states’ territorial
boundaries. From this perspective, as well as that of a former Florida governor, metropolitan
Atlanta’s excessive consumption of ACF water caused Florida to experience drastic and negative
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effects with regard to both the Florida panhandle’s unique ecology and its future economic
development prospects.

	
  
Figure 21: Seafood Catchment in Apalachicola Bay.
Source: Northwest Florida Water Management District 2014.

A high-ranking water manager from the State of Alabama echoed these twin concerns
about economic growth and ecological disruption. This finding explains Alabama’s 1990
lawsuit, which alleged that metropolitan Atlanta’s water withdrawals out of Lake Lanier would
cause the state to sacrifice “badly needed economic development” (Williams 1991). The same
water manager stated that Alabama’s industries, municipalities and electric utilities along the
Chattahoochee River rely on water from the ACF Basin in order to operate. Furthermore, in line
with stakeholders in Florida, he blamed metropolitan Atlanta’s water consumption for Alabama’s
diminished water supply.
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Map 5: Riverine Species with Critical Habit in the ACF Basin.
Source: Adapted from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS).

A recurring theme identified from interview data was Florida and Alabama stakeholders’
casting a net of blame over metropolitan Atlanta and, to a lesser degree, the USACE for
perpetuating and institutionalizing the ACF conflict. The growth of metropolitan Atlanta’s
population, geography and economy were frequently identified by Florida and Alabama
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stakeholders as the main drivers of the conflict among and between the three states. Interviews
with communications specialists from the Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC) confirmed this
view. To recapitulate, their argument is that metropolitan Atlanta’s explosive growth justifies the
region’s disproportionate use of ACF water. Indeed, these same informants accuse the USACE
of misallocation of ACF water resources, thereby making the downstream effects merely et
sequitur of USACE’s water management. An overriding theme emerging from interviews and
other data sources is that metropolitan Atlanta’s stakeholders believe that USACE should
continue to operate the Buford Dam and Lake Lanier to meet the region’s municipal water
demands.
A second recurring theme that emerges from analysis of the data is that stakeholders from
each of the three states shift blame for the persistence of the water conflict away from themselves
and their respective states. Commonly, the stakeholders avoid responsibility by shifting blame
onto officials from the other states and the USACE for their roles in producing and allocating
water in the ACF Basin. While none of the stakeholders interviewed for this study accepted
responsibility for perpetuating the ACF conflict, there were also none who expressed confidence
that the collective riparian demands could be sustained, either currently or into the future.
Furthermore, according to all the stakeholders to the conflict, either the ACF’s water supply must
be increased – a near geophysical impossibility, or water demand must be decreased – a
geopolitical and geoeconomic improbability. However, not a single stakeholder could coherently
explain why the conflict has persisted for so long. Similarly, among the stakeholders there is no
consensus as to whether or how an increase in water supply or decrease in water demand can be
equitably achieved.
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Altering the Scale and Style of Governance: Federal-State Conflict

In January of 1992, only three years after a major drought and subsequent water
withdrawal contract between USACE and metropolitan Atlanta’s northern suburbs sparked the
beginning of the ACF conflict, the States of Georgia, Florida and Alabama agreed to negotiate a
new, equitable allocation formula for the basin in the hope of ending the conflict. The states
agreed to negotiate an allocation formula pursuant to the water policy recommendations of
USACE and the results of USACE’s Comprehensive Study. The 1992 agreement assumed that
the Comprehensive Study would be completed by 1995, but a succession of delays ensued and
the study was not completed within that timeframe. A high-ranking water manager for the
USACE recalled the events, which led the states to abandon the Comprehensive Study:

“At some point [the states] decided that the Comprehensive Study was not achieving the
goals that it was intended to achieve…The states decided to go the route of forming a
compact, and then, the negotiations became strictly between the three states and we were
there only to provide technical assistance, as required” (Interview, February 7, 2013;
brackets added).

By December of 1996, the states grew tired of waiting for the Comprehensive Study to be
completed and signed a new agreement. The new agreement stipulated that the states would
engage in compact negotiations sans USACE, with the agency only providing expert technical
and scientific assistance, as needed.
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In the wake of the states’ decision to dismiss USACE and to shift the scale of conflict
management and negotiations, the federal government’s role in managing the production and
allocation of ACF Basin water diminished significantly. As Abrams (2009) suggests, this stateled effort to wrest management authority away from USACE to the three states resulted in basin
management becoming an infinitely more complex and intractable conflict. Chapter 4 described
a brief history of neoliberal efforts to scale down and “roll-back” (Peck and Tickell 2002) the
authority of the federal government in the 1980s regarding the interstate management of water
resources. The “roll-back” is a destructive form of neoliberalism in which state capacity is
dismantled or otherwise limited, as opposed to the “roll-out” which is the construction of new
forms of state governance. Recall that, in Executive Order 12612, President Reagan demanded
that the federal government take a hands-off approach to inter-jurisdictional issues, arguing that:

“[i]t is important to recognize the distinction between problems of national scope
(which may justify Federal action) and problems that are merely common to the States
(which will not justify Federal action because individual States, acting individually or
together, can effectively deal with them)” (R. Reagan 1987).

In fact, for the Reagan administration, two classic examples of problems “common to the States”
that did not justify federal intervention were water management and water resource planning
assistance (Gerlak 2005, 238).
Reagan first articulated the doctrine that water management and resource planning were
best left to the states during his tenure as Governor of California, from 1967 to 1975; and then he
made this national policy after becoming President in 1981. Regarding water programs, Reagan
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(1967, 5) once observed that Congress and, by extension, the federal government, should
“continue to seek a regional solution to what is truly a regional problem.” It is, therefore, clear
that Reagan and his successors believed that federal authorities would serve the states well by
transferring the power to manage and plan water production and distribution back to state
authorities. In the context of the ACF conflict, however, the “roll-out” (Peck and Tickell 2002)
of a new water management doctrine has been neither smooth nor effective.
As Bakker and Cook (2011) put it, efforts to appropriately scale water management
authority inevitably lead to a tension between “subsidiarity” (here taken to mean decentralized,
localized water management authority) and “harmonization” (here taken to mean centralized
water management authority). Neoliberals dress up and ideologically and discursively tout
decentralized water management as the democratization of decision-making (Gaventa and
Valderrama 1999; Rhodes 1996; Hughes, Smith and Tabellini 1991; Gibbins 2001) and as a costeffective strategy to increase government responsiveness to the needs of local and individual
water consumers (Dillinger and Fay 1999; Rogers 2002; O'Riordan 2004). Meanwhile, the costs
and benefits of rolling-out new forms of water management authority continue to be a source of
exploration and debate in the environmental geographic literatures (Swyngedouw, Kaika and
Castro 2002; Maddock 2004; Gandy 1997; Bakker and Cook 2011). Based on this literature, it is
clear that geographically rescaling the ACF water conflict resulted in a severely fragmented
water management system, which in turn led to a series of protracted secondary conflicts among
the three states, on the one hand, and between the states and the USACE, on the other hand,
regarding rolling-out a new interstate water regime.
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The Contradictions of Rescaling Water Management Authority

The competitive logic of Reagan’s neoliberal water doctrine assumed that, absent
interference by federal water managers, regional governments would efficiently and effectively
produce, allocate and distribute water according to the economic principle of “highest and best
use.” With regard to water, the “highest and best use” principle holds that water should be
allocated and used to maximize its economic value (Levi 1969; Trelease 1954). Moreover, this
principle holds that through competition for water access, preferences for water use will be
articulated vis-à-vis market exchange, which allows for water uses to be ordered according to a
hierarchy and for value to be monetized. In order to embed this logic in water policy, the Reagan
administration and its neoliberal successors strove to facilitate competition for water by first
rescaling water management authority to the subnational scale, thus allowing states and regions
to compete for water security.
Competition by states and regions to achieve water security, whether by capturing water
management authority or by other means, is part and parcel of what Harvey calls the “territorial
logic of power” (2003, 93-94). For “state actors, statesmen [sic] and politicians, ‘whose power is
based in command of a territory and the capacity to mobilize its human and natural resources,’”
these actors must attempt to configure territories in a way that allows them to stand out as
differentiated, distinctive and unique sites, which are suitable for capital accumulation, but which
results in a contradiction between internal and external territorial logics (R. Brenner 2006, 80).
For these actors, the territories over which they preside must achieve a certain degree of
“structured coherence” to enable the molecular processes of capital accumulation. That is,
territories must assume a coherent character, which often extends to synergetic flows of
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“production, distribution, exchange, and consumption,” as well as shared attitudes, cultural
values, beliefs, and even religious and political affiliations (Harvey 2003, 102). But, while
territories must strive to assume a coherent character within the territorial borders, at the same
time, they are forced to differentially produce territorial space with respect to competitors
external to the borders. In a process which Harvey (ibid) calls “regionality,” coherent territories
must converge into distinct regions in order to leverage advantages over competitors so that the
region

becomes a more attractive site for capital investments (Harvey 2003, 101-102). If

successful, the region may proceed to grow and consolidate both geopolitical and geoeconomic
power in a convergence of the “territorial and capitalist logics of power,” thereby allowing their
influence to be wielded across the body politic of the state (ibid, 104-105).
It is in this context that metropolitan Atlanta should be regarded as a dominant and
hegemonic region, able to exert both territorial and capitalist influences throughout the American
South. Chapters 3 and 4 described the massive, historical efforts undertaken by the region’s
business and political elites to produce an economic agenda of “soft services” and
suburbanization across the region as early as World War II, as well as sanctioning the annexation
of the wealthy suburbs surrounding Atlanta’s central business district (Stone 1989). However, as
early as 1940, metropolitan Atlanta’s water managers recognized that regionalization in the form
of geographic and economic expansion would be threatened by the region’s “inconsistent water
supply” and “insufficient water pressure and inadequate supply during dry spells” (Atlanta
Journal Constitution 1940).
Despite warnings by metropolitan Atlanta’s water managers that the region’s water
resources would not sustain its growth trajectory, both the population and economy boomed
throughout the next four decades and beyond. In the late 1980s, however, this unchecked growth
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culminated in a water crisis which, in turn, generated a conflict between metropolitan Atlanta
and its regional competitors, Florida and Alabama, as well as southern Georgia’s agricultural
interests. Ultimately, the politically and economically powerful commercial and residential
interests of metropolitan Atlanta successfully exerted influence over USACE and the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, maintaining access to progressively more Chattahoochee
River water to support those interests. Secured flows of water thus exacted a one-two punch
against metropolitan Atlanta’s competing riparians by draining their economies and ecologies of
freshwater while also allowing the Atlanta region to remain a suitable site for capital
accumulation and suburbanization.
Far from Reagan’s (1987) hands-off approach to regional water problems, Harvey (2003)
suggests that it is often the state which plays an active role in mediating regional processes of
capital accumulation. While Harvey consistently uses the word “state” to refer to national
governments, in the context of the ACF conflict, it is more appropriate to suggest that capital
accumulation in the Atlanta metropolitan region was mediated by “supra-regional” governments.
A contradiction is evident in which metropolitan Atlanta’s processes of capital accumulation
were mediated by both federal and state policies and laws. This allowed metropolitan Atlanta to
pressure federal and state governments to continue providing a secure water supply. This
contradiction will be discussed in further detail later in the sections that follow. For now, suffice
it to say that the Georgia State government has made evident its urban and regional biases,
having dispossessed the state’s southern agricultural interests of water so that it may instead
continue to flow to metropolitan Atlanta. Similarly, actions by both the USACE and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stacked the deck in favor of the State of Georgia and
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metropolitan Atlanta to secure their water supply by delaying compact negotiations and
overturning a landmark court decision.
Reagan’s aforementioned parochial attitude toward water management has become
hegemonic, particularly in the American South, where it has resulted in a scalar reconfiguration
of power away from USACE and towards the states. The first efforts to rescale water
management authority in the ACF Basin materialized in December of 1996. During this time, the
states unanimously agreed to negotiate a compact agreement to allocate the water resources
within the ACF Basin as opposed to allowing the USACE Comprehensive Study to guide the
process because of a two-year delay in the completion of the study. The states’ discursive
characterization of the Comprehensive Study as “not achieving the goals that it was intended to
achieve” (Interview, February 7, 2013) alongside the marginalization of the Corps in the
negotiations, are hallmark neoliberal strategies to explore alternative modes of water
management. That is, by drawing attention to the perceived “failure” of the USACE to manage
the basin, the states legitimized the negotiation of a compact according to a purely competitive
logic (Lemke 2001; Kaika 2003; Swyngedouw 1995, 2005a, 2005b).
The usurpation of the Corps’ congressionally mandated authority by the states did not,
however, streamline compact negotiations. Moreover, a consistent and recurring theme emerged
from extended interviews with stakeholders from Georgia, Florida and Alabama, namely, that
the persistence of water inequity in the ACF Basin is largely attributed to USACE’s failure to
operate the Buford Dam and Lake Lanier according to the respective and competing needs of the
three states. Accordingly, the states’ strategic efforts to usurp power from USACE went horribly
wrong and in the process exposed a contradiction that is inherent to the neoliberal shift in water
policy: spatiotemporal shifts in the regional configuration of capital accumulation create an
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uneven landscape of water needs and an uneven landscape of water competitors. Regional
unevenness, including uneven access to water leads, inevitably, to contested notions of what
constitutes “water equity.”
The ongoing neoliberalization of water management in the ACF Basin has exposed a
management deficit between the federal and state scales in which neither the Corps nor the states
are sufficiently capable of resolving the conflict. As demonstrated above, balancing the
competing needs of the three states is a tall order for the Corps. Yet, while many of the
stakeholders interviewed for this study blame USACE for failing to equitably allocate the water
of the ACF Basin, USACE water managers and an agency mediator to the negotiations placed
blame squarely on the three states for failing to negotiate a compact. In other words, in contrast
to certain state actors who blamed USACE for failing to provide water to meet their states’
respective needs, the USACE’s response was that it was never provided with specific
management directives as to how to allocate the waters of the ACF Basin. Thus, left with the
responsibility but not the power and authority to manage the basin according to its erstwhile
congressional mandate, USACE is effectively powerless to intervene in the conflict yet it
shoulders blame from state stakeholders who were overwhelmed by the scale of the conflict.
While “good governance” is often given as a justification for rescaling the state
(Batterbury and Fernando 2006), the contradictions of neoliberalism were made evident as
relations among the states, on the one hand, and between the states and USACE, on the other
hand, remain far from “good.” Once USACE relinquished its management authority, the
compact negotiations became infinitely more complex and politically contentious. Competing
political and economic goals, another hallmark of neoliberalism, make it even more unlikely that
the states will be able to negotiate a fair and sustainable water allocation formula by which
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USACE can operate the ACF Basin. And yet, in the eyes of state officials, the states do not bear
responsibility for this failure. Instead, from their perspective, it was the Corps that was guilty of
“bad governance” for failing to exercise its management authority to meet the water demands of
each respective state. Meanwhile, in terms of the conflict, the Corps’ weakened position vis-à-vis
scalar reconfiguration played right into the hands of Georgia and metropolitan Atlanta’s
competitive strategy.

Negotiating in Bad Faith

By 1997, eight years after the ACF conflict first began, with the USACE downgraded to
a technical assistant, each state selected a Chief Negotiator to represent its respective interests in
the compact negotiations while an appointee from Congress represented federal interests (Ezzard
1997). Finally, by the end of 1997, the U.S. Congress approved the states’ agreement to allocate
ACF Basin water through compact negotiations, and thus allowed the states to proceed toward a
long awaited resolution to the water conflict (Seabrook 1997).
It did not take long, however, before water managers from the State of Alabama,
including Walter Stevenson Jr., head of the Water Resources Division of the Alabama
Department of Economic and Community Affairs, accused Georgia water officials of negotiating
in bad faith. One month after Congress ratified the 1996 agreement to pursue compact
negotiations, a coalition of West Georgia officials submitted House Bill 489 in the state
legislature, urging the construction of the West Georgia Regional Reservoir. HB 489 called for
the construction of a 3,500-acre lake along the Tallapoosa River to supplement north Georgia’s
water supply. This decision, according to Florida and Alabama officials, violated the terms of the
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1996 agreement by altering the hydrological conditions under which water allocation formulas
were created (Seabrook 1997).
Far from solving the twin problems of water management and production, the neoliberal
strategy of decentralizing water management made a bad situation worse for the State of Florida
and Alabama. Seeking a “regional solution to what is truly a regional problem” (R. Reagan
1967, 5), USACE’s authority to manage the ACF Basin was turned over to the states and the
agency was relieved of its capacity to mediate and assist the compact negotiations. In response to
severely weakened federal water management authority, each state was forced to adopt a
competitive logic in order to secure the flow of water into its territorial boundaries. Against this
background, the laissez-faire conditions of water governance, created in the material absence of
a coherent governing body, resulted in the states availing themselves of the “zero-sum” (Hirsch
1977) opportunity to compete for water resources. The opportunities opened up by
decentralization and “roll-back” necessitated a range of competitive strategies, one of which was
Georgia’s refusal to negotiate on equitable terms.
The controversy surrounding the West Georgia Regional Reservoir was the first time
Georgia officials attempted to solve their water problem through a spatio-technical fix (Harvey
1981, 2003; Jessop 2006), by investing in a Promethean project to increase the state’s water
supply (Kaika 2003). Officials from Florida and Alabama condemned HB 489 as an effort to
frustrate the negotiating process by stalling progress towards a resolution of the water conflict
(Seabrook 1997). For Florida and Alabama, the reservoir project would have safeguarded
metropolitan Atlanta’s position as a regional hegemon and secured both the flows of water and
power into its already formidable metropolitan growth machine (Kaika 2004; Swyngedouw
2004). At the same time, the reservoir would have been a temporal fix for Georgia’s crisis of
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water scarcity – not resolving the conflict among the three states, but allowing Georgia to further
delay compact negotiations into the indefinite future. However, Georgia’s proposals to construct
a reservoir should not only be seen as an effort to temporally stall the negotiating process.
Rather, it should also be considered as an effort to spatially displace the crisis to Florida and
Alabama, as well as to its own agricultural interests downstream of metropolitan Atlanta (Harvey
1989, 201-210). As shown in Table 5 below, between the years of 1996 and 2008, when the
states were engaged in compact negotiations, Georgia stakeholders proposed six spatio-technical
fixes in the form of massive infrastructural projects in order to increase the state’s water supply.
The proposals were formulated despite Florida and Alabama’s protestations that the projects
violated the terms of the negotiations, namely, the flow requirements and adaptive management
protocol outlined in the 2003 Memorandum of Understanding.
Despite warning signs that Georgia was not fully committed to resolving the ACF
conflict, compact negotiations dragged on despite a notable lack of progress. Since the first
attempt by the states to negotiate a resolution in September of 1990 (Teegardin 1990) until the
last attempt in February of 2008 (Eberly and Shelton 2008), compact negotiations were marred
by successive delays, missed deadlines and time extensions, as shown in Figure 22 below. Per
the terms of the November 1997 agreement, compact negotiations were slated to be completed
within one year, by a December 1998 deadline. Negotiations, however, were dragged out over a
period of 18 years due in large part to 11 extensions of the negotiation deadlines.
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Table 5: Georgia's Proposed Infrastructural Projects, 1997-2011.
Date
of
Proposal

Project Type

Estimated
Location of Project

Cost

Construction of a West Georgia Regional
1997

Reservoir

Western Georgia

$55 million

1998

Construction of a County Water Reservoir

Pike County, GA

Not Projected

Storage Capacity Upgrades to Dog River
1998

Reservoir

Douglas County, GA

Not Projected

2000

Construction of Shoal Creek Filter Plant

Gwinnett County, GA

$38 million

2001

Upgrades to Atlanta's Sewer System

Atlanta, GA

$2 billion

Gwinnett County, GA

$162 million

Atlanta, GA

$4 billion

Improvements to County's Freshwater Intake
2004

System
Upgrades

2009

to

Water

Distribution

System
Construction

2011

City's

System

of

a

Statewide

Reservoir

Several locations across
Georgia

$46 million

Source: Wong, J., History compiled from AJC “Water Wars” Archival Materials.
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Figure 22: ACF Compact Negotiations Timeline.
Continued on page 181.
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Figure 22: ACF Compact Negotiations Timeline (Continued).
Source: Wong, J., History compiled from Atlanta Journal-Constitution “Water Wars” Archival Materials.
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Georgia Officials’ Spatiotemporal Fix

Despite the obvious lack of measurable progress over the 18-year period of negotiations,
Florida officials were the only parties to the conflict who were prepared to indict the negotiations
as a “pointless” endeavor. A major reason for their indictment was the unwillingness of Georgia
officials to provide Florida with “reasonable assurances” that minimal flows delivered to the
Georgia-Florida state line would be a regular occurrence. All but confirming this charge,
Georgia’s then-Chief Negotiator, Bob Kerr, responded: “Georgia will get its water…It may
prove difficult and expensive, but we will meet our citizens' needs” (Seabrook 2002). Given this
uncompromising attitude, which is corroborated by interviews with other parties to the conflict,
officials in Florida, and Alabama to a lesser degree, felt justified to accuse Georgia of
negotiating in bad faith. According to a former compact mediator, during the negotiations,
Georgia and metropolitan Atlanta only seemed to be committed to sustaining Atlanta’s suburban
“growth machine” (Molotch 1976), even to the detriment of Georgia’s own agricultural interests
in the south (Seabrook 2000; Kundell 2001). In addition to interviews with a high-ranking water
manager from Alabama and a former Florida Governor, the compact mediator’s statements
clearly demonstrate that Georgia’s chief negotiators had a vested interest in not resolving the
conflict and were content to maintain the status quo for water allocation in the ACF Basin.
Having portrayed Georgia officials as the antagonists in the ACF conflict, Florida and
Alabama stakeholders interviewed for this study regarded the discursive and symbolic gestures
of their Georgian counterparts (Badertscher 2003; Signatory States 2003) as well-disguised delay
tactics. A compact mediator from Florida suggested that Georgia’s rhetorical displays of
commitment were only intended to conceal the state’s efforts to delay a final resolution.
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According to him, Georgia officials were willfully ignorant of Florida and Alabama’s water
needs. In support of this claim of willful ignorance, the mediator described an incident in which
Georgia negotiators proposed an allocation formula based on a patently flawed hydrological
model. In his view, Georgia officials submitted the proposal with full anticipation that it would
be rejected, but they simply did not care to budge from their position. From the mediator’s
perspective, Georgia officials came to the negotiating table absolutely unwilling to compromise
any of metropolitan Atlanta’s municipal water supplies.
Thus, the strategic efforts by Georgia officials to delay negotiations were successful in
that the status quo for water allocation was only challenged twice during 18 years of
negotiations. During that time, Florida and Alabama only achieved two short-term symbolic
victories. First, in 2006, Judge Karon Bowdre of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of Alabama ordered USACE to drastically increase the quantity of water released to stakeholders
in the State of Florida. Judge Bowdre ruled that USACE should release 8,500 cubic feet per
second (cfs) of water from the Jim Woodruff Dam, which is at the confluence of the Flint and
Chattahoochee Rivers, in order to provide adequate flow to endangered species in Florida. This
was a massive increase considering that, prior to the ruling, USACE operated the dam to release
only 5,500 cfs (Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2006; Fiese 2006). Second, a 2009
ruling by U.S. District Court Judge Paul Magnuson determined that providing metropolitan
Atlanta with municipal water was neither an authorized purpose of Buford Dam nor of Lake
Lanier. According to the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (2009), Judge Magnuson’s
ruling concluded that “water supply was not an originally authorized purpose of Lake Lanier
under the legislation that created Lake Lanier, but instead that Congress intended for water
supply to be an ‘incidental’ benefit of releases for hydropower and other purposes.” The ruling
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sent shockwaves across the three states. Stakeholders in Florida and Alabama rejoiced but
stakeholders in Georgia and metropolitan Atlanta declared the ruling “draconian” and claimed
that it unfairly placed the region “on the brink of devastation” (Goncher 2012, 1).
These two judicial rulings against Georgia and metropolitan Atlanta’s water excesses
were the only short-term victories against their longstanding inequitable and unsustainable
consumption of water from the ACF Basin. The 8,500 cfs released from Woodruff Dam, per
Judge Bowdre’s 2006 ruling, was eventually reduced to a baseline level of 6,000 cfs – due to a
voluntary agreement between the three states that an environmental storage pool would be
constructed in the ACF Basin system to maintain a consistent flow to the State of Florida (Fiese
2006). Then, two years after Judge Magnuson ruled that metropolitan Atlanta’s municipal water
supply was only an ‘incidental benefit’ of hydropower produced by the Buford Dam, the 2009
ruling was infamously overturned on appeal in 2011 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, as was discussed in chapter 5 and 6. Three years before the Appellate Court
issued its historic ruling, the states finally walked away from the negotiating table and, instead,
chose to litigate a resolution. The landmark ruling in 2011, however, compelled the Corps to
operate the ACF Basin according to a preferential “ask and ye shall receive” relationship with
metropolitan Atlanta and likely guaranteed that the states will never again return to the
negotiating table. Against this background, it seems clear that Georgia officials’ spatiotemporal
strategies to displace the water crisis to Florida and Alabama while simultaneously delaying a
negotiated resolution were successful.

	
  

184	
  

	
  
Georgia’s Urban-Rural Divide

Chapter 6 discussed how, despite the states’ inability to negotiate a water compact,
metropolitan Atlanta has enjoyed an “improved water situation” (Lawler 2013). As discussed
above, the landmark 2011 ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
determined that supplying metropolitan Atlanta with a municipal water supply is an authorized
purpose of the Buford Dam. The ruling drastically altered the “urban metabolism of water” in the
region, that is, the ways in which the politics and power of water drive the material production of
the urban center (Kaika 2006; Gandy 2004). And yet, while metropolitan Atlanta rejoiced in the
ruling, the rest of the State of Georgia found itself in a more precarious position in the wake of
the court’s ruling.
The reason is that in 1987, two years prior to the start of the ACF conflict, another
conflict arose between Georgia’s urban and rural water users over House Bill 137 (HB 137), in
which sponsors sought to decentralize the state’s water management authority. Similar to the
three states’ efforts to wrest power from USACE, HB 137 proposed that Georgia’s Department
of Natural Resources (DNR) hand over its authority to grant water permits to regional water
management boards, known as water planning regions (WPRs) throughout the state (Hallman
1987). The bill was popular among farmers representing Georgia’s southern agricultural interests
who believed that DNR was primarily concerned with providing water to metropolitan Atlanta’s
booming residential and commercial counties in the north. Georgia’s southern agricultural
interests, therefore, saw decentralization or subsidiarity as a means to protect their water supply
from being dispossessed by the state DNR to supplement metropolitan Atlanta’s water supply.
As E. Dunn Jr., a Calhoun County farmer in southern Georgia proclaimed, “to me, the solution is
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to leave [water permitting] up to the local counties. I'd like to see the landowner freed from any
restrictions from Atlanta” (Hallman 1987, 2).
Historically, a tension has existed between Georgia’s northern urban commercial and
residential interests and southern agricultural interests over withdrawing water from the ACF
Basin to either expand suburbanization in the north or irrigate crops in the south. The two WPRs
which manage the agricultural withdrawals from the Chattahoochee River are the Upper Flint
and Lower Flint Ochlockonee. In 2008, the Upper Flint WPR estimated that 136 mgd were
withdrawn for irrigation while the Lower Flint Ochlockonee WPR estimated that 301 mgd were
withdrawn from the Chattahoochee River, thus amounting to 437 mgd (Hook 2010). Meanwhile
during the same years, the Metropolitan North Georgia Water Planning District, which includes
the metropolitan Atlanta region, minus DeKalb County, estimated water withdrawals at a
staggering 515 mgd (Metropolitan North Georgia Water Planning District 2011). While
Georgia’s northern urban interests consumed nearly 100 mgd more than the agricultral interests
in 2008, the urban interests of metropolitan Atlanta actually joined Florida in leveling
accusations of excessive water withdrawals against Georgia’s southern farmers. In the opinion of
the Florida estuarine biologist mentioned earlier, Georgia’s agricultural interests have
significantly contributed to diminished streamflows received at the Florida-Georgia state line. He
described the problem in the following way:

“It's not just Atlanta's demands…Certainly, the agricultural withdrawals [in]
southwestern Georgia contribute rather sizably to the loss of water upstream…And, it
doesn't help that there have been thousands of small ponds and impoundments that have
developed over the years throughout, primarily, Georgia's portion of the basin, that now
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capture water that, at one time, had come back as groundwater…A lot of this has been, I
use the term ‘captured’…[The stream flow] was not able to come back as stream flows
and, if that water has been either used for irrigation or lost in evaporation, just the
manipulation of putting all those ponds and impoundments in place caused a decline in
rainfall…We are losing more water upstream for a variety for reasons” (Interview,
February 1, 2013; brackets added).

In early 2000, the urban-rural struggle over water allocation materialized in the form of
HB 1362, the Flint River Drought Protection Act. This controversial bill sought to allocate $30
million ($39 million in 2013) to a drought mitigation fund (Kundell 2001, 3) through which the
Georgia General Assembly promised to financially compensate the state’s southern farmers to
forego irrigating crops during times of drought. Thus, avoiding irrigation was seen as a practical
measure to avoid reducing the stream flow to the Flint River, and consequently, to Florida and
Alabama (Seabrook 2000). The bill passed and by April of 2000, the Georgia Environmental
Protection Division (GEPD) placed a moratorium on all new water withdrawal permit requests
and would not approve any new agricultural permits (Seabrook 2000), which effectively
amounted to northern urban interests dispossessing agricultural water from southern farmers.

Discourses of Silence With Respect to Urban Bias

Georgia’s urban-rural conflict over water became a one-sided fight following the 2011
ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The ruling demonstrated not only a
clear state bias toward Georgia’s interests over Florida and Alabama, but also a clear urban bias
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toward metropolitan Atlanta over the rural-agricultural interests of southern Georgia. Following
the ruling, USACE issued a 2012 legal opinion, which stated that:

“[i]t has always been apparent from the plain text of the Newman Report that the Corps
proposed, and Congress authorized, a system that was expressly intended to ‘ensure an
adequate water supply for the rapidly growing Atlanta metropolitan area’ downstream,
and the Corps designed, and has always operated, the Buford Project with that goal in
mind” (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2012, 27).

The 2011 Appellate Court ruling iterated the justification behind the 1958 Water Supply Act,
which authorized the Buford Dam, as follows:

“developing such water supplies in connection with the construction, maintenance, and
operation of Federal navigation, flood control, irrigation, or multiple purpose projects”
(U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 2011, 16; bolded for emphasis).

However, in the 2012 USACE legal opinion, the Corps struck the word ‘irrigation’ from the
record and inserted ‘municipal and industrial,’ summarizing the court’s ruling as to the intent of
the Water Supply Act as follows:

“Congress intended for the Corps to use this authority to assume an active role, in
conjunction with State and local interests, ‘in developing [municipal and industrial]
water supplies in connection with the construction, maintenance, and operation of
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Federal navigation, flood control . . . or multiple purpose projects,’ i.e., by including
storage for water supply in the planning for new Corps projects, or by allowing the use
storage in existing Corps projects for water supply” (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
2012, 34-35; brackets in original).

The Corps’ legal opinion codified the agency’s commitment to protect Georgia’s urban
interests from water insecurity even if it meant sacrificing the state’s agricultural interests. The
federal and state biases have, therefore, greatly contributed to metropolitan Atlanta’s immunity
from water scarcity and created an environment in which discourses of water scarcity are ignored
and otherwise avoided. Since the landmark 2011 ruling, even as Georgia suffered from drought
conditions characterized as “extreme or exceptional” by meteorologists (Banerjee 2012, 1),
public officials and water managers for metropolitan Atlanta failed to comment on its effects.
Despite much of the state suffering from water shortages, metropolitan Atlanta maintained a
degree of immunity from the drought such that efforts to encourage water conservation in the
region were subsequently characterized as unnecessary and reactionary by high-ranking state
officials. Even Nap Caldwell, a former Chief Negotiator for Georgia and then-Head of the
Georgia Environmental Protection Division’s (GaEPD) Drinking Water Program, deemed an
outdoor water conservation program in metropolitan Atlanta to be an inconsequential and
unnecessary effort to stave off water shortages in rural counties south of metropolitan Atlanta. In
2012, Caldwell stated that: “a gallon of water saved in the metro Atlanta area would fail to
ensure that there would be adequate water for human consumption in southern parts of the
state” (Banerjee 2012, 1). Metropolitan Atlanta has, therefore, successfully dispossessed its
regional competitors of water, which has both swiftly and thoroughly (re)produced geopolitical
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and geoeconomic unevenness among metropolitan Atlanta, Florida, Alabama and southern
Georgia. Furthermore, any efforts to resist metropolitan Atlanta’s water hegemony have been
defeated for the foreseeable future.

Atlanta’s Water Security and Florida’s Contestation of the 2011 Ruling

The fourth and final conflict revealed by the study data is Florida and Alabama’s
continued contestation of the 2011 Appellate Court ruling and Georgia’s institutionalized
dispossession of downstream states’ water supplies. The multiple implications of the 2011 ruling
were detailed in chapter 5, which included a discussion of how the ruling: (a) abruptly
transformed the water metabolism of metropolitan Atlanta; (b) significantly altered the politics of
water distribution between USACE and the States of Georgia, Florida and Alabama; and, (c)
resulted in water supply and demand management policies being deprioritized, ignored and/or
displaced into the future by metropolitan Atlanta officials. Interviews with communications
specialists at the Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC), in addition to water production and
distribution data collected from the USACE Mobile District, confirm that the Appellate Court’s
ruling effectively compelled the Corps to provide metropolitan Atlanta’s municipal utilities with
all the water they need to sustain the region’s growth trajectory. A communications specialist at
the ARC even suggested that the 2011 ruling provided metropolitan Atlanta’s water utilities with
the opportunity to work in tandem with USACE to coordinate the amount of water released from
the Buford Dam – a claim which was confirmed by a high-ranking Legislative and Public Affairs
specialist at the USACE Mobile District and also a high-ranking water manager in Alabama.
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While metropolitan Atlanta stakeholders enjoyed an improved water situation following
the 2011 ruling, a high-ranking water manager from Alabama characterized the extreme
distributional disparity between metropolitan Atlanta and his state as unfair and unbalanced.
Whereas the Appellate Court granted metropolitan Atlanta the highest priority with respect to
water use and allowed the region’s utilities to coordinate releases with USACE, the Alabama
water manager complained that since 2011, USACE has made no efforts to educate itself about
Alabama’s water needs, let alone coordinate releases with the state’s water utilities. Against this
background, for many stakeholders from Florida and Alabama, the 2011 ruling represented a
major blow to any lingering hope for an equitable production and distribution of the waters of the
ACF Basin.
Stakeholders from the State of Georgia, metropolitan Atlanta, and even USACE,
subsequently treated the 2011 ruling as Atlanta’s final victory in the ACF conflict. Yet, despite
having suffered a momentous setback, the State of Florida has continued to contest the Appellate
Court’s decision. In June of 2012, the State of Florida petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court
(SCOTUS) to revisit the Tri-State Water Rights Litigation in an effort to overturn the Appellate
Court’s ruling. SCOTUS, however, denied the petition for writ of certiorari and thereby stayed
the Appellate Court’s earlier decision, once again frustrating Florida and Alabama’s pursuit of
water equity (Florida, et al., Petitioners v. Georgia, et al. 2012).
One year later, in October of 2013, the State of Florida filed a second motion in the U.S.
Supreme Court to seek relief from the ecological and economic injuries suffered as a result of the
2011 ruling. Denied the petition for writ of certiorari by SCOTUS in 2012, the State of Florida
claimed that its second appeal to SCOTUS represented Florida’s last hope of reclaiming its water
rights. The motion claimed that:
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“Florida has exhausted all other reasonable means to arrest Georgia’s unchecked use of
water and halt the continuing degradation of the Apalachicola Region. Florida now, of
necessity, invokes the Court’s original jurisdiction seeking an appropriate apportionment
to redress existing harm and to avert additional harmful depletions caused by uses in
Georgia. There is no other forum in which Florida may vindicate its interests and obtain
the requisite relief against Georgia” (State of Florida 2013, 6).

The motion, which is slated to be heard by the Court in January of 2014, alleges that Georgia:

“took advantage of the time between initiation of the Comprehensive Study in 1992 and
failure of the ACF Compact in 2003 to continually increase its consumptive uses. Since
1992, Georgia’s municipal, industrial, recreational, and agricultural uses of ACF Basin
water have grown significantly, but under the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement
and the ACF Compact, Georgia had no entitlement to any of these inflated uses. The
pattern did not end after the ACF Compact failed, but has continued unabated, despite
another decade of lower court litigation and failed judicial and non-judicial settlement
efforts. Indeed, Florida has made numerous attempts to resolve this interstate dispute
through formal and informal discussions, as well as court-sponsored mediation
(including sessions facilitated by the U.S. Secretary of the Interior and the Council on
Environmental Quality). See, e.g., Joint Motion for Order Regarding Confidentiality of
Settlement Negotiations, In re Tri-State Water Rights Litig., (No. 315). All of these efforts
ultimately failed” (State of Florida 2013, 5-6).
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Court-Sponsored (Re)Production of Uneven Development

The quotes above demonstrate two important developments regarding the future of the
ACF conflict. First, the State of Florida alleges that Georgia willfully orchestrated the failure of
compact negotiations as part of its strategy of spatiotemporally fixing the crisis of water. Florida
has also gone on the record to claim that Georgia’s participation in the compact negotiations was
nothing more than a symbolic gesture intended to conceal its goal of hoarding water at the
expense of downstream users. In the Supreme Court docket, Florida accused Georgia officials of
feigning a commitment to compact negotiations. According to Florida, Georgia used the time
between 1992 and 2003 to increase its consumption of water and grow its municipal, industrial,
recreational and, to a lesser extent, agricultural consumptive uses, thus making it politically
unthinkable and economically unlikely to cut off the water supply to a rapidly growing state.
Second, according to Florida and Alabama, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit actively sponsored Georgia’s dispossession of the states’ respective water rights.
Furthermore, alongside the Appellate Court’s decisive bias toward the political and economic
interests of metropolitan Atlanta, USACE and SCOTUS demonstrated tacit complicity with the
lower court’s decision by failing to challenge the 2011 ruling on the grounds of well-established
ecological and economic consequences. USACE’s complicity was demonstrated clearly in its
2012 legal opinion, in which USACE’s Chief Counsel was forced to retroactively concede that
the agency had operated the ACF system in error for nearly 60 years, stating that:

“[i]t has always been apparent from the plain text of the Newman Report that the Corps
proposed, and Congress authorized, a system that was expressly intended to ‘ensure an
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adequate water supply for the rapidly growing Atlanta metropolitan area’ downstream,
and the Corps designed, and has always operated, the Buford Project with that goal in
mind” (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2012, 27).

USACE’s position reversal is stunning, considering that the Chief Counsel admitted that “[i]n
2002 and 2009, I reached different conclusions regarding the extent of the Corps’ authority for
water supply associated with the Buford Project” (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 2012, 2). The
conclusions reached by USACE suggest an extremely deferential attitude toward the Appellate
Court, which actively crafted water management policies. Second, the legal opinion revealed the
Corps’ capricious attitude toward basin management procedures, thus making the agency a
pedestrian to the water conflict.
In contrast to the ARC communications specialist, who suggested that metropolitan
Atlanta has thrived due to the 2011 ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
the landmark decision was not the lone factor that allowed metropolitan Atlanta to thrive
economically. Atlanta’s rapid growth from a stopover destination to “the economic jewel of the
Southeast” (Saporta 2013) was due to the region’s post-World War II transition from “heavy”
industries toward a service economy (Stone 1989), a suburban restructuring of the region and,
above all, a consistently available water supply.
The 2011 Appellate Court ruling should not be portrayed as the single event responsible
for producing uneven development across the States of Georgia, Florida and Alabama. However,
the ruling undoubtedly contributed to reproducing political and economic disparities between
metropolitan Atlanta, eastern Alabama and the Florida panhandle. The 2011 ruling and the
failure by SCOTUS and USACE to challenge the ruling amount to the institutionalization of
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metropolitan Atlanta’s “prevailing laissez-faire market economy-driven approach to growth”
(Hartshorn and Ihlanfeldt 2000, 17). Like many other major metropolitan regions, Atlanta’s
economic model was founded upon the twin principles of geographical expansion and
geographical restructuring (Harvey 1981, 1989, 2001, 2003; N. Smith 1984, 2007) and to that
end, massive quantities of water were, are and will be necessary to meet the demands of a
sprawling urban center. Both the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and SCOTUS
have set the stage for water policy in the American South by expressly providing metropolitan
Atlanta with the water necessary to continue its water-intensive, suburban growth. Table 6 and
Map 6 show that over an eight-year period from 2000 to 2008, the metropolitan Atlanta region
increased its housing stock by nearly 40% in the counties outside of the densely populated
“Core” 10-counties of metropolitan Atlanta, thus further exacerbating regional sprawl.
Table 6: Housing Units and Households, 10 and 20-County Regions.

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2007 American Community Survey.
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Map 6: 28-County Metropolitan Statistical Area, 2013.
Source: Atlanta Regional Commission 2013.

Continuation of Atlanta’s Booming Growth

As of 2013, with a population of greater than 5.3 million people and projected to add
another 500,000 by the year 2018 (U.S. Census Bureau 2013), metropolitan Atlanta’s water
consumption can only be expected to increase. Table 7 below shows that over a 20-year period,
the Atlanta Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) added more than 2.2 million people. Figures 23,
24 and 25 below show that metropolitan Atlanta’s own water managers, as they did in 1940, still
recognize that rapid population growth will lead to unsustainable increases in water
consumption. However, the Metropolitan North Georgia Water Planning District (2009) also
projects that alongside suburban growth, its water supplies will simultaneously increase and thus,
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the region will somehow be able to stave off future crises of water scarcity. Furthermore, a 2011
report by the ARC projected that by 2040, the Atlanta region will add an additional 3 million
people and will require approximately 2,000 new residential subdivisions to house this
population (Atlanta Regional Commission 2011). As Florida alleged in its motion filed in the
U.S. Supreme Court:

“Georgia officials have projected that Georgia’s consumption of ACF Basin water will
nearly double from present levels by 2040…If Georgia’s consumption increases as
planned, the sole source of fresh water sustaining the Apalachicola River and Bay will
shrink further, jeopardizing the viability of the Apalachicola Region’s ecology, economy,
and way of life” (State of Florida 2013, 3).

Table 7: Population Growth of Atlanta MSA, 1990-2010.

	
  Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2010.
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Figure 23: Directions of Population Growth in Metropolitan Atlanta, 1990-2006.
Source: Atlanta Regional Commission.
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Figure 24: Photograph of Metropolitan Atlanta's Urban Sprawl.
Source: ATL-Urbanist, 2013.

Figure 25: Metropolitan Atlanta Water Demand and Supply Forecasts, 2005-2035.
Source: Metropolitan North Georgia Water Planning District 2009.
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While many land and real estate developers in metropolitan Atlanta view the projected growth as
an opportunity to expand their businesses (Chapman 2011), stakeholders in Florida and Alabama
view this as a disaster and potential death knell to their economies and ecologies. As Florida
Governor Rick Scott summarized in a letter to Timothy Skaggs, Regional Director of the U.S.
Small Business Administration:

“[t]he economy of Apalachicola and Franklin County is tied inextricably to the
commercial seafood industry, which is heavily dependent on a healthy natural ecosystem.
In the summer of 2012, the State of Florida experienced an unprecedented decline in the
supply of oysters within Apalachicola Bay, resulting from a lack of necessary freshwater
inflows to support productive oyster communities. The collapse of the oyster fishery
caused a significant loss of income to commercial oyster fishermen, oyster processors,
and rural coastal communities. As a result, many businesses in Franklin County have
experienced economic injury” (Rick Scott 2013).

Chapter 8 will conclude and summarize this study’s findings and will also discuss its
contributions to the existing scholarship on the ACF conflict. Finally, the study limitations will
be considered and suggestions for future research directions will be offered.
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CHAPTER EIGHT:

CONCLUSIONS

Discussion of Study Conclusions

The primary goals of this doctoral dissertation are to explore, describe and provide an
empirical explanation as to why multiple efforts to resolve the 25-year old ApalachicolaChattahoochee-Flint River conflict involving the riparian states of Georgia, Florida and
Alabama, have been unsuccessful and largely counterproductive. Data collected over an almost
four year-long period from in-depth interviews, archival sources and first-hand observations
provided a rich historiographical account of the conflict and presented new insights into the
negotiating strategies and tactics used by competing stakeholders in order to either maintain or
secure greater access to the waters of the ACF Basin. By securing interviews with high-ranking
federal, state and regional water managers, state officials, lawyers, scientists and
communications specialists, this study offers new insights and specific conclusions regarding the
consequences of rescaling and rolling-back water management authority in the ACF Basin.
This study suggests that the collective decision by the three states to usurp USACE’s
water management authority over the ACF Basin resulted in a governance failure due to a lack of
state capacity to collectively manage the basin. Instead of using USACE’s Comprehensive Study
technical reports to inform the allocation formula, the states determined that compact
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negotiations would resolve the conflict quickly and cheaply. Yet, the decision to negotiate a
compact was hijacked by metropolitan Atlanta’s territorial and capitalist logics of power (Harvey
2003, 104-105) to secure water for the region. Florida was the first state to publicly recognize
that the tri-state compact negotiations were an inappropriate state apparatus to create water
equity, as this process was laden with contradictions and amounted to a “zero-sum” (Hirsch
1977) political exercise. The removal of USACE from the compact negotiations left the states to
collectively design a water allocation formula in spite of their respective overlapping and
competing economic interests. It is, therefore, no surprise that the interest of metropolitan
Atlanta prevailed because as the “economic jewel of the Southeast” (Saporta 2013), its territorial
and capitalist power was reinforced by the competition for water. And thus, metropolitan
Atlanta’s combined geopolitical and geoeconomic power forced USACE and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit to endow the region with enough water to sustain its residential
and commercial interests for the foreseeable future.
Metropolitan Atlanta’s success in securing ever more water is contingent upon the
region’s ability to establish its water needs as the “highest and best use” of water from the ACF
Basin. Dating back to World War II, metropolitan Atlanta’s rapid population, economic and
suburban growth enabled the region to win billing as a premiere destination in the New
American South (Rutheiser 1996, 1997; Allen 1996; Bullard, Johnson and Torres 2000). As a
result of the region’s preeminence in the South, metropolitan Atlanta was able to (a) outcompete
Georgia’s southern agricultural interests for intrastate water supplies; (b) recruit Georgia state
officials to actively compete for interstate water supplies on behalf of the region’s powerful
urban and suburban interests; and, (c) successfully leverage its geopolitical and geoeconomic
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clout in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit so as to dispossess both Florida and
Alabama of their respective riparian rights to the waters of the ACF Basin.
Against this background, the initial hypothesis that the State of Georgia strategically
orchestrated the failure of compact negotiations is correct. The findings of this study suggest that
Georgia’s negotiators used a series of delay, defer and discursive strategies and tactics in order to
both increase and guarantee the state’s consumption of water and grow its municipal, industrial,
recreational and, to a lesser extent, agricultural consumptive uses. A series of spatiotemporal
fixes made it politically unthinkable to cut off the water supply to a rapidly growing state and one
of the most significant regions in the southeastern U.S. (F. Allen 1996). However, while this
study’s findings support the initial hypothesis, they also partially contradict the central research
question, namely, why has the longest water dispute in U.S. history, the ACF River Basin conflict
among the riparian States of Georgia, Florida and Alabama, not yet been resolved? The reason
is that while the current status of the ACF conflict may not be equitable and is far from resolved
from the perspective of the States of Florida and Alabama, it has in fact been resolved, at least
for the foreseeable future, from the perspective of the State of Georgia.

Review of Literature and Theoretical Context of the ACF Conflict

This study was theoretically informed by several strands of the burgeoning
environmental-economic-geography (EEG) literature. First, literature on the resolution of
capitalist crises informed the study by framing the ACF conflict as an historically specific
interruption of the molecular processes of capital accumulation. Drawing primarily from the
works of David Harvey (2001, 2003, 2007, 2009), Giovanni Arrighi (1978, 2004) and Peck,
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Theodore and Brenner (2010), this study treats metropolitan Atlanta’s geographical restructuring
and economic expansion as both distinctive responses to a crisis of overaccumulated capital, as
well as the causes of a crisis of water scarcity. Harvey’s second and third “cuts” at crisis theory
identify spatiotemporal fixes as strategic responses to crises of overaccumulation. For Harvey,
geographically restructuring the built environment and economic expansion into new markets are
two ways in which the disruptions of capital accumulation can be temporarily, although not
structurally, resolved. This theoretical contribution is useful in that it explains why, after World
War II, Atlanta’s political and economic elites sought to intitiate an economic transformation by
expanding the region’s transportation network and annexing underdeveloped counties
surrounding the city. By encouraging low-density suburban growth, Atlanta’s elites were able to
transfer capital from less profitable “hard” industries, like defense manufacturing, to more
profitable “soft” services, thereby massively expanding residential real estate and commercial
markets. The 1946 Lochner Report and 1952 Plan for Improvement not only encouraged
expansion of Atlanta’s spatial economy, but strategically encouraged investment into projects
with “long lag times between investment and payoffs” (Sheppard 2004, 472), which thus acted as
capital sinks providing future streams of benefits to investors.
Metropolitan Atlanta’s strategy to open and expand commercial and residential markets
was thus contingent upon the production of a secure supply of municipal water. As Swyngedouw
(2004) argues, neoliberalism is transforming local waters into global money through processes of
capital accumulation. The consequences of this transformation are evident in that, while the
spatiotemporal fix to the crisis of overaccumulated capital allowed metropolitan Atlanta to
consolidate economic and political power through a process of regionality (Harvey 2003),
Atlanta soon confronted the biophysical limits of that strategy vis-à-vis a severe drought which
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produced water scarcity in the ACF Basin. Relative water scarcity, with respect to the various
competing interests in the basin, thus led to conflict over access to the water supply.
The processes of allocating water to competing political and economic interests has been
interrogated often in the literature on water conflicts. While contemporary water conflict scholars
(Zeitoun and Warner 2006; Davidson-Harden, Naidoo and Harden 2007; Loftus and Lumsden
2008; Selby and Hoffmann 2014) have expanded this literature by incorporating Gramsci’s
(1971) notion of hegemony to explain the political and economic dimensions of accumulation
processes, neo-Gramscian frameworks stop short of framing spatiotemporal fixes as water
accumulation strategies. Closely related, Loftus (2006) applies Harvey’s concept of
spatiotemporal fixes to explain the capital accumulation strategies of Umgeni Water, a water
supplier to Durban, South Africa. Here, like Bond (2004), Loftus situates market expansion in
South Africa as part and parcel of the neoliberal logic to search for proftability and capital
accumulation wherever possible. Loftus explains that in the 1990s, Umgeni Water sought to
construct new infrastructural projects and expand distribution into rural markets so as to increase
bulk water sales. While Lofton (2006) successfully confirms that water suppliers are using
Harvey’s concept of spatiotemporal fixes to resolve crises of underaccumulation, the South
African case study is fundamentally different from the ACF Basin case study in which the
spatiotemporal fix, alongside other strategies, has been used to facilitate water accumulation as a
precondition for capital accumulation. The framework adopted in this study necessarily
problematizes the ‘natural’ existence of a neo-Gramscian hydro-hegemony by applying Harvey’s
concept of spatiotemporal fixes to explain how water simultaneously produces political and
economic power and how power produces water security. By problematizing the existence of a
hydro-hegemony and interrogating how hegemonic power is produced and manifest with respect
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to water conflicts, this study is poised to make several valuable contributions to the literatures
discussed below.

Contributions to Scholarship

Spatiotemporal Fixes as Water Accumulation Strategies

The findings of this study extend the works of David Harvey (1981, 2003), Jessop (2000,
2006), Arrighi (2004), and Brenner and Theodore (2002) on spatiotemporal fixes as crisisavoidance-strategies to the study of interstate water conflicts. Here, this study contributes a new
way to understand spatiotemporal fixes, which is similar to that of Bolin, Collins and Darby
(2008), who applied the framework to explore place-based water conflicts in the Arizona Central
Highlands. However, whereas Bolin, Collins and Darby explore the ways in which water
infrastructure projects are used to defer groundwater depletion into the future, this study extends
spatiotemporal fixes to include strategies to: (a) delay the equitable resolution of a 25-year crisis
of water scarcity by negotiating in bad faith and, (b) geographically expand the Atlanta
metropolitan region via suburbanization and annexation in order to develop facts on the ground.
By employing these two complementary strategies, metropolitan Atlanta was simultaneously
able to avoid confronting the natural limits of its excessive water consumption while also making
it politically unthinkable to and economically unlikely to cut off the water supply to a rapidly
growing metropolitan region.
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Production of Economic Space and Regionality

This single-case study makes a valuable empirical contribution to the literature on the
uneven production of space and nature, especially the work of David Harvey (1982, 1989, 2001,
2003), Neil Smith (1984, 2007), Erik Swyngedouw (2000, 2004, 2005b) and Maria Kaika (2003,
2004) by extending their concepts and theories into the study of environmental geography,
especially water conflicts. By examining the ACF conflict through an economic-environmentalgeographical (EEG) lens, this study provides empirical support to Harvey and Smith, who
suggest that the production of economic space is mediated by the capitalist production of nature.
Borrowing from Smith’s (1984, 2007) work on the uneven development of space and Harvey’s
(1982, 1989, 2001, 2003) work on the regional dynamics of capital accumulation, this study
demonstrates that uneven production and allocation of the waters of the ACF Basin, vis-à-vis
water competition, has worked to secure a locational advantage for metropolitan Atlanta, thereby
making the region a suitable site for capital accumulation. Accordingly, this study shows how the
twin logics of capital accumulation and urbanization in the American South are contingent upon
the ability of dominant metropolitan regions to successfully outcompete, out-litigate and/or outnegotiate riparian competitors for access to water resources. By providing a precise historical
account of the complexity of the water conflict over the last 25 years, this study systematically
connects the various failures and delays of the water conflict to a number of interconnected
causes, notably the institutionalization of water competition, the neoliberalization of water
management and the underlying logic of capitalist regionalization that overwhelmingly serves
the commercial and residential interests of metropolitan Atlanta.
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Metabolism of Water

The findings of this study also complement and extend the works of Kaika (2003, 2004)
and Swyngedouw (2004), which use an urban metabolic approach to examine the power relations
embedded in, but also fetishized by, urban technological networks (Kaika and Swyngedouw
2000). Whereas Kaika and Swyngedouw limit the metabolic framework to the urban scale, this
study extends their work on the uneven metabolism of water to the regional and interstate scales.
For Kaika and Swyngedouw, power relations are materially embedded in the production of urban
technological networks which, at once, provide secure flows of water to rich urban enclaves and
simultaneously exclude or unevenly include the urban poor and powerless from these networks.
Accordingly, this study contributes to the contested spatiality of water metabolism by
demonstrating how regional and interstate water conflicts produce: (a) hegemonic regions, which
are able to secure access to water networks and (b) dispossessed regions, which are excluded
from water networks.
For the American South, which is characterized by a high degree of decentralized water
management authority, examining the power relations embedded within the regional metabolism
of water offers a distinct advantage and opportunity over the urban scale. First, by theorizing the
ACF conflict as a power struggle between regional riparians, this avoids privileging the urban
scale as the de facto scale where water inequities materialize. Accordingly, this study avoids
falling into the “local trap” (Brown and Purcell 2005; Purcell 2006) and, rather than placing the
city at the “centre of political analyses of socioecological sustainability” (Davison 2007, 263),
recognizes that the competitive logic for water materializes across all geographical scales of
analysis and governance.
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Rescaling of Water Governance

Finally, this study also corroborates the findings of Bakker and Cook (2011), which
suggest that efforts to decentralize water management authority can result in a highly fragmented
policy framework with governance overlaps, gaps and semi-autonomous governing bodies. For
Bakker and Cook, the appropriate institutional and geographical scale of water governance lies
somewhere between “subsidiarity” (meaning decentralized, localized water management
authority) and “harmonization” (meaning centralized water management authority). It is by
negotiating this tension that water users determine how best to balance: (a) decision-making and
policy implementation, and (b) standardization of laws pertaining to water production and
distribution and ecological and economic health. As an example, Bakker (2003) uses the French
regulatory approach (Aglietta 1979; Lipietz 1987) to explain how governance changes and
restructuring of the English and Welsh water industries led regulatory bodies to adopt neoliberal
management practices. Future research on the ACF conflict may benefit from applying a similar
regulatory (Bakker 2003; Gandy 1997) or institutional (Martin 2003; Amin 2004; Gibbs 2006)
framework to explore how USACE’s changing capacity to manage the basin constitutes a
putative and strategic effort to institutionalize commercialization of the ACF Basin (Bakker
2007, 441). However, for Bakker (2003) and Bakker and Cook (2011), neoliberalism’s tendency
toward subsidiarity means that water governance responsibilities often devolve to multiple
stakeholders, who may have vastly divergent geoeconomic, geopolitical and geoecological
interests.
In the context of the ACF conflict, policy fragmentation resulted from the transfer of
water management authority from USACE, a centralized institution with demonstrated capacities
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to govern interstate water bodies, to the states, which individually lack the state capacity to
equitably manage the ACF Basin. As the current case demonstrates, federal power was
dismantled through decentralization and roll-back neoliberalism (Peck and Tickell 2002), which
compelled the three states to restructure the scale of water governance in terms of the capitalist
logic of the market. This new competitive system overwhelmingly favored the commercial and
residential interests of metropolitan Atlanta.
Many advocates of governance decentralization (Bardhan 2002; Ribot 2002; Larson and
Ribot 2004) often assume, incorrectly, that a decentralized system transfers water management
authority from the few to the many. However, this claim is contradicted by the findings of this
study, which demonstrate the relative ease with which the State of Georgia manipulated the
competitive process of the compact negotiations with Florida and Alabama. In this context, this
study also demonstrates that, as a result of decentralization, legal and other institutional decisionmaking processes governing water production and distribution can easily be hijacked by regional
hegemons. For, although the riparian states were supposed to negotiate the terms of the
compact, the process was marked by competing regional interests: Georgia fighting for
metropolitan Atlanta’s municipal water supply; Florida fighting for Apalachicola Bay’s estuarine
supply; and, Alabama fighting for water to develop a regional economy in the eastern corridor of
the state. Of course, as a result of the vast power inequities among the regions, decentralization
produced an overtly undemocratic negotiation process. Subsequently, metropolitan Atlanta and
the State of Georgia were able to seize control of the ACF Basin from Florida and Alabama.
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Limitations of the Study

This study encountered several major obstacles with regard to data accessibility.
Although there is a significant body of literature related to the ACF conflict, many of these
studies are: (a) overly quantitative; (b) lack specificity and grounding in the political economy of
state restructuring vis-à-vis neoliberalism, and the urban and regional dynamics of U.S.
capitalism; and, (c) when they do adopt a theoretical framework, it is often legalistic or narrowly
economic with very little engagement with the environmental and geographical science
literatures (Peterson and Wallick 2006; Wolf, et al. 1999; Jordan and Wolf 2006; Dellapenna
2006). Despite the proliferation of quantitative studies, there is surprisingly little in-depth
qualitative and theoretically informed studies of the causes of this enduring conflict. One of the
reasons for this gap is that the 2009 and 2010 confidentiality orders by the U.S. District Courts of
the Northern District of Alabama and the Middle District of Florida, respectively, greatly restrict
access to all data related to litigation and compact negotiations. The 2010 U.S. District Court
Order stipulates that:

“[t]he ongoing negotiations among the three States of Alabama, Florida and Georgia
concerning the issues presented by this litigation are, and shall be kept,
confidential…This Order extends to all documents, data or other materials prepared in
anticipation of or exchanged in the course of such negotiations and to all statements
made during negotiations” (3:07-md-00001 [PAM/JRK]).
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The confidentiality order seriously limited the ability to recruit research participants for
the study and also limited the depth of interviews. During interviews, participants often declined
to speak at length about potentially sensitive topics and, at times, avoided questions but
suggested that their opinions could be surmised from the content of published documents and
reports. For the purpose of using interview conversations to add depth to theory (Flick 1992),
these responses made it difficult to triangulate research findings. Furthermore, the confidentiality
orders complicated the initial sampling design for the study. As mentioned in chapter 6, the
“gatekeeping” method (Groger, Mayberry and Straker 1999; Johnston and Sabin 2010) turned
out to be an ineffective sampling technique due to the clandestine nature of the compact
negotiations. In fact, several potential participants utilized “gatekeeping” as a way to distance
themselves from the study and either (a) declined to be interviewed, while at the same time
offering the names of others whom they believed would participate in the study, or (b) agreed to
be interviewed, but declined to offer the names of others. Ultimately, this study found that the
confidentiality order significantly limited the availability of interview and other pertinent data
because research participants often appeared reluctant to both discuss certain topics and also to
refer others to participate.
There is a substantive gap in the research literature on empirical and practicable strategies
for overcoming the specific methodological barrier of ‘gag orders,’ which prevent research
participants from discussing certain topics. While the condition of a ‘gag order’ is a highly
specific research barrier, general strategies to overcome participants’ reluctance and resistance
to discuss certain topics have been theorized in the qualitative research literature. For instance,
Becker and Geer (1970) suggest that getting participants to open up is one of the most difficult
challenges researchers will face in the field due to the absence of a clear strategy to cope.
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According to them, one possible coping strategy would be to simply make informed guesses of
participants’ potential responses:

“frequently, people do not tell an interviewer all the things he [sic] might want to know.
This may be because they do not want to, feeling that to speak of some particular subject
would be impolitic, impolite, or insensitive, because they do not think to and because the
interviewer does not have enough information to inquire into the matter, or because they
are not able to” (ibid, 78).

“researchers working with interview materials, while they are often conscious of these
problems, cannot cope with them so well. If they are to deal with matters of this kind it
must be by inference. They can only make an educated guess about the things which go
unspoken in the interview; it may be a very good guess, but it must be a guess” (ibid, 79).

Aside from Becker and Geer’s (1970) suggestion to make educated guesses, other coping
strategies are similarly problematic. For Adler and Adler (2002), without a willing participant to
engage, any coping strategy will result in “significant data gaps” and a poor understanding of the
topic (516). However, getting participants to open up under the conditions of a ‘gag order’ is not
likely considering the ‘sensitive nature’ of the data and the potential threat to participants for
violating the confidentiality order (Johnson and Clarke 2003, 421, 422). While there is no sure
way to overcome participants’ reluctance, resistance or inability to open up about a sensitive
topic, Corbin and Morse (2003) suggest using unstructured interactive interviews may encourage
participants to reveal information they might not have otherwise offered when prompted. Using
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unstructured interactive interviews allows research participants to assume a greater degree of
control over the stories they reveal during the research process (Cassell 1980; Fontana and Frey
1998). During an unstructured interview, the researcher will often prompt a response by
establishing an opening ‘grand tour question’ (Spradley 1979) to determine where the narrative
will begin. However, from that point on, the participant will then determine where the narrative
will proceed. In the coming year, this issue will require more attention in the geographical and
environmental sciences at a time when progressively more environmentally important
information is being categorized as “sensitive” by state agencies (AAUP 2003).
In addition to the problem of confidentiality, this study also encountered problems related
to the limited accessibility of public records and documents. Chapter 2 discussed how the
USACE Mobile District, unlike many other USACE district libraries, does not provide reference
materials to its customers unless accompanied by a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.
Roberts (2005) suggests that although FOIA is discursively promoted as a way to ‘empower
citizens’ by balancing information asymmetries between citizens and government, but
bureaucratic agencies often employ techniques of ‘message discipline’ to preserve a degree of
secrecy and confidentiality. In order to deal with the problem of limited accessibility,
participants were recruited from the USACE Mobile District using snowball sampling and cold
call techniques to provide source materials relevant to the study. However, in one instance where
(a) weekly water demand projections from metropolitan Atlanta’s water utilities and (b) weekly
Buford Dam release reports were needed, it was not possible to access the necessary data without
submitting a FOIA. Consistent with USACE Mobile District protocol, a FOIA request was
completed and submitted to the agency’s FOIA specialist, Keri Schenter. However, a ‘no
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records’ determination was returned. Figures 26 and 27 below show the text of the records
request and the ‘no records’ determination returned by the Corps.
After the request was denied, Ann Taylor, the USACE District Counsel, and Keri
Schenter were contacted in order to determine the reason for the denial. In a personal
conversation (January 9, 2014), they stated that metropolitan Atlanta’s weekly water supply
requests could not be provided because the requested data are not the property of USACE, but
rather belong to one of metropolitan Atlanta’s water agencies. They advised that the Atlanta
Regional Commission (ARC) might have access to those records, but cautioned that they were
unsure and, in fact, other regional water agencies may maintain the records and not ARC.
Several hours after the phone conversation ended, a high-ranking water manager for the USACE
Department of Legislative and Public Affairs, who was interviewed for this study, provided the
Buford Dam release reports. However, in a second attempt to locate and access metropolitan
Atlanta’s weekly water supply requests, an ARC communications specialist supervisor, who was
also interviewed for this study, was contacted. In a personal conversation (January 9, 2013), she
stated that a small fire had occurred in the ARC office and may have damaged or destroyed
many of the departmental records, including the weekly supply requests.
Consistent with the findings of Roberts (2005), there is an undeniable aura of
bureaucratic secrecy, which pervades the USACE Mobile District. From the Corps’ response to
the FOIA request it is clear that records of metropolitan Atlanta’s weekly water supply requests
are maintained by the agency. However, the District’s FOIA staff remained firm in their
determination not to share this information and ultimately did not provide the records.
Consequently, because the USACE Mobile District library is supposedly a repository for
publicly available records, reports and water data, it is troubling that institutional controls
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actively discourage legitimate research efforts to fully expose the historiography of the ACF
conflict. Furthermore, USACE’s data restrictions in combination with the 2009 and 2010
confidentiality orders create a chilling effect on any independent research, thereby virtually
ensuring that all qualitative studies of the ACF conflict will be significantly limited in several
key respects.
Given that the water conflict is still far from over, future research on the ACF conflict
must take these limitations into serious consideration. As a primary stakeholder in the conflict,
the water research community will have to explore collective alternatives with which to engage
the USACE Mobile District despite the agency’s tight control over data. It may also be beneficial
to allocate more time to cultivating and recruiting participants at water agencies and less time
attempting to secure access to confidential records and documents, which ultimately may not be
accessible, or which may be heavily redacted. Taking the time to gain access to more
strategically placed participants may add depth to theory and allow for appropriate
methodological triangulation. Hopefully, these suggested tactics will allow future studies to
avoid the troubles associated with navigating the bureaucratic minefield which is the USACE
Mobile District.

Suggestions for Future Research

Congruent with contemporary literatures on the geography of water, future research
related to the ACF conflict may contribute to broader debates on the evolving nature of
neoliberalization (England and Ward 2007; Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010; Peck 2011),
particularly with respect to the refinement and intensification of neoliberal resource management
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(Bakker 2003, 2013). By focusing attention on the fiscal, ideological and social processes at
work within the USACE Mobile District, as a result of decentralization and the 2011 Appellate
Court ruling, future research may apply an institutional (Jessop 1995; Goodwin and Painter
1996; Tickell and Peck 1992; Amin 2004) or regulatory (Bakker 2003; Bakker and Cook 2011;
Gandy 1997) framework to determine how USACE’s regulatory and management mandates help
to mobilize capital flows to the metropolitan Atlanta region. Alternatively, by applying a
regulation theory framework similar to Bakker’s (2003) exploration of the English and Welsh
experience with governance restructuring, future research may explore the ways in which the
distributional principle of “highest and best use” constitutes a strategic push toward
neoliberalization. At the same time, future research might investigate how the discursive
representation of decentralization as a progressive and ‘democratic’ water governance innovation
likely softened metropolitan Atlanta’s primitive accumulation of the ACF Basin (Roberts 2008;
Swyngedouw 2005b; Mansfield 2007; Sneddon 2007).
A second possible direction for future research is related to contemporary literatures on
water governance innovations implemented in response to management challenges (Martins, et
al. 2013; Bakker and Cook 2011). Future studies on the ACF conflict will benefit from
theorizing the ways in which popular protests can effect positive governance changes (Bakker
2007; Perreault 2006, 2008). While decentralization and processes of democratic water
governance have both been critiqued here, there still exists the potential for democratic water
governance to transform the hegemonic processes of water production and distribution (Castro
2007). Whether or not the State of Florida can singlehandedly continue to challenge metropolitan
Atlanta’s hegemony of water distribution remains to be seen. However, should Florida be
unsuccessful, the current conditions of uneven water scarcity throughout the ACF Basin avail
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opportunities for alternative governance innovations like participatory democracy, or Georgia’s
community response program recently proposed in HB 549, which empowers communities to
self-monitor surface water consumption (Georgia General Assembly 2014). According to Hickey
and Mohan (2005), alternative participatory approaches to resource governance often arise out of
crises which illuminate the politics of underdevelopment and exclusion. Similarly, for Griffin
(1981) and Slater (1989), it is not decentralization which begets democratic resource governance,
but rather, the circumstances under which decentralization occurs. An exploration of these issue
offers a profitable terrain for future research.
The creation of the ACF Stakeholders (ACFS) group was one such innovation which
arose from the public’s dismay over the compact negotiation process. In September of 2009, in
response to the stalled compact negotiations and seemingly irreconcilable differences among the
riparian states, the ACFS was created to:

“change the operation and management of the ACF Basin to achieve equitable solutions
among stakeholders that balance economic, ecological, and social values [and] viable
solutions that ensure that the entire ACF Basin is a sustainable resource for current and
future generations” (ACF Stakeholders 2013).

Initially comprised of 50 members that represent the interests of all stakeholder groups affected
by the ACF conflict, the ACFS emerged to serve as a model for compact negotiations to follow
and shortly thereafter expanded to hundreds of members. The idea was that, if the ACFS could
formulate a politically-sound allocation formula, this would form the basis from which Chief
Negotiators could foment discussions (Personal conversation with an ACFS board member,
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April 25, 2013). The potentialities and limitations of this group, and others, could offer another
fruitful avenue of research in the years to come.

Figure 26: FOIA Request Submitted to USACE Mobile District.
Source: USACE Mobile District 2013.
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Figure 27: USACE Mobile District FOIA: A 'no records' Determination was Returned.
Source: USACE Mobile District 2013.
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It is evident that the ACFS model did not aid in an equitable resolution of the ACF
conflict. However, popular protests organized along the lines of truly democratic and
participatory interests groups can inform the literature on inclusionary and exclusionary water
governance. While currently more symbolic than material, the ACFS group allows water
managers and society at large to imagine feasible alternatives to the conservative and bourgeois
‘governance-beyond-the-state movement,’ which is discursively dressed up as participatory
democracy (Pares 2011; Jessop 1998, 2002; Swyngedouw 2000, 2005b, 2007). Future studies on
the ACF conflict could benefit from exploring the ways in which popular protests can effect
material changes in the politics of water inclusion and exclusion. Theorized in this way,
inclusionary governance practices such as truly democractic and participatory decision-making,
constitute a formidable means of not only resisting neoliberalization, but also pursuing ‘water
peace’ (Allan 2002).
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